Leverett v. Bishop Furniture Co.
Decision Date | 17 May 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. M-5-121. |
Citation | 451 F. Supp. 289 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Elizabeth LEVERETT a/k/a Marjorie Huckabee, Plaintiff, v. BISHOP FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
Alan Rosenblum, Staff Atty., Piedmont Legal Services, Inc., Spartanburg, S. C., for plaintiff.
This matter is before the Court upon the application of a plaintiff in a truth-in-lending case to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 In the complaint, which plaintiff seeks to have filed without prepayment of costs she alleges that defendant failed to make the truth-in-lending disclosures in the precise manner required by Regulation Z2 in connection with a credit sale of household furniture. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to use the exact terminology specified by §§ 226.8(c)(2), (5) & (7) of Regulation Z and that defendant failed to identify the type of security interest retained in violation of § 226.8(b).
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit as required by § 1915 in which she alleges that, because of her poverty, she is "unable to pay costs of said proceedings or give security therefor, and the imposition thereof would work a hardship." The Court also notes that the action plaintiff seeks to maintain is not frivolous but has arguable merit. However, despite the fact that plaintiff is truly poor and, despite the fact that she is seeking to prosecute a potentially valid claim, this Court has, in the exercise of its discretion, determined that plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed without prepayment of costs.
Section 1915 was originally enacted in 18923 and was significantly amended in 1910.4 The statute, as it appeared after the 1910 amendment, provided as follows: (Language added to the 1892 statute appears in italics and deleted material appears in brackets with a line of erasure.)
The Supreme Court, in Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Co.,5 construed the original statute and the 1910 amendment and found that the amendment did not change the fact that "the statute imposed no imperative duty to grant a request to proceed as a poor person, but merely conferred authority to do so when the fact of poverty was established and the case was found not to be frivolous."6 In light of this language, it appears that the Court's discretion is not limited to ascertaining the applicant's status as a pauper and the frivolous nature of the proposed proceeding. Rather, the Court has discretion to grant or refuse a request to proceed in forma pauperis even if a true pauper seeks to institute a meritorious cause of action. Accordingly, the Court has no duty to permit such a pauper to proceed in forma pauperis. If any duty exists it is that the Court deny a request to proceed in forma pauperis if the applicant can afford the court costs or if the proposed action lacks merit.7
The view that the Court's discretion extends beyond merely determining the applicant's poverty and the merit of the cause of action is supported by the language of the current statute. Section 1915 states that the Court "may authorize" the applicant to proceed in forma pauperis if the requisite affidavit is filed. It does not say that the Court "will permit" the applicant to proceed without prepayment of costs if the Court, in its discretion, finds that the applicant is impoverished. The fact that the Court has discretion to deny in forma pauperis status, even after the poverty of the plaintiff and the merit of the cause of action is established, is implicit in cases which have granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis but have denied requests for the appointment of an attorney to represent the pauper.8 Subsection (d) of § 1915 states that the "court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." If a Court permits the filing of a complaint without prepayment of costs, it has necessarily determined that the plaintiff is a pauper and that the cause of action is not frivolous. Therefore, when such a Court refuses to request an attorney to represent the plaintiff it is exercising discretion to deny the relief provided for by § 1915 even though the plaintiff has established his poverty and the arguable merit of his claim. This observation is important because there is no significant difference between the language "may request" in subsection (d) and the language "may authorize" in subsection (a). Surely the Court's discretion is just as broad under subsection (a) as it is under subsection (d).
An impoverished plaintiff in a truth-in-lending case has no "right" to proceed in forma pauperis. If such a right did exist, it would have to be based on either the Constitution or on some statute. Applicant clearly has no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Boddie v. Connecticut9 and United States v. Kras.10 In Boddie the Court held that Connecticut's filing fee statute as applied to indigents seeking to institute divorce proceedings violated the indigents' due process right to access to the courts. In Kras, however, the Court found no due process violation in requiring an indigent seeking a discharge in bankruptcy to pay a $50 filing fee. The Court thus drew a distinction between the inherent right to dissolve a marriage and the statutory privilege of bankruptcy discharges which Congress established as a matter of public policy. The private right of action established by the Truth-In-Lending Act11 falls under Kras rather than Boddie. This Act grants a right of action, not to recover "damages," but to recover a "penalty" amounting to twice the amount of the finance charge with the minimum penalty being $100 and the maximum being $1,000. There is no inherent right to receive the disclosures provided by Regulation Z. Rather, the disclosures are required as a matter of public policy and this policy is effectuated by private actions brought to recover the statutory penalty. Just as no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis exists in a truth-in-lending case, no such "right" is conferred by statute. Section 1915 confers a "privilege," not a "right."12
This Court bases its refusal to permit this action to be maintained in forma pauperis on the nature of the action. Plaintiff herein is not seeking to vindicate the deprivation of a constitutional right nor is she seeking access to this court to redress a grievance. She is merely seeking the windfall penalty established by the Truth-In-Lending Act which is designed to encourage compliance with its disclosure requirements. Plaintiff has sustained no "damages" as such and is not, therefore, being deprived of a "remedy" by being unable to proceed in forma pauperis.
This Court believes that the nature of the cause of action is a legitimate factor to consider in exercising its discretion under § 1915. Plaintiff is not being singled out by the denial of the in forma pauperis application in the instant case. This Court intends, as a matter of judicial policy, to deny all requests for in forma pauperis status from plaintiffs who come to this court seeking, not to recover damages, but to make a profit. If a plaintiff wants to use the Truth-In-Lending Act to make such a profit at the expense of the lender, this Court expects her to pay the filing fees and service costs as...
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...expects her to pay the filing fees and service costs as her initial investment in the profit making venture. Leverett v. Bishop Furniture Co., 451 F.Supp. 289, 293 (D.S.C.1978). 15 The authors stated that the title initially proposed for the article was "The Truth Shall Make You a Fee." 35 ......
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...discretion to determine whether or not it will even grant in forma pauperis status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Leverett v. Bishop Furniture Co., Inc., 451 F.Supp. 289, 291 (D.S.C. 1978). Once granted, in forma pauperis status can be revoked. Wiideman v. Harper, 754 F.Supp. 808, 809 (D. Nev. 19......
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...costs or that her action was frivolous. Instead, the court supported its decision with the reasons set forth in Leverett v. Bishop Furniture Co., 451 F.Supp. 289 (D.S.C.1978). In Leverett, the district court denied the request of a "truly poor" plaintiff to proceed with a non-frivolous Trut......
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...warranted dismissal before ordering the plaintiffs to pay a partial filing fee) (emphasis added); see also Leverett v. Bishop Furniture Co., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 289, 293 (D. S.C. 1978) (opining that "the nature of the cause of action is a legitimate factor to consider in exercising its discr......