Lesesne v. Doe

• Decision Date: 21 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 10–cv–00602 CRC
• Citation: 65 F.Supp.3d 1
• Parties: John B. Lesesne, Plaintiff, v. John Doe, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

65 F.Supp.3d 1

John B. Lesesne, Plaintiff

v.John Doe, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 10–cv–00602 CRC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 21, 2014

Moses Vincent Brown, Brown & Butler, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Joseph Alfonso Gonzalez, Steven J. Anderson, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge

Plaintiff John Lesesne alleges that he suffered physical injuries and emotional distress due to negligent treatment by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) while hospitalized for a gunshot wound following his arrest. He has sued the District of Columbia, the DOC, and several named and unnamed DOC employees. The Defendants move to dismiss or for summary judgment. Because Lesesne has failed to allege any custom or policy by the District that caused his injuries, and because he alleges no negligence by Defendant Henry R. Lesansky, the Court will dismiss these parties. The Court finds that Lesesne's statutory notice to the District put the city on notice of the necessary facts underlying his claims, and that Lesesne has adequately pled negligent infliction of emotional distress. It will therefore deny the Defendants' motion as to those claims.

I. Background

Lesesne was shot in the abdomen by his brother, a D.C. police officer, who, according to a police report, Lesesne had attacked with a knife. Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 at 2. He was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital where he underwent surgery. During his ensuing hospital stay, Lesesne was in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. In his amended complaint, Lesesne alleges that DOC personnel continuously handcuffed him to his bed and ignored his attending physicians' requests that he be allowed to receive physical and occupational therapy, causing long-term injury. Id. ¶¶ 15–18. Later, when the hospital discharged him, DOC officers allegedly made Lesesne walk to a transport vehicle while shackled and then dropped him, causing a pulmonary embolism. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. After a second trip to a hospital and a return to the D.C. Jail, Lesense claims he contracted a staph infection because DOC denied him adequate medical treatment. Id. ¶¶ 26–28.

Lesesne brought suit in this Court against the DOC, the District of Columbia and three individuals: an unnamed DOC officer that oversaw his detention; Captain David Holmes, a DOC employee; and Henry R. Lesansky, a DOC health services administrator. His initial complaint listed sixteen claims, including for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 27–42. Judge Wilkins, who was previously assigned to this case, granted the District's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321, and for failure to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Order, Dkt. 32 (Sept. 30 2011). The D.C. Circuit reversed as to Lesesne's federal claims. Mandate, Dkt. 35 (June 4, 2014). After remand, Lesesne filed an amended complaint alleging a violation of the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Defendants move to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, as to Lesesne's constitutional claims against the District of Columbia and Dr. Lesansky, and his claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. The Court held a hearing on the Defendants' motion on June 17, 2014.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” and “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court assumes the plaintiff's factual assertions to be true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.

Summary judgment should be granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The “evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-movant, however, must establish more than “the existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of his position, id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999).

III. Discussion

The Defendants argue that (1) Lesesne's constitutional claim against the District of Columbia should be dismissed because the amended complaint does not allege any policy or custom by the District that caused his injuries; (2) the amended complaint fails to allege any actions by Dr. Lesansky that caused Lesesne's injuries; (3) Lesesne failed to provide notice of his tort claims under D.C. Code § 12–309 ; and (4) the Defendants cannot be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress because Lesesne's psychological well-being was not the primary basis of their relationship with him while he was detained. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim Against the District

Lesesne brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits suit against any person acting under state law for the deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional and legal rights. The District of Columbia is considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Best v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C.1990). “[I]n considering whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for municipal liability, the district court must conduct a two-step inquiry.” Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C.Cir.2003). The court “[f]irst ... must determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. If so, then “the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” Id.¹

Where, as here, the defendant is a municipality, “[d]eliberate indifference is determined by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional violations, an objective standard.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ). “[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). Plaintiff, then, must “allege[ ] an affirmative link ... such that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Assuming for the sake of argument that Lesesne has stated a claim for a predicate constitutional violation,² his claim against the District still must be dismissed because the amended complaint fails to allege a custom, policy or practice of the District or the DOC that caused Lesesne's injuries. See, e.g., Yancey v. Dist. of Columbia, 991 F.Supp.2d 171, 179–80(D.D.C.2013) (dismissing § 1983 claim where plaintiff “has not provided any indication that her situation was the result of any custom, practice or policy of the District”); Poindexter v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 891 F.Supp.2d 117, 125 (D.D.C.2012) (same). Indeed, Lesesne's counsel acknowledged at the hearing on this motion that the amended complaint does not identify any District policy or practice that led to Mr. Lesesne's injuries.

B. Claims Against Dr. Lesansky

Dr. Lesansky, a health services administrator with the DOC, moves to dismiss the complaint as against him. Because the amended complaint lacks any factual allegation concerning Dr. Lesansky's personal involvement in the treatment Lesesne received, or did not receive, while in DOC custody, the Court will dismiss all claims against him in his individual capacity. See Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 602 (D.C.Cir.2011) (dismissing prisoner's § 1983 claims against individual where complaint did not allege personal conduct causing alleged constitutional violations); Jeff e ries v. Dist. of Columbia, 917 F.Supp.2d 10, 25–26 (D.D.C.2013) (same); Way v. Johnson, 893 F.Supp.2d 15, 22 (D.D.C.2012) (same).

C. Notice under D.C. Code § 12–309

Section 12–309 of the D.C. Code requires that a plaintiff seeking damages against the District of Columbia first give notice “of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.” Compliance with Section 12–309 is a mandatory prerequisite to filing tort claims against the District of Columbia. E.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.1995) ; Gwinn v. Dist. of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981).

While Section 12–309 “is to be strictly construed,” Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378,...