Letters v. Com.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1963 |
| Parties | William J. LETTERS, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH. Paul J. GUILMETTE v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Arnold W. Olsson, Worcester (John W. Linzee, Worcester, with him), for petitioners.
James W. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William T. Buckley, Dist. Atty., and John F. Driscoll, Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.
Before SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.
At issue on each of these petitions for writs of error is whether the petitioners' pleas of guilty were coerced. The single justice reserved and reported each case without decision. The facts are set out in his findings.
The petitioner Letters, then an eighteen year old high school junior, pleaded guilty on December 19, 1960, to two indictments for being an accessory before the fact of rape and to a third indictment for conspiracy to rape. On December 20, 1960, he was sentenced on each of the two accessory indictments to concurrent terms of from fifteen to twenty years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole. The conspiracy indictment was filed. Trial of Letters and other defendants, indicted for rape and on related charges, had begun on December 5, 1960.
On December 10, during the course of the trial, Letters' attorney told Letters in the presence of his parents, and of a codefendant and the latter's uncle and aunt, that the trial judge had called him into the lobby on two or three occasions and had told him that if Letters were found guilty he would receive two life sentences to be served consecutively but if Letters pleaded guilty he would receive but one life sentence. The judge had suggested that the attorney talk to Letters; the attorney had told the judge that he felt that Letters should not plead guilty to rape.
On December 15 there was another conference attended by five of the defendants still on trial, their counsel and families, and several court officers. Each attorney related what had taken place in a meeting with the judge in his lobby. The group was informed that a jury finding of guilty on the charge of rape and other charges would produce 'life on life' sentences but a plea of guilty would involve just one life sentence; the judge would be severe if it became necessary for the complainant to take the stand.
The same group met again on December 19. Letters' counsel then told Letters that he had again seen the trial judge and that Letters would receive the maximum sentence if found guilty 'but with the charge of 'rape' no longer being pressed against him upon a plea of guilty his sentence would be fifteen years.' After some talk, which included discussion of the probable date of Letters' parole eligibility and his family's desire to see the judge, the other defendants agreed to plead guilty. Letters, however, was reluctant to change his plea since the evidence at the trial had indicated that he endeavored to leave the scene of the crime when he discovered what was happening there. Letters at this point understood that lighter sentences would be imposed on all the defendants who had not yet pleaded guilty only in the event that all did so and that if he alone failed to plead his codefendants would be in jeopardy of heavier sentences. The attorney told Letters that the decision was his, but the family had the impression that the attorney favored the plea. A deputy knocked on the door but more time was asked and given during which Letters decided to plead guilty.
The criteria which should guide the sentencing judge are well understood. They include punishment, deterrence, and correction. The record and character of the defendant are relevant. Perhaps in a particular case there might be some basis for an adverse conclusion as to a defendant's character from the circumstance that, knowing his guilt, he elects to stand on his right to trial at the cost of embarrassment and shame to the innocent complaining witness who has already suffered from his crime. In view, however, of what is at stake for the defendant it would appear difficult to conclude that a decision not to plead guilty, at least considered alone, is a significant reflection of character. The circumstances, if entertainable at all, would be relevant at the time for sentencing and not before. But, plainly, a defendant, whatever his character, may not be punished for exercising his right to trial and, therefore, the fact that he has done so should be given no weight in determining his sentence.
We recognize that the purpose of the statement of the proposed consecutive sentences was to protect the victim of the crimes from further hurt. It was, however, in effect notice that the petitioner would be severely punished for electing to stand trial. The case is stronger than United States v. Tateo, 214 F.Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y.), where the trial judge (who lacked the power to impose consecutive sentences), after...
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Com. v. Coleman
...sentence if defendant does not plead guilty constitutes appearance of vindictiveness warranting resentencing); Letters v. Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403, 405, 193 N.E.2d 578 (1963) (judge cannot induce guilty plea by threatening heavier punishment for exercising right to trial). See also Commo......
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