Lester v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1941
• Docket Number: 15211.
• Citation: 13 S.E.2d 627,196 S.C. 357
• Parties: LESTER v. GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

13 S.E.2d 627

196 S.C. 357

LESTER v. GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 15211.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 7, 1941

Thomas Cain & Black, of Columbia, for appellant.

Sue Evelyn Lester and E. J. Best, both of Columbia, for respondent.

BONHAM Chief Justice.

We adopt the "Statement" set out in the record and agreed to by the respondent and the appellant:

"This action was instituted in the County Court for Richland County, South Carolina, by the service of a summons on May 18, 1938, and seeks the recovery of $3,000 damages, actual and punitive, for the alleged wrongful and fraudulent cancellation of a policy of insurance in the face amount of $25,000 issued by the defendant to the plaintiff.

"The defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that the policy in question had become lapsed for nonpayment of the premium and loan interest due May 18, 1932 and the failure of the plaintiff to do the acts necessary to enable the company to consider the reinstatement thereof. It specifically denied any wrongful or fraudulent conduct on its part.

"The action came on to be heard before the presiding Judge and a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant announced that it would offer no testimony and made motions for nonsuit and direction of verdict, which were refused as to actual damages but granted as to punitive damages.

"The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,371.25, actual damages.

"A motion for new trial was made on the grounds stated in the record and refused by a formal order. Within due time notice of appeal was given."

There is a great deal of documentary evidence in the case consisting principally of letters written to the Insurance Company by the plaintiff and letters written to her by the Company. When these letters especially some of those written by the plaintiff, were offered in evidence, the plaintiff was allowed by the Court to give her interpretation of them over the objection of the defendant. It was error for the Court to allow this to he done. It confused the issues and must have led the jury to come to the conclusion that what the plaintiff thus said while on the witness stand was evidence in support of her contention. We make this ruling at the opening of this opinion because these letters are for the interpretation of the Court and play an important part in the determination of the Court.

We have given much study to these letters; they are too numerous to be inserted. From our study of them we deduce this plain conclusion: That the plaintiff erred in thinking she had paid the premium due on her policy when she finally paid the sum of $100.73, and that this was all she was required to pay to settle the premium and interest due on the loan on May 18, 1932, and thus to keep the policy in force. It appears from the record that she kept the policy in force until October 18, 1932, by making several extension payments up to that date, at which time there was due the sum of $100.73. She was notified that this sum must be paid and the application for loan filled out and returned before application for further extension could be granted.

On October 12, the plaintiff was furnished with a loan blank and a memorandum showing that the amount due the Company in settlement of the premium and loan interest due May 18, 1932 was $100.71. She was also furnished with a memorandum showing the amounts of the deposits received at the Company's office for the purpose of extending the time for the payment of the premium due May 18, 1932. On October 14, plaintiff completed and forwarded to the Company the loan application but did not pay the $100.73, but continued to contend that she had paid all that she was due. On November 16, 1932, the Home Office advised the plaintiff that her policy had been lapsed for the nonpayment of the premium due May 18, 1932, which had been extended to October 18, 1932, but that they would be glad to consider a proposition for the reinstatement of the policy through the medium of a new loan; that she would have to pay the $100.73, as shown by the memorandum sent her, and the Company would have to be furnished with satisfactory application for reinstatement and proof of her insurability. The plaintiff refused to furnish an application for reinstatement. She claims that she had paid all amounts due; nevertheless, she sent her check for $100.73 on December 9, 1932. The Company acknowledged receipt of the check and asked plaintiff to send the application for reinstatement of the policy. The plaintiff replied that she did not send in the remittance to reinstate her policy. On January 5, 11, 25, February 8, 17, 28, and March 7, 1933, plaintiff was again asked for these papers but no response was received from her. March 9, 1933, the Home Office in New York called the attention of the plaintiff to this matter and informed her that they were holding the $100.73 remittance pending the receipt of satisfactory application for reinstatement. She was again advised to this effect on March 25, and April 15. Plaintiff advised the Company on April 20, that she would not furnish application for reinstatement. May 15, 1933, the Company returned to the plaintiff the amount of her deposit, $100.73, in view of the fact that the requirements for reinstatement had not been fulfilled; and on May 18, 1933, advised her that in view of the fact that the premium due May 18, 1932, had not been paid the net cash surrender value of...