LeRoux v. Secretary of State

• Decision Date: 25 March 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 120338, Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 640 N.W.2d 849,465 Mich. 594
• Parties: David LeROUX, Michael Gray, and Robert L. Ellis, Plaintiffs, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Director of Elections, Defendants, and Suzanne L. Anderson, Sharon Yentsch, and Bradley Van Haitsma, Intervening Defendants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

640 N.W.2d 849

465 Mich. 594

David LeROUX, Michael Gray, and Robert L. Ellis, Plaintiffs, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Director of Elections, Defendants, and Suzanne L. Anderson, Sharon Yentsch, and Bradley Van Haitsma, Intervening Defendants.

Docket No. 120338, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued January 23, 2002.

Decided March 25, 2002.

Bodman, Longley & Dahling L.L.P. (by R. Craig Hupp, F. Thomas Lewand, and William B. Forrest, III), Detroit, MI, and Jenner & Block, L.L.C. (by Paul M. Smith, Sam Hirsch, Marc A. Goldman, and James A. Trilling), Washington, DC, for the plaintiffs.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Gary P. Gordon and Katherine C. Galvin, Assistant Attorneys General and R. Lance Boldrey, Special Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for the defendants.

Dickinson Wright P.L.L.C. (by Peter H. Ellsworth, Jeffery V. Stuckey, Phillip J. DeRosier, and Susan G. Schwochau), Lansing, MI, and Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (by Michael A. Carvin and Louis K. Fisher), Washington, DC, for the intervening defendants.

PER CURIAM.

In this original action, plaintiffs challenge the plan for redistricting Michigan's fifteen seats in the United States House of Representatives adopted by 2001 PA 115. Plaintiffs claim that the statute was not validly enacted because the bill passed by the Legislature was changed by the Secretary of the Senate before presentation to the Governor for his approval. Second, they contend that the plan fails to comply with Michigan statutory requirements for congressional redistricting established by 1999 PA 221. We conclude: (1) 2001 PA 115 was validly enacted because the changes made before submission to the Governor were technical corrections that do not violate the provisions of the Michigan Constitution regarding enactment of legislation; (2) the redistricting guidelines of M.C.L. § 3.63(c), as enacted by 1999 PA 211, were not binding on the Legislature's redistricting of Michigan's congressional seats in 2001; and (3) the reference to the 1999 guidelines in the 2001 redistricting act does not indicate an intention by the Legislature to make the redistricting plan reviewable using those guidelines. We therefore deny the application for review of the congressional redistricting plan.

I. Federal Framework for Congressional Districting

The Constitution provides that representatives in Congress are to be apportioned among the states according to their populations,¹ with the allocation to be made according to the decennial census.² In general, the United States Constitution leaves to the states the manner of electing representatives. U.S. Const., art. I, § 4 provides:

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.

However, the Congress and the federal courts have imposed several limitations on the states' authority in the area of congressional districting. In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has established the primacy of the principle of "one person, one vote." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-564, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). That principle requires that congressional districts must be constructed so that "as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is ... worth as much as another's." Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 84 S.Ct. 526. That standard has been refined to require that good-faith efforts be made to achieve precise mathematical equality. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-531, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). Thus, to justify any deviation from mathematical equality, it must be demonstrated that the deviation was either unavoidable despite good-faith efforts or was necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983).

Second, Congress enacted the voting rights act of 1965,³ which, among other things, prohibits state election practices or procedures that result in "a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the Untied States to vote on account of race or color...." 42 USC 1973(a). See, generally, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 117 S.Ct. 1491,137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997): Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976).

Third, Congress has imposed a requirement for use of single-member districts for the election of representatives. 2 USC 2c.

II. Recent History of Congressional Redistricting in Michigan

Unlike the constitutions of a number of states,⁴ Michigan's Constitution does not include any provisions regarding the procedure or standards for congressional redistricting.⁵ Thus, the Legislature has been free to adopt redistricting plans in any manner it chose, consistent with federal requirements. However, before 2001 PA 115, the Michigan Legislature last enacted a congressional districting plan in 1964. 1964 PA 282. The Legislature failed to redistrict the state following the next three censuses, and the federal courts ultimately adopted plans that have been used since 1972. See Dunnell v. Austin, 344 F.Supp. 210 (E.D.Mich., 1972); Agerstrand v. Austin, No. 81-50256 (ED. Mich., unpublished opinion issued May 20, 1982); Good v. Austin, 800 F.Supp. 557 (E.D.Mich.1992).

III. Michigan Redistricting Legislation

Three Michigan statutes are relevant to the issues raised in this case—1999 PA 221 and 222, passed in anticipation of the redistricting process following the 2000 census, and 2001 PA 115, the redistricting plan at issue in this case.

A. 1999 PA 221—The Substantive Statute

1999 PA 221 provided a legislative process for redistricting congressional seats. It set November 1, 2001,⁶ as the deadline for legislative action, M.C.L. § 3.62, and then, in M.C.L. § 3.63, established standards to be used in drawing districts. MCL 3.63(a) and (b) incorporated the federal constitutional and statutory requirements.⁷ In this action, plaintiffs do not claim that the legislative plan fails to comply with those provisions.⁸ MCL 3.63(c) then created "secondary" guidelines. The first priority was contiguity of districts, followed by provisions involving breaking county and municipal lines. MCL 3.63(c) provides:

The secondary guidelines in order of priority are as follows:

(i) Each congressional district shall consist of areas of convenient territory contiguous by land. Areas that meet only at points of adjoining corners are not contiguous.

(ii) Congressional district lines shall break as few county boundaries as is reasonably possible.

(iii) If it is necessary to break county lines to achieve equality of population between congressional districts as provided in subdivision (a), the number of people necessary to achieve population equality shall be shifted between the 2 districts affected by the shift.

(iv) Congressional district lines shall break as few city and township boundaries as is reasonably possible.

(v) If it is necessary to break city or township lines to achieve equality of population between congressional districts as provided in subdivision (a), the number of people necessary to achieve population equality shall be shifted between the 2 districts affected by the shift.

(vi) Within a city or township to which there is apportioned more than 1 congressional district, district lines shall be drawn to achieve the maximum compactness possible.

(vii) Compactness shall be determined by circumscribing each district within a circle of minimum radius and measuring the area, not part of the Great Lakes and not part of another state, inside the circle but not inside the district.

(viii) If a discontiguous township island exists within an incorporated city or discontiguous portions of townships are split by an incorporated city, the splitting of the township shall not be considered a split if any of the following circumstances exist:

(A) The city must be split to achieve equality of population between congressional districts as provided in subdivision (a) and it is practicable to keep the township together within 1 district.

(B) A township island is contained within a whole city and a split of the city would be required to keep the township intact.

(C) The discontiguous portion of a township cannot be included in the same district with another portion of the same township without creating a noncontiguous district.

(ix) Each congressional district shall be numbered in a regular series, beginning with congressional district 1 in the northwest corner of the state and ending with the highest numbered district in the southeast corner of the state.

B. 1999 PA 222—The Procedural Statute

1999 PA 222 created a mechanism for involving this Court in the redistricting process. MCL 3.71 said that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over state claims regarding congressional redistricting:

The supreme court has original and exclusive state jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases and controversies in Michigan's 1 court of justice involving a congressional redistricting plan. A case or controversy in Michigan's 1 court of justice involving a congressional redistricting plan shall not be commenced in or heard by the state court of appeals or any state trial court. If a case or controversy involves a congressional redistricting plan but an application or petition for review was not filed under section 2 or 3, the supreme court may, but is not obligated to, undertake all or a portion of the procedures described in section 4.

The statute then provided two ways for actions to be brought. First, M.C.L. § 3.72 says...