Levine v. Milton

Decision Date04 April 1966
Citation42 Del.Ch. 597,219 A.2d 145
PartiesIrving LEVINE v. David M. MILTON et al.
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware

Aubrey B. Lank, of Theisen & Lank, Wilmington, for plaintiff, Nemerov & Shapiro, New York City, of counsel.

E. Dickinson Griffenberg, of Killoran & VanBrunt, Wilmington, for certain defendants, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Bruce M. Stargatt, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for defendant The Equity Corp.

SHORT, Vice Chancellor:

This is a double derivative suit brought by plaintiff on behalf of Oceanic Trading Company, Inc., (Oceanic), a Panamanian corporation, the sole stockholder of Darien Continental Corporation (Darien), also a Panamanian corporation. The complaint alleges three causes of action. First, that certain defendants wrongfully caused Darien to transfer shares which it held in The Equity Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and options with respect to such shares. The complaint prays that these transfers be declared null and void. Second, after realleging the facts set forth in the first cause of action, that the principal defendant has personally profited from the transactions complained of. An accounting is sought as to this cause of action. The third cause of action purports to be a representative class action. However, since it merely realleges the facts stated in the first two causes of action, it must also be taken as asserting a derivative claim. The fact that the relief sought is for distribution of any recovery directly to the stockholders does not have the effect of converting it into a representative cause of action.

Defendants have moved to dismiss (1) for failure to obtain jurisdiction over indispensable parties, namely Darien and Oceanic, neither of which has been served or has appeared in this action; (2) for failure to allege that derivative actions are recognized under Panamanian law; and, (3) that this court, in a derivative action, has no jurisdiction over Panamanian corporations which have not appeared and are not subject to service of process under the laws of this state.

I am satisfied that defendants Oceanic and Darien, for whose benefit this action is brought, are indispensable parties. 13 Fletcher, Corporations, § 5997; Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067; Overfield v. Pennroad Corporation, 3 Cir., 146 F.2d 889; Greenberg v. Giannini, 2 Cir., 140 F.2d 550, 152 A.L.R. 966; Busch v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 283 F. 443 (D.C.Del.); Tessari v. Herald, D.C., 207 F.Supp. 432; Levey v. Babb, 39 Misc.2d 648, 241 N.Y.S.2d 642. That this is the general rule does not seem to be disputed by plaintiff. He contends however that the rule should not be applied in the circumstances presented, particularly where, as here, there is a prayer such as that contained in the third cause of action, that is, for distribution of any recovery directly to stockholders. Assuming that the case of Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., Sup., 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, cited by plaintiff, is precedent in support of his contention, it is not in accord with Delaware law. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904, 120 A.L.R. 227. I therefore hold that Oceanic and Darien are indispensable parties in this action.

But plaintiff suggests that the interests of Oceanic and Darien in the Equity shares 'can and will be sequestrated in the future so that this Court will thereby acquire jurisdiction.' This contention is based upon the false assumption that 10 Del.C. § 366, the sequestration law, was designed to provide a means of compelling the appearance not only of 'real' defendants named in a derivative action, but also of the corporation for whose benefit the suit is brought. I am satisfied that the statute was not intended to be utilized for the latter purpose. Nor am I impressed with plaintiff's argument that to now hold Oceanic and Darien indispensable parties would be premature. The circumstances here presented...

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9 cases
  • Sternberg v. O'Neil
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 25 juillet 1988
    ...the monetary award in the event of recovery. The same logic has been held to apply in a double derivative suit. Levine v. Milton, Del.Ch., 219 A.2d 145, 146 (1966). The parent corporation is an indispensable party in a double derivative suit against a subsidiary because any recovery for los......
  • Blasband v. Rales
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • 31 juillet 1992
    ...derivative actions have been recognized by the inferior Delaware courts for at least the last two decades. See, e.g., Levine v. Milton, 42 Del.Ch. 597, 219 A.2d 145 (1966). Nonetheless, we have found no case decided by the Delaware Supreme Court entertaining such an action prior to Sternber......
  • Maldonado v. Flynn
    • United States
    • Court of Chancery of Delaware
    • 18 mars 1980
    ...derived from the corporation). In the suit the corporation is named as a nominal defendant and is an indispensable party, Levine v. Milton, Del.Ch., 219 A.2d 145 (1966), but does not normally exercise control over the suit. Slutzker v. Rieber, N.J.Ch., 28 A.2d 528 (1942); Solimine v. Hollan......
  • Partners v. Englard
    • United States
    • Court of Chancery of Delaware
    • 15 décembre 2010
    ...without analysis, that the two corporations "for whose benefit this action is brought[ ] are indispensable parties." Levine v. Milton, 219 A.2d 145, 145-46 (Del.Ch.1966). The decision cited only authorities addressing standard derivative actions and noted that the "general rule does not see......
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