Leonard v. Pope
| Decision Date | 22 April 1873 |
| Citation | 27 Mich. 145 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jason Leonard v. Sarah J. Pope |
Submitted on Briefs April 16, 1873.
Error to Oakland Circuit.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
W. B Jackson and M. E. Crofoot, for plaintiff in error.
Patterson & Patterson, for defendant in error.
The defendant in error, a married woman, sued plaintiff in error in slander, the declaration setting forth in separate counts two slanderous charges. The first count was for a charge imputing unchastity. The second was for a charge of theft and dishonesty.
It appeared by the proofs that she was the wife of one Edgar Pope. Charges were asked and refused, claiming that she could not recover in this action: First, because her husband did not join with her; and, second, because the marriage was proved by repute and not by strict proof.
These objections were frivolous. It was decided in Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. R. 215, that no joinder of husband and wife is necessary where the wife sues for a personal grievance or cause of action. And there is no authority that has been referred to, or which we are aware of, that requires the highest evidence of marriage in suits not directly involving the marriage relation as a part of the main issue.
It is also alleged as error that the defendant below was not allowed, upon a question of impeachment, to cross-examine a sustaining witness concerning statements in the neighborhood about the honesty of the witness sought to be impeached. This ruling was proper. The question of dishonesty has not been allowed to be considered as an issue upon impeachment. Very likely a man who steals may lie also; but there can be no occasion to enlarge the rule, because he is quite as likely to get such a reputation as he deserves for want of veracity as for want of honesty. And if he has not obtained a bad reputation for truth, it would be a very unreasonable assumption to claim that he ought to have it. The whole doctrine of impeachment, although necessary in many cases, is so often resorted to where the local gossip turns out to be unfounded and malicious, that no good purpose would be subserved by opening the door any wider for the reception of such rumors.
The first count in the declaration charged Leonard with asserting that "the Popes (that is, the husband and the father-in-law of defendant in error), are all thieves, and their wives are whores." The evidence was, that in a conversation in which the Popes (father and son), were the subjects of discussion, Leonard said, among other things, "I live right between them, and have known them for years; the men are thieves and their wives are whores, and I can prove it." The charge here, so far as it relates to the plaintiff below, was literally, as well as substantially, identical with the proof, and the objection that the evidence did not support the count is not well taken.
Certain requests were made asking that the jury be instructed that the testimony of witnesses concerning the slander averred in the second count could not be applied to the first; and error is alleged upon their refusal. The court, if they were refused at all, must have refused them as separate charges because sufficiently covered by the charge given, which was much more explicit and intelligible for the same purpose than a charge in the language of the requests would have been.
The only other questions relate to the proof, which was admitted, of several repeated utterances of the same slander set up in the second count. These repetitions, although at different times and to different persons, were almost identical in language, and all related to the same thing.
The court refused to charge in accordance with the following request: "That in determining whether the defendant ever uttered or published the words charged in the declaration, the jury have no right to consider the testimony of any of the witnesses, except that of William Burk, Calvary Richmond, and Melvin D. Guthrie, as the testimony of all the other of the plaintiff's witnesses was only offered or received to show malice." And an exception was based on the charge, because it did not exclude these proofs from consideration for the same reason.
The language of the request is open to criticism, as literally asking to have those proofs thrown out entirely, as they all bore upon the same slander. But the object was, undoubtedly, to raise the question how far, and for what purpose, such proofs may be used.
There has been much controversy in different courts and at different times, in relation to the admission of proof of other instances of defamation than those declared on. In some courts the declaration has been required to be very special. In others a much more general form has been allowed. The prevailing doctrine has long been that there should be no straining of any rule beyond reason, and that these cases should, like other actions of tort, be governed by such principles as shall be best calculated to work out substantial...
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Redmond v. Heller
...Court long ago recognized that each publication of a libelous or slanderous statement was independently actionable. See Leonard v. Pope , 27 Mich. 145 (1873). In Leonard , the Court held that a plaintiff could bring a separate action against a publisher for each printed newspaper containing......
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Mosier v. Carney
...for slander, and for alienation of her husband's affections against others than her husband. Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215; Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145; Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich. 371, 62 N.W. 833. At the same time, it has held that the wife could not enter into a partnership or other busin......
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People v. Dawsey
...of a witness by proof of reputation. In such a case the proof of reputation is confined to reputation for veracity. Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145 (1873); People v. Abbott, 97 Mich. (484) 488 (56 N.W. 862 (1893)). The principles governing the admissibility of testimony in the two classes of ......
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Julian v. Kansas City Star Co.
... ... action. 3 Sutherland on Damages, 648; Bigelow v ... Sprague, 140 Mass. 427; Leonard v. Pope, 27 ... Mich. 149; Root v. Loundes, 6 Hill 518; Enos v ... Enos, 135 N.Y. 611; Townshend on Slander & Libel (4 ... Ed.), p. 561; ... ...