Lester v. CITY OF ROSEDALE, MISS.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. DC 90-2-D-0.
• Citation: 757 F. Supp. 741
• Parties: Carrie LESTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROSEDALE, MISSISSIPPI; and Spencer Arbuckle, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Chief of the City of Rosedale, Mississippi, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

757 F. Supp. 741

Carrie LESTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROSEDALE, MISSISSIPPI; and Spencer Arbuckle, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Chief of the City of Rosedale, Mississippi, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. DC 90-2-D-0.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

February 14, 1991.

Cleve McDowell, Drew, Miss., for plaintiff.

Gary E. Friedman, Louise Harrell, Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIDSON, District Judge.

This matter is before this court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.¹ Her complaint centers on the actions of Spencer Arbuckle, Rosedale's chief of police, on January 4, 1989, when he attempted to subdue her with mace as she grabbed and held the head of her civil opponent in Bolivar County Justice Court. The altercation was severe enough to cause County Justice Court Judge James Strait to physically intervene while a spectator shouted for help. The defendants are the City of Rosedale, Mississippi, and Arbuckle, individually and in his official capacity as police chief.

Although the movant has raised doubts about important elements of the plaintiff's case, the court discerns two issues of material fact which prevent the court from granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Rosedale and Defendant Arbuckle in his official capacity. At the same time, the court finds that Arbuckle is protected in his individual capacity by the doctrine of qualified immunity and, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of Arbuckle individually. The relevant facts and legal issues are set forth below.

FACTS²

After a dispute with her niece, Patricia McNiel, over a bed allegedly sold to a pawn shop, the plaintiff filed conversion of property charges. Plaintiff's case was heard on January 4, 1989 at the Bolivar County Courthouse in Rosedale, Mississippi, before Bolivar County Justice Court Judge James Strait. Apparently finding insufficient evidence,³ Judge Strait issued a ruling in favor of the defendant, McNiel. Although plaintiff disclaims that she was extremely angry after hearing the ruling,⁴ she does admit that she was "upset"⁵ and that she grabbed her niece by the forehead and held her back when her niece began laughing at her or saying words to the effect of, "that's the way it fell."⁶

When Ms. McNiel began hollering, Judge Strait rushed toward the two, caught plaintiff by the hand and attempted to separate them. According to the plaintiff's own deposition, Mr. Joe Green, a spectator in the courtroom, called for assistance by hollering, "Hey, y'all, she's murdering this girl. She's murdering this girl." Deposition of Carrie Lester, p. 28. Three people had pinned plaintiff to the wall when Arbuckle ran through the door and, after allegedly giving no warning, sprayed plaintiff in the face and eyes with mace.⁷ Plaintiff argues that the direct spraying was excessive and, without estimating the length of time the mace was used, argues that "he did not have to spray ... as long as he did." Affidavit of Carrie Lester, p. 2. Plaintiff claims that she sustained serious injuries from the incident and that she underwent medical treatment.

As a result of the incident, Judge Strait cited plaintiff for contempt of court, fined her fifty dollars and sentenced her to one day in jail. Plaintiff was also arrested by the Bolivar County Sheriff and charged with committing simple assault against McNiel. She was found guilty of this charge, fined $315 and was placed on probation for two months.⁸ Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on January 2, 1990, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that Arbuckle interfered with her right to engage in argument, and therefore, her right "to free speech and to assemble peacefully." She further claims that the actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Finally, she alleges that the City of Rosedale, by condoning such actions and other abuses of authority,⁹ has pursued a policy or practice of unconstitutional behavior, actionable under Section 1983.

DISCUSSION

(1) Summary Judgment Standard

A court should grant summary judgment only where no genuine issues of material fact exist and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must present adequate basis for the motion, after which the nonmoving party must counter with enough evidence to create a factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmovant bears the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact and "may not await trial or appeal" to develop responsive claims or defenses. C.F. Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 836 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1988). Nonetheless, all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Emphasizing the duty of a court to draw inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, plaintiff argues that pages 18, 24, 25, 28, 33 and 34 of plaintiff's deposition "clearly indicate that there exist major issues as to what the facts of this case are." On page 18, plaintiff discusses her degree of emotional upset after the judge's decision and disputes the suggestion that she became extremely angry. On pages 24 and 25, plaintiff claims that she caught her opponent by the forehead and pulled her back and not by the hair. Page 28 recounts the "real loud" hollering of Mr. Green for help, while pages 33 and 34 recount Arbuckle's entry into the room and his alleged failure to warn.

Certainly plaintiff does not mean to suggest that her Section 1983 claim is stronger because she pulled her opponent by the forehead rather than by the hair or because she privately felt less angry than her actions indicated. She herself admits that Arbuckle ran in after a spectator shouted "murder" or words to that effect; that Green's shouting was loud enough to cause Arbuckle to act; and that both the Judge and two other persons had acted to restrain her. After studying these pages, the court is of the opinion that at best, only two issues of material fact remain: 1) Did Arbuckle have sufficient time to give a verbal warning? and 2) Was the direct manner and length of the spraying reasonable under the circumstances?

Of course, an issue of fact must be "genuine" to preclude summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and plaintiff has forwarded very little evidence to show why a reasonable juror might find for the plaintiff. Aside from plaintiff's deposition, the only evidence that exists in the record on these two issues is plaintiff's affidavit, in which she states that she fell to her knees and had to undergo medical treatment.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the jury, and not the court, must decide whether enough time was available for a warning or whether the manner and timing of the spraying was reasonable. In asking whether a juror could find for the plaintiff, the court cannot venture into credibility determinations, weigh evidence or draw inferences from the facts. Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir.1987). Even if one view might seem more credible, drawing inferences is a job for the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. Moreover, a court may deny a motion for summary judgment "where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." Id.

(2) Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims

Having found that genuine issues of fact exist, the court must next determine whether these facts are material in light of the Section 1983 claim plaintiff forwards. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A plaintiff seeking to recover under Section 1983 must first satisfy its elements. To be liable, a defendant must be a "person," acting "under color of state law" and "in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Essentially, defendants' motion for summary judgment argues that plaintiff has failed to meet the first and last parts of this definition.

Plaintiff has sued the city as well as Arbuckle in his official and individual capacity for violations of the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments. "For purposes of liability, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is in effect a suit against the local government entity he represents." Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, Connick v. Mairena, 484 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 697, 98 L.Ed.2d 649 (1988). Therefore, the court will consider the claims against the city and Arbuckle in his official capacity together and will analyze the claims against Arbuckle in his individual capacity separately.

a) Claims Against the City of Rosedale and Defendant Arbuckle in his Official Capacity

A city "may be liable under section 1983 only if a municipal policy caused the deprivation of a right protected by the Constitution or federal laws." McConney v. Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir.1989); see also, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). These cases show that a city may be a "person" under Section 1983 if the "policy" requirement is met. The Fifth Circuit has defined a policy as:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated

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