Rutledge v. Town Of Chatham
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | 4:10CV00035 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | MERLE T. RUTLEDGE, JR., Plaintiff v. TOWN OF CHATHAM, ET AL. Defendants |
By: Jackson L. Kiser
Before me are Defendant Officer Nathan Roach's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Merle Rutledge, Jr.'s Motion to Amend. Mot. to Dismiss, Sept. 29. 2010, ECF No. 33; Mot. to Amend, Oct. 27, 2010, ECF No. 52. A Roseboro notice was mailed to the pro se Plaintiff on September 30th, 2010. Roseboro Notice, Sept. 30, 2010, ECF No. 39. The Court conducted a hearing on these two motions on November 16th, 2010. For the reasons set out below, the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is DENIED and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The dismissal is WITH PREJUDICE.
The facts that follow are set forth in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (). On August 3rd, 2010, the Plaintiff was walking on a sidewalk across from a supermarket and a gas station in Chatham when Officer Roach stopped and exited his police cruiser to initiate an encounter with the Plaintiff. Compl. 2, Aug. 10, 2010, ECF No. 3. Officer Roach was in uniform and displaying his badge of authority at the time. Upon exiting his cruiser, Officer Roach approached the Plaintiff on foot and told the Plaintiff to stop, which the Plaintiff did. Id Understandably worried, the Plaintiff asked Officer Roach whether he was in trouble, to which Officer Roach responded that "[p]eople want to know who [you are]." Id. Officer Roach then asked for the Plaintiff's identification, prompting the Plaintiff to produce his driver's license. Id. Officer Roach took the Plaintiff's license and checked to see if there were any outstanding warrants on the Plaintiff. Id. When he was finished, Officer Roach returned the Plaintiff's license and asked him about where he lived and where he was from. Id. After Officer Roach finished asking the Plaintiff questions, the Plaintiff asked for Officer Roach's badge number, to which Officer Roach replied Id. At that point Officer Roach returned to his cruiser and left. Id. The Plaintiff then filed a complaint with the Chatham Police Department, which prompted Chief Marvin Wright to hold a meeting with both Officer Roach and the Plaintiff. Id. at 3. The Plaintiff does not mention the results of that meeting, except to point out that Chief Wright denied that the Chatham Police Department stops people for no reason and that Officer Roach was unapologetic. Id. at 3-4.
Based on these facts, the Plaintiff originally alleged that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures of his person had been violated. Id. at 2. On September 29th, 2010, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support, in which he asserted that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Mot. to Dismiss; Br. in Supp. of the Mot. to Dismiss 3, Sept. 29, 2010, ECF No. 34. On October 27th, 2010, twenty-eight days after the Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Br. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, Oct. 27, 2010, ECF No. 51. Five days later, on November 1st, 2010, the Defendant filed a Reply Brief in which he pointed out that the Plaintiff overran his deadline to file his Brief in Opposition by fourteen days. Reply to Br. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss 1-2, Nov. 1, 2010, ECF No. 53.
On October 27th, 2010, the Plaintiff also made a Motion to Amend and offered a Proposed Amendment. Mot. to Amend. The Plaintiff sought to add three additional claims arising from his August 3rd encounter with Officer Roach. Those three claims are gross negligence, illegal seizure of his property, and a state law tort claim for invasion of the right to privacy. Proposed Am. Compl. 1-2, Oct. 27, 2010, ECF No. 52-1. The property the Plaintiff claims was illegally seized was his driver's license. Id. The Defendant responded to the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend on November 1st, contending that the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend was a rambling, unintelligible copy-and-paste project. Def.'s Br. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend 1, Nov. 1, 2010, ECF No. 52. On November 16th, 2010, the Court held a hearing on both the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Dismissal pursuant to a motion to dismiss is appropriate where the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). In considering the motion, the Court must take the factual allegations in the Plaintiff's pleadings in the light most favorable to him. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94. While the Court does not question the truth of the Plaintiffs allegations of fact on a motion to dismiss, the Court is under no obligation to accept as true any legal conclusions he has offered. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The Court also recognizes that there is a strong preference for resolving matters of qualified immunity as early on in litigation as possible. See Sandcrest Outpatient Services, P.A. v. Cumberland County Hospital System, 853 F.2d 1139, 1148 fn.9 (4th Cir. 1988) (); Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). This preference for early resolution of immunity issues stems from the fact that "qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) ().
The Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss was filed twenty-eight days after the Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss. Under the Local Rules applicable in this Court, "the opposing party must file a responsive brief..within 14 days after service." W.D.Va. Civ. R. 11(c)(1). Furthermore, pursuant to the Scheduling Order entered in this case, if an opposition brief is not filed within fourteen days of the service date on the movant's brief, "EXCEPT FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN...IT WILL BE DEEMED THAT THE MOTION IS WELL TAKEN." Pre-Trial Scheduling Order 12, Sept. 30, 2010, ECF No. 44 (). Although courts traditionally give pro se litigants more leeway than represented parties, that leeway is not unlimited and the Court cannot act as an advocate for litigants who proceed without counsel. Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990) (); Davis v. Bacigalupi, 711 F.Supp.2d 609, 615 (E.D.Va. 2010) (). It has been held that the additional latitude given to those proceeding pro se must be tempered to require compliance with procedural rules. McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (); Davis, 711 F.Supp.2d at 615. Considering a brief filed fourteen days after the fourteen day deadline would give the Plaintiff in this case significantly more latitude than this Court can afford any litigant, whether represented or not.
In his Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, Officer Roach asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Br. in Supp. of the Mot. to Dismiss 3. In determining whether Officer Roach is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court's first step is to determine whether the facts presented by the Plaintiff show that Officer Roach's conduct violated a constitutional right. Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004). If this first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, the next step is to decide whether the right violated was clearly established at the time. Id. Although the Fourth Circuit recently held that it is not necessary for the analysis to proceed in this order in every case, in this case it would be appropriate to do so because this Court's inquiry will end if it is determined that the Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation. Compare Doe ex rel. Johnson v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Services, 597 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2010) () with Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 2007) ().
For Fourth Amendment purposes, there are three types of police-citizen encounters. The first type is an arrest, for which the police must have probable cause. U.S. v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1984)). The second type is a Terry stop, for which the police must have reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The third type is a consensual encounter between police and citizens, which require no objective justification whatsoever. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). See also Weaver, 282 F.3d at 309. It should be underscored that the meaning of "consensual" in common parlance is different from the meaning of that word in law. Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure "occurs when, in view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 'stop, ' a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter." Weaver, 282...
To continue reading
Request your trial