Lerma v. County of Orange
Decision Date | 13 July 2004 |
Docket Number | No. G032120.,G032120. |
Citation | 120 Cal.App.4th 709,15 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Richard LERMA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Allen, Mullings & Allen and Debra E. Allen, Santa Ana, for Defendant and Respondent County of Orange.
Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, Steven J. Rothans, Los Angeles, and Jill W. Babington for Defendant and Respondent City of Rancho Santa Margarita.
There are times when respect for the human condition dictates a compassionate response to a request for a continuance. This is one of those times.
In the case before us, plaintiffs' counsel was served with a motion for summary judgment on the day he was admitted to the hospital to have his cancerous bladder removed. The attorney was unaware that he had been served with the motion until the day after he was released from the hospital. He then had two business days in which to obtain affidavits, and prepare and file an opposition to the motion, or lose his clients' case. Even though the attorney was in no condition to work, he managed to timely file a perfunctory opposition, together with a gut-wrenching request for a continuance. He was largely nonspecific as to the particular affidavits he might file, and the explicit facts he might adduce in opposition to the motion, if only he had the time to do so. He was, however, painfully specific about the reasons why he was in a position to be no more complete at that moment in time.
The trial court applied Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), to deny the continuance request, and thereafter put an end to plaintiffs' case, by granting summary judgment in defendants' favor. It did not consider whether the request, even though shy of compliance with section 437c, subdivision (h), showed good cause for a continuance.
Defendants argue that the attorney should have already had on hand all evidence necessary to oppose the motion, and that, therefore, a continuance should have been unnecessary. Defendants seem to overlook the fact that, even if all the necessary evidence was contained in files located only 10 feet away from the attorney's desk, there are times when walking those 10 feet, lifting each individual file, and searching through documentation to find each specific item of evidence, is simply beyond human ability. The fact that the incapacitated attorney filed anything at all was nothing short of heroic. The request he filed unquestionably showed good cause for a continuance and the court abused its discretion in denying the request. We reverse and remand.
Garrett Lerma was killed in an automobile accident. In December 2001, his father, mother and sister, plaintiffs Richard, Deborah and Ashlie Lerma (the Lermas), filed a wrongful death complaint against the County of Orange, the City of Rancho Santa Margarita, and Morgan A. Pasqualetto (Pasqualetto), one of the drivers involved in the accident.
In the complaint, the Lermas alleged that:
On November 26, 2002, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, which was set for hearing on December 24, 2002. The motion was based on four grounds: (1) pursuant to Government Code section 830.6, the city was immune from liability for the roadway design; (2) the city had neither actual nor constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition before the accident; (3) there was no dangerous condition at the time of the accident; and (4) the conduct of the drivers of certain vehicles involved in the accident constituted intervening, superseding negligent acts. On November 27, 2002, the county filed a notice of joinder in the motion for summary judgment.
On December 10, 2002, the Lermas filed an opposition and request for continuance of the motion for summary judgment. The request for continuance was based on the dire health condition of the Lermas' attorney.
In his declaration in support of the request for continuance, the attorney stated in pertinent part:
The declaration continued:
In the opposition to the summary judgment motion, the Lermas stated: (1) their cause of action for dangerous condition of property was not based on the design of the roadway, but rather was based on the maintenance of shrubbery within the center divider, which they contended obscured the view of drivers; (2) if given the opportunity, they would be able to provide evidence to raise a triable issue of fact pertaining to the public entities' notice of the dangerous condition; (3) whether there was a dangerous condition was a question of fact; (4) the negligence of any third party would not, as a matter of law, exonerate the public entities; and (5) the county's joinder was untimely filed.
The court denied the Lermas' request for a continuance and granted the summary judgment motion. In its formal order granting summary judgment in favor of the city, the court stated that summary judgment was granted for two reasons: (1) the city was immune from liability as a matter of law pursuant to Government Code section 830.6; and (2) the city had neither actual nor constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition before the accident. In the formal order granting summary judgment in favor of the county, only the first ground was mentioned.
Summary judgment was thereafter entered in favor of each of the city and the county. Richard and Deborah Lerma appeal from each judgment.1
In order to determine whether a continuance is mandatory, then, we look to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). That subdivision provides in pertinent part: "If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment ... that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make any other order as may be just."
The court denied the Lermas' request for a continuance on finding they had not presented competent evidence to establish the grounds for a continuance. Indeed, the Lermas did not provide any affidavits whatsoever indicating what facts essential to justify opposition may have existed. The only hint provided as to what essential facts might have been available was contained in the body of the opposition. In the opposition, the Lermas emphasized that it was not roadway design but shrubbery maintenance that was at issue, and stated that Pasqualetto had testified at deposition that the shrubbery in the center divider obscured the view of approaching vehicles. From this, one might infer that the Lermas, had they more time, would have presented evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the state of the shrubbery, rather than the roadway design, caused the allegedly dangerous condition of property.
The only declaration the Lermas actually offered was the declaration of their incapacitated attorney. He stated in a conclusory fashion that he believed he would "be able to obtain the necessary evidence and declarations to successfully oppose the motion and establish a triable issue of fact to...
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