Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 20 April 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,667 - (44) |
| Citation | 106 N.W. 955,97 Minn. 503 |
| Parties | CAROLINE LESCH v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $2,600 for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as the result of fright caused by the acts of two of defendant's servants while trespassing upon the premises occupied as a homestead by plaintiff and her husband. The case was tried before Orr J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $80. From a judgment entered pursuant to the verdict, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Possession of Homestead.
A wife has an interest in the homestead of herself and husband although the legal title thereto is in him, and she is entitled to the peaceful and quiet enjoyment thereof. Any unlawful invasion of such right is a legal wrong against her.
Question for Jury.
In an action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of fright caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant's employees, it is held that the evidence justified the submission of the cause to the jury, and that it sustains the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
M. L. Countryman and R. A. Hastings, for appellant.
Warren H. Mead, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered upon a verdict for $80 in a personal injury action. This is the second appeal in the case. See 93 Minn. 435, 101 N.W. 965. The sole question presented by the record is whether the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in accordance with defendant's motion made at the close of all the evidence. The case is here upon a bill of exceptions, which the trial judge certifies contains all of the evidence pertinent or material to the questions raised by the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Counsel for plaintiff makes the objection that the bill of exceptions does not contain all of the evidence relevant to issues made by the pleadings and submitted to the jury, hence the action of the trial court in denying the defendant's motion cannot be here reviewed. We must accept the certificate of the trial judge as correct; there being nothing properly in the record to impeach it. State v. Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 98 N.W. 334.
If the record discloses any evidence, taking the most favorable view of it for the plaintiff, sufficient to sustain a verdict for her, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied; but, if it does not, the defendant is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The alleged wrongful acts on the part of the defendant were committed by two of its employees. No claim is here made by the defendant that there was no evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that such alleged acts were within the scope of the employment of the defendant's employees and in furtherance of its business. This question was settled adversely to the defendant on the first appeal.
The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff was sufficient, the jury having found it credible, to establish these facts: On July 21, 1903, plaintiff was living with her husband and family at 113 Acker street, St. Paul, Minnesota, the premises consisting of a three-room house and one lot, the property and homestead of her husband, Lawrence Lesch. About 9:30 a.m. of that day she was alone in the house, the same being her home, and hearing her dog bark she went into the yard and saw two men on the outside of the fence looking at some second hand or worn out railroad ties which were piled near the fence. These men were the defendant's employees, Charles J. McKenna and Louis Fanger. Some conversation then ensued between her her and them upon the subject of railroad ties. McKenna asked plaintiff if the dog would bite, and she replied: "Sure, he will bite." Without asking her permission and without invitation, the men then opened the gate and entered the yard of the Lesch premises, where they remained about half an hour, most of the time engaged in examining and making a written list of a lot of tools which they found in a yard and in a small shed. They put the tools in a pile in the yard near the house, and left them in that position. While they were so engaged she remained in the yard near them and observed what they were doing. She did not at that time know their names, nor that they were defendant's employees, nor did they explain the object of their investigations. They were strangers to her, and she had never seen them before. After examining and listing the tools, the two men, without invitation and without asking plaintiff's permission, opened the door of the Lesch dwelling-house and entered it; plaintiff following as far as the open door, where she stood and watched them as they went from one room to another. In one room they opened a trunk containing family wearing apparel and underclothing, and threw the contents onto the floor, apparently searching for something. They then went into another room and in a like manner searched another trunk and threw the contents, clothing, etc., onto the floor. They also emptied two hat boxes of their contents, which included a sum of money, $325, also disturbed the contents of a clothes basket in one of the rooms. During these proceedings she was watching them. They did not put anything into their pockets, or attempt to carry anything away. While they were in the house she called a neighbor's little girl, about six years old, who came and stood near her, by the door, looking at the men. They went away. She asked them who they were, and if they had a warrant. They told her they had none, but did not tell their names. Neither of the men made any threats against her. Nor did they offer any violence to her person, nor use any violent or improper language to her at any time, and there was no testimony indicating that either of the men had any purpose or intention of injuring or interfering with the plaintiff's person in any manner. She was frightened by their acts, and immediately after they left she became sick, feverish, her head ached, she trembled, and had spells of vomiting. She was obliged to go to bed, and was confined to her bed most of the time for about two weeks, and was not well for a considerable time afterwards. The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to contradict, in many important particulars, the plaintiff's version of what happened on the occasion referred to by her.
1. The defendant's first contention is to the effect that it conclusively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff's alleged fright was not the result of any legal wrong against her; hence she cannot recover any damages resulting therefrom. It is the law of this state that there can be no recovery for fright which results physical injuries, in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the plaintiff, unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong against the plaintiff by the defendant. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034, 16 L.R.A. 203; Sanderson v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542, 60 L.R.A. 403, 97 Am. St. Rep. 509. While the legal title to the plaintiff's home was in her husband, she had an interest therein. It was her homestead, and she had an interest therein and the same right to its peaceful and quiet enjoyment as her husband had. Any unlawful...
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