Lepard v. State, 17A03-8812-CR-381
Decision Date | 22 May 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 17A03-8812-CR-381,17A03-8812-CR-381 |
Citation | 542 N.E.2d 1347 |
Parties | Jeffrey L. LEPARD, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Frederic L. Romero, Romero & Thonert, Auburn, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-appellant Jeffrey L. Lepard appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting law enforcement, fleeing, a Class A misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor; resisting law enforcement, police officer, a Class A misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated having a previous conviction, a Class D felony.
Lepard presents the following issues for this Court's consideration:
(1) whether the trial court erred in denying Lepard's motion to suppress evidence; and
(2) whether the trial court erred in denying Lepard's requests for a directed verdict of acquittal.
The facts relevant to this appeal disclose that on June 19, 1987 Officer Thornsbearry observed Lepard on his motorcycle fail to come to a complete stop, disregard a traffic signal, turn right, go left of center and accelerate enough to bring the front end up off the road. Thornsbearry followed Lepard eight blocks attempting to obtain the license number. Thornsbearry never activated her lights or siren. Thornsbearry observed Lepard pull into a driveway so she parked across the street and approached Lepard in his driveway to discuss the traffic infractions. Thornsbearry asked for Lepard's operator's license and registration but Lepard refused. Thornsbearry informed Lepard that she had seen him commit traffic infractions. Thornsbearry determined from Lepard's attitude, the smell of alcohol, and his weaving while standing that he was intoxicated. Thornsbearry pushed a button on her radio to request back-up. Lepard started walking towards the house and Thornsbearry asked him to stop but Lepard refused.
Sergeant Kaiser then arrived at the scene. Kaiser also requested Lepard to stop but Lepard responded by shouting obscenities. Lepard entered his house and Kaiser and Thornsbearry followed. Lepard told them to leave his house once again using vulgar language. Kaiser requested Lepard's license and registration several times but Lepard, responding with vulgarities, refused. Kaiser told Thornsbearry to radio for additional assistance and State Trooper Crabtree arrived. Lepard later produced his license and Thornsbearry ran a check on it.
Kaiser advised Lepard that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and Lepard had to be restrained by all three officers to be handcuffed. Lepard was twice given an implied consent advisement but did not agree to take a breathalizer test.
Lepard was charged by Thornsbearry for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and resisting law enforcement. Kaiser charged Lepard with disorderly conduct and resisting law enforcement.
At trial appellant moved to suppress all evidence that was obtained from the officers' entry onto Lepard's premises and later into his home, which the trial court denied. After the State rested, Lepard renewed his motion to suppress which again was denied by the trial court. The trial court also denied Lepard's motions for a directed verdict.
A trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress will be reviewed as a sufficiency matter, focusing on whether there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the denial. In doing so, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Winegar v. State (1983), Ind.App., 455 N.E.2d 398, 401.
Appellant contends that all evidence obtained after the police officers entered onto Lepard's premises and then into his house should have been suppressed since Lepard's constitutional rights were violated.
After Thornsbearry saw Lepard commit two traffic infractions, she continuously pursued him attempting to get a license number so that in the event that Lepard would flee when she activated her lights, the vehicle could be traced. However, Lepard pulled into his driveway before she could get the license number. Continuing her investigation into this situation, she followed him so that she could question him and obtain his identification. Lepard's constitutional rights were not violated by Thornsbearry's actions. Thornsbearry had a legitimate purpose for walking onto Lepard's premises. She wanted to ask him some questions about the traffic infractions she had witnessed. There is no rule that in furtherance of her duty to conduct a legitimate investigation into a situation she can only question a person in a public place. She has committed no constitutional violation by walking up to Lepard with the honest intent of asking questions of him.
After questioning and observing Lepard, Thornsbearry had probable cause to believe he was intoxicated and had committed the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated in her view. When he proceeded into his house disregarding Thornsbearry's and Kaiser's requests to stop, the officers had probable cause to believe Lepard was fleeing which constituted the misdemeanor of resisting law enforcement.
Appellant argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the officers entered his house without a warrant.
State v. Blake (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 548, 551.
The court in Blake, supra, 468 N.E.2d at 553 held that a police officer in continuous pursuit of a perpetrator of a crime committed in the officer's presence, be it a felony or a misdemeanor, must be allowed to follow a suspect into his home if he is fleeing there. The act of fleeing while being pursued by a police officer creates an exigent circumstance necessary to effectuate an...
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