Tomlinson v. Board of Educ. of City of Bristol

• Decision Date: 27 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14718,14718
• Citation: 629 A.2d 333,226 Conn. 704
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086, 85 Ed. Law Rep. 104 Marsha TOMLINSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRISTOL.

Page 333

629 A.2d 333

226 Conn. 704, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086,

85 Ed. Law Rep. 104

Marsha TOMLINSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRISTOL.

No. 14718.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 27, 1993.

Decided July 27, 1993.

Leon M. Rosenblatt, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Jamie L. Mills, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Gregory T. D'Auria, with whom were Brian Clemow and Linda L. Yoder, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the Bristol board of education (school board), properly relied on two collective bargaining agreements between itself and the Bristol Federation of Teachers, Local 1464 of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (Local 1464), in terminating the teaching contract of the plaintiff, Marsha Tomlinson, a tenured English teacher, as part of a work force reduction. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151(f), ¹ from the school board's decision to terminate her teaching contract. The trial court affirmed the school board's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the school board illegally terminated her contract because: (1) the school board violated one of the agreements, referred to as Project Pride, and therefore could not rely on it as a basis for her termination; (2) open teaching positions for which she was qualified existed in the English as a Second Language (ESL) program at the time of her termination; (3) the school board eliminated a high school ESL program to avoid retaining her in violation of public policy; and (4) the president of Local 1464 lacked apparent authority to execute the agreements because such apparent authority was dissolved when she contested the president's actual authority to the school board. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, a tenured teacher in Bristol, was certified to teach English, grades seven through twelve, and had been employed for twelve years by the school board. During the 1989-90 school year the plaintiff was a high school English teacher.

In the spring of 1990, the school board voted to reduce the number of teaching positions in the Bristol high schools' English departments. After waiting for voluntary resignations or retirements, the school board decided that layoffs were necessary to achieve the desired reduction in teaching staff. The school board subsequently selected the plaintiff for layoff pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151(d). ²

On July 12, 1990, the school board notified the plaintiff by letter that it was considering termination of her teaching contract because of a reduction in the number of teaching positions. Pursuant to § 10-151(d), the plaintiff requested, and the school board provided, a written statement of its reasons for selecting the plaintiff for possible termination.

In its letter, the school board stated that it was considering the plaintiff's termination, because, in accordance with § 10-151(d)(5), it was eliminating her position and there were no other teaching positions available for which she was qualified and to which she could be appointed. ³ The school board's letter explained further that § 10-151(d)(5) permitted it to reduce positions and terminate the teaching contracts of affected teachers in accordance with the layoff procedure agreed upon by the school board and Local 1464. ⁴ The agreement in effect at the time of the plaintiff's termination (original agreement), used seniority as the determining factor for layoffs. ⁵

At the time the school board selected the plaintiff for layoff, she was the least senior high school English teacher, with the exception of two tenured high school English teachers who taught in two special programs: Project Pride and Alternative Education. Despite the seniority system established in the original agreement, two additional agreements between the school board and Local 1464, entitled Agreements Concerning Project Pride (Project Pride agreement) and Agreement Concerning Alternative Education ⁶ (Alternative Education agreement), protected tenured teachers in the Project Pride and Alternative Education programs from layoff, involuntary transfer, or bumping by other teachers exercising their bumping rights. ⁷ On the basis of the Project Pride and Alternative Education agreements, the school board did not select one of the two less senior teachers for layoff and, instead, selected the plaintiff. ⁸

Upon receiving the school board's letter, the plaintiff requested, pursuant to § 10-151(d)(6)(B), a public hearing before an impartial hearing panel to determine whether grounds existed for her discharge. The plaintiff and the school board agreed to convene before a single member hearing panel, under a waiver of the statutory time limit for commencing the hearing.

Between August 31, 1990, and October 19, 1990, the hearing officer held a series of hearings at which he entertained arguments by both the plaintiff and the school board and received evidence. At these hearings, the plaintiff argued, that (1) the school board had violated the Project Pride agreement by failing to create two teams and, therefore, could not rely on it as a basis for her contract termination; (2) she had been illegally discharged under § 10-151(d) because, at the time of her discharge, the school board had been improperly employing "tutors" in teaching positions for which she was qualified; (3) the Project Pride and Alternative Education agreements were void because they had not been ratified properly by Local 1464 membership, in accordance with the constitution of Local 1464. During the hearings, the hearing officer precluded, as irrelevant, evidence the plaintiff offered to show that: (1) the president of Local 1464 lacked actual authority to bind Local 1464 to the Project Pride and Alternative Education agreements; and (2) the school board was employing "tutors" to do the work of "teachers."

On January 6, 1991, the hearing officer issued a written opinion containing his findings and conclusions. On the basis of his findings, the hearing officer concluded that the school board had lawfully selected the plaintiff for discharge pursuant to § 10-151(d) and, in accordance with valid agreements between the school board and Local 1464. Additionally, he rejected the plaintiff's claim that the school board had breached the Project Pride agreement by not creating two Project Pride teams. Finally, he rejected the plaintiff's argument that, because the school board had been improperly using less senior tutors in teaching positions, she could not be discharged while tutors still worked.

At a public hearing on January 14, 1991, the school board considered the hearing officer's recommendation and, by a vote of six to two, discharged the plaintiff. The school board gave the plaintiff timely written notice of its decision. Pursuant to § 10-151(f), the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from that decision. ⁹ The trial court affirmed the school board's decision and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). Additional facts will be set forth hereinafter where pertinent.

When considering termination of a tenured teacher's employment contract, a school board "acts, like an administrative agency, in a quasi-judicial capacity...." Mauriello v. Board of Education, 176 Conn. 466, 469, 408 A.2d 247 (1979); Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 191, 348 A.2d 584 (1974). Consequently, on appeal from a school board decision, the proper scope of review is that applicable to administrative appeals.

The standard of judicial review of administrative agency rulings is well established. Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 261, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Board of Education v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 531, 540, 556 A.2d 572 (1989). "General Statutes § 4-183(j), as amended to take effect July 1, 1989, permits modification or reversal of an agency's decision if substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. As under the prior statute, [t]he [reviewing] court may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.... Rather, an agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.... On the other hand, it is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 216 Conn. at 262-63, 579 A.2d 505.

Thus, on review of a school board decision, "it is not the function of the trial court, nor of this court, to retry the cause. The defendant board is an administrative agency, although it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. To render a decision, it must weigh evidence and reach conclusions.... The credibility of witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters within its province." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747 (...