Levitt v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 12 April 1932
• Citation: 114 Conn. 628,159 A. 878
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LEVITT v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

159 A. 878

114 Conn. 628

LEVITT v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 12, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Alfred E. Baldwin Judge.

Proceedings by Albert Levitt to require the Connecticut Light & Power Company to furnish electric service. Decision of the Public Utilities Commission dismissing plaintiff's application was affirmed by the superior court, on trial to the court and plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Where public utilities commission reasonably determined that sole issue before it was whether utility should be required to furnish prospective customer service at regular rate superior court on appeal properly refused to consider reasonableness of rates and conditions imposed for extension service.

Albert Levitt, of Redding, pro se.

William E. Thomas of Waterbury, and Edward M. Day, of Hartford, for appellee Connecticut Light & Power Co.

Warren B. Burrows, Atty. Gen., Ernest L. Averill, Dep. Atty. Gen., and H. Roger

Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant Public Utilities Commission.

MALTBIE, C.J.

The plaintiff has appealed from an order of the public utilities commission refusing to direct the Connecticut Light & Power Company to furnish him electric service at his home. The company serves a considerable number of country towns and has established rates for its customers in them, with special provisions governing service where extension lines more than 600 feet in length are required. Under the latter provisions, customers are served at the regular rates if they will agree to use a certain amount of electricity for each 100 feet of the extension: or, if the customer does not wish to use that amount, at an increase over the regular rate based upon the length of the extension beyond 600 feet: or, if the customer prefers, he may pay the company the cost of the extension in excess of 600 feet; and provision is made for an adjustment of the charges if others are then or later served by the extension, or street lights are installed upon it. The plaintiff's house stands upon a little used country road. The nearest service line of the company is 3,000 feet away, and between the line and the house are no other buildings which might require service. The next house beyond the plaintiff's is about 3,000 feet distant from it, with no other possible users of electricity between. The construction of an extension line upon the road to the plaintiff's house would entail more than ordinary cost, because it would have to run through woods and over a rocky soil. The trial court has also found that there is no prospect of any real estate development upon the road within any reasonable length of time in the future; and, while this finding is attacked, we cannot say that it so lacks reasonable support in the evidence as to justify striking it out. The estimated cost of constructing the extension would be $1,332.71, the estimated gross annual revenue at the regular rates charged by the company would be $119.40, and the estimated annual expense of the company in providing the service would be $151.21. The company is in good financial condition, and the construction of the extension and service to the plaintiff at the regular rates would not materially affect its financial structure or require a change in its present rate structure.

The basic claim of the plaintiff is that the company was under a duty to build the extension and furnish him service without expense to him or any additional charge beyond its regular rates. Stated broadly, his claim is that a public utility company is obliged to serve all within the territory it is chartered to serve without discrimination in rates, provided it can do so without materially affecting its financial or rate structure. An examination of the numerous authorities cited by him does not substantiate this claim. A moment's consideration shows that the application of such a principle at least as applied to a company with charter authority to serve a large rural area, would be impracticable. If the company were under a duty to build extensions so long as its financial or general rate structure was not affected, it could very likely for a time build extensions as they were requested. But a situation would inevitably be reached where the construction of further extensions would affect its financial and general rate structure. When that situation arose, if its financial or general rate structure is not to be affected, two courses would be open; either to permit the company to refuse any further extension where service upon it considered by itself would entail a loss to the company, or, at that time, to apply the very principle followed by the commission in this case; to require of the company thereafter to make only reasonable extensions. The first alternative would be to discriminate between those desiring extensions solely upon the basis of the relative order in time at which their requests were made, and the second would, on the one hand to a considerable extent make the same discrimination and, on the other, would merely postpone the application of the test of the reasonableness of requiring the particular extension. It is generally recognized that in determining whether or not a public service company is to be required to build an extension to serve a customer or customers, the question is whether, in view of all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to compel it to do so. " The question of a public service corporation's duty is not one which is determinable by the application of any such simple test as, ‘ Will the proposed new service be immediately self-supporting or remunerative?’ Its duty is measured by what it ought reasonably to be called upon to do. The test sets up reasonableness as the standard, and in its application here as elsewhere it takes into account all relevant circumstances, and has no definite or precise measure. It is clear, however, that in a case like the one before us prospective future returns from the new undertaking is a factor not to be overlooked or passed over slightingly." Root v. New Britain Gas Light Co., 91 Conn. 134. 143, 99 A. 559, 562. See also, New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 269 U.S. 248, 46 S.Ct. 83, 70 L.Ed. 255: Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 322, 146 P. 640, Ann.Cas. 1916D, 277; Public Service Commission of Maryland v. Brooklyn & Curtis Bay L. & W. Co., 122 Md. 612, 619, 90 A. 89; Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co, v. State, 87 Okl. 174, 209 P. 777; Murray v. Public Utilities Commission, 27 Idaho, 603, 623, 150 P. 47, L.R.A. 1916F, 756; Ladner v. Mississippi Public Utilities Co., 158...