Leonard v. Schall
| Decision Date | 24 April 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,615 - (40) |
| Citation | 146 N.W. 1104,125 Minn. 291 |
| Parties | JAMES A. LEONARD v. THOMAS D. SCHALL |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $3,240.94 for professional services as attorney at law. The answer among other matters specifically denied that defendant ever agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $50 per day for time spent out of his office and in court, and $25 per day for office services, and alleged an agreement that defendant should pay $25 for each full day for time spent by plaintiff in court, and pay $10 for each full day of time spent by plaintiff in defendant's business for office service, and that plaintiff performed services for defendant under such agreement. The case was tried before Hale, J., who at the close of plaintiff's case denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action, and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of defendant. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
New trial -- document in jury room.
1. Where at the close of a trial the attorneys for both parties acting jointly, collected the exhibits for delivery to the jury, and both, supposing that a certain package contained exhibits only, permitted it to be given to the jury without examining its contents, although both had an opportunity to do so, the discovery after verdict that, unknown to either party, such package, in fact, contained a document not offered in evidence, will not justify granting a new trial at least unless it be made to appear that such document improperly influenced the jury.
Verdict sustained by evidence.
2. An examination of the evidence shows that it is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Francis B. Hart, for appellant.
Freeman P. Lane, John Ott and Burdette C. Thayer, for respondent.
Defendant is a practicing attorney. Having become blind, he employs other attorneys to appear in court for him and try his cases. He has quite an extensive practice in the line of personal injury litigation, and, for about a year, employed Francis B. Hart, another practicing attorney, to try his personal injury lawsuits. Mr. Hart tried a number of such suits and received various payments from time to time on account of his services; but a disagreement arising as to the amount of compensation to which he was entitled, the arrangement between them was terminated. Thereafter Mr. Hart assigned his claim for the compensation due him to the plaintiff, and this suit was brought to recover an alleged unpaid balance thereof.
The complaint alleged an express contract to pay Hart $50 per day for court work and $25 per day for office work, and also alleged that the services rendered were reasonably worth those amounts. The answer admitted the employment, but alleged that the services were performed under an express contract whereby Hart was to receive $25 per day for court work and $10 per day for office work, and also alleged that he had been paid in full for all services rendered. At the opening of the trial, defendant moved that plaintiff be required to elect whether he would proceed upon the theory of an express contract or upon quantum meruit, and plaintiff, apparently without waiting for a ruling by the court, announced that he would rely upon quantum meruit. At the close of the trial the court instructed the jury to the effect that plaintiff, having elected to rely upon quantum meruit, could not recover in this action if defendant had established that the services in question were rendered under the special contract alleged by defendant. The jury were directed to determine whether such contract had been made, and, if they found that it had been made, to return a verdict for defendant. They were directed, in case they failed to find that such contract had been made, to determine the reasonable value of the services rendered, to deduct therefrom the amount of the payments made to Hart, and, if any balance remained, to return a verdict for plaintiff therefor. They returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial and appealed from an order denying it.
Plaintiff does not question the correctness of the instructions given the jury and concedes that they have become the law of the case. Neither does he question the correctness of any of the rulings made by the court during the trial. Only two questions are presented for decision. (1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict; (2) whether a new trial should be granted for the reason that a certain memorandum which had not been offered in evidence was in the possession of the jury during their deliberations.
1. Two ultimate questions of fact were submitted to the jury for determination: First, whether the services were rendered under the special contract asserted by defendant; second, if the services were not rendered under such special contract, whether the reasonable value thereof exceeded the amount already paid to Hart therefor. If the evidence justified the jury in finding either of these issues in favor of defendant, it is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
It is conceded that defendant and Mr. Hart met on March 23, 1911, and entered into the arrangement under which the services in controversy were performed. Plaintiff contends, and presented evidence tending to prove, that it was agreed at this interview that Hart should try certain cases then ready for trial before any definite contract should be made as to compensation or the performance of further services, in order that Hart might inform himself concerning the work which would be required of him and determine whether he would care to continue it, and that defendant might have an opportunity to judge whether his services were satisfactory and likely to continue so to be; that after the trial of these cases Hart insisted that his fees should be $50 per day for court work and $25 per day for office work; that defendant refused to agree to these fees; and that in fact no agreement was ever reached as to the compensation which Hart should receive.
On the other hand, defendant, in his testimony as to what occurred at the interview of March 23, 1911, states: ...
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