Leonetti v. Boone
Decision Date | 31 August 1954 |
Citation | 74 So.2d 551 |
Parties | LEONETTI v. BOONE. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Arthur James Sims, Stuart, and Mizell & Carmichael, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Earnest, Lewis, Smith & Jones, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The appeal is from an order granting a new trial in favor of the defendant in a personal injury action.
Peter Anthony Leonetti, as plaintiff below, sued C. A. Boone to recover damages resulting from the alleged negligent operation of a motor truck owned by Boone, which was at the time of a collision with plaintiff's car being operated 'through [Boone's] certain agent and employee, one Ollie Haynes.' In his answer to the complaint the defendant Boone denied that the said Haynes was the agent or employee of the defendant or was operating the motor truck with defendant's knowledge and consent, either express or implied; or was operating the vehicle in any way connected with the business or interest of the defendant.
The parties went to trial on the issue of negligence vel non, and on the issue which we have stated above. At the trial all of the evidence was to the effect that the driver of the defendant's truck was not the agent or servant of the employer; and that the truck was not being driven with the defendant's knowledge or consent, either express or implied. Moreover, there was no evidence introduced at the trial to support the theory of entrustment of the vehicle to the driver.
After the evidence was in the trial court charged the jury, among other things, as follows:
'* * * I have told you that the defendant or the owner of the automobile must overcome the presumption that one driving his automobile is driving with his consent, must overcome that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the driver did not have the consent of the owner, either express or implied; that burden is upon the defendant. * * *'
The verdict by the jury was in favor of the plaintiff. Subsequently, on motion of the defendant, the trial court granted a new trial, stating in his order:
'The conclusion is inescapable that grievous error was committed in giving the charge complained of. * * *
The sole question on the appeal is in respect to the propriety of the order granting the new trial.
We find no error in the order appealed from. The presumption to which the trial court referred in its charge derives from section 51.12, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A., which provides:
'In any action brought by a person for damages claimed to have been sustained by reason of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a person other than the owner thereof * * * the plaintiff therein, with respect to the element of liability of said owner for such acts of said driver, shall be required only to prove by competent evidence the ownership of said vehicle and the driver thereof at the time of the alleged negligent operation of the same, to establish a presumption of liability of said owner for any such negligent acts of said driver in his operation of such vehicle, said presumption being subject to rebuttal by said owner by competent evidence within the limits of the facts set forth in any such special plea or pleas.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The general rule in respect to the effect of a presumption such as is here involved may be stated as follows:
'A presumption of law which arises upon the pleading or during the course of the trial after the introduction of evidence may aid a party in the discharge of the burden of proof cast upon him and shift to his adversary the burden of explanation or of going on with the case, but does not, as a general rule, shift the burden of proof; a presumption simply changes the order of proof to the extent that one upon whom it bears must meet or explain it away, and when such an explanation is made, the duty is upon the plaintiff to take up the burden which the law has cast upon him and sustain the issue by a preponderance of the evidence. A presumption which operates in the plaintiff's favor casts upon the defendant the burden of producing evidence to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case, and not the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial. * * * ...
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