Lewco Iron Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court

• Citation: 76 Cal.App.4th 837,90 Cal.Rptr.2d 671
• Decision Date: 29 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. E022135.,E022135.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: LEWCO IRON METALS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Bernardino County, Respondent; Michael Dibble, Sr., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

90 Cal.Rptr.2d 671

76 Cal.App.4th 837

LEWCO IRON METALS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Bernardino County, Respondent;

Michael Dibble, Sr., et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. E022135.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

November 29, 1999.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Review Denied March 22, 2000.

Combs & Schaertel, Arthur T. Schaertel and William R. Lutz, Claremont, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Anthony & Carlson and Richard H. Carlson, Oakland, for Real Parties in Interest.

OPINION

RICHLI, J.

Case law holds generally that, where one party to a multi-party judicial arbitration proceeding requests a trial de novo, the entire arbitration award is vacated and the whole case must be tried. A limited exception has been recognized, under which an award in favor of one party may stand despite a trial de novo request by another, where the two parties' claims are legally and factually unrelated. We must decide whether that exception applies here. We conclude that, if the exception is valid at all in view of the governing statutes and court rules, it has no application in this case.

I PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael Dibble, Sr. (Father) and Michael Dibble, Jr. (Son) brought a combined action for wrongful death and personal injuries. Father's wrongful death claim alleged his daughter, Victoria Dibble, died as a result of a collision between a vehicle in which she was a passenger and a truck owned and operated by defendants. Son's personal injury claim alleged he also was a passenger in the vehicle and was injured as a result of the collision.

Concurrently, Son brought a separate action for wrongful death and personal injuries. Son's wrongful death claim alleged his mother, who was driving the vehicle in which he was a passenger, died in the collision. Son also alleged damages based on his own injuries and on witnessing his mother's death.

The lower court ordered the actions consolidated, and Father and Son filed an amended complaint asserting each of the claims noted above and adding a claim based on Son witnessing Victoria Dibble's death. The case went to judicial arbitration (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1141.10 et seq.), and Father was awarded $300,000 and Son $325,000. Son timely requested a trial de novo pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.20.¹ No other party requested a trial de novo.

The clerk entered judgment for Father on the arbitration award pursuant to section 1141.23.² Defendants objected to entry of the judgment based on Son's trial de novo request. They also moved to vacate the judgment based on the same ground. The lower court denied the motion, and defendants appealed from the order denying the motion.

II DISCUSSION

A. Appealability^**

B. Merits

The issue of whether one party's request for a trial de novo effectively vacates the entire arbitration award and requires a trial of the whole case was first considered in Trump v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 411, 173 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Trump). The plaintiff in Trump sued Carlino on an agreement between the plaintiff and Carlino to purchase a business from the Trumps. In the same action, the plaintiff also sued the Trumps on their agreement to sell the business. The Trumps cross-complained against the plaintiff for breach of the sale agreement.

In a judicial arbitration proceeding, the plaintiff received an award against Carlino, but the Trumps received an award on their cross-complaint against the plaintiff. Carlino timely elected a trial de novo, but the plaintiff did not. The court nonetheless held Carlino's trial de novo request required trial of the entire case, including the Trumps' cross-complaint against the plaintiff.

The court noted, first, that the statutes and court rules pertaining to judicial arbitration made no provision for a trial de novo as to part of an arbitration award. (Trump, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d 411, 415, 173 Cal.Rptr. 403.) Second, the court stated it would be unfair to allow a party to wait until the last possible moment and then request a trial de novo only on certain aspects of the award, when the other party had refrained from requesting a trial de novo based on its satisfaction with the award as a whole. (Id., at pp. 416-417, 173 Cal.Rptr. 403.)

At the same time, the court in dictum indicated there might be situations in which a partial trial de novo would be appropriate: "If plaintiffs claims against the various defendants were totally unrelated, both legally and factually, a better argument could be made in favor of a subsequent partial trial de novo. Here, however, where the claims emanate from a single integrated set of facts, and where resolution of a factual issue may affect several theories of liability, the resulting award is more appropriately treated as indivisible for purposes of subsequent trial." (Trump, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d 411, 417, 173 Cal.Rptr. 403.)

Subsequent decisions have endorsed Trump's conclusion that any timely request for a trial de novo ordinarily requires trial of the entire case. (See, e.g., Muega v. Menocal (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 868, 876, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 697 [plaintiffs could not request trial de novo as to one defendant only where claims against both defendants emanated from same facts]; Wagy v. Brown (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 [trial de novo request "operates to vacate the arbitration award in its entirety" (dictum)]; Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368, 382, 258 Cal.Rptr. 473 [defendant could not request trial de novo "`on the Complaint only'" (dictum)].) Most recently, the court in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Mendez Trucking, Inc. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 691, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 held that a plaintiffs request for trial de novo required trial of the defendants' indemnity cross-complaints against one another, even though the plaintiff later settled with both defendants and therefore was no longer in the case.

The court stated: "... Trump establishes that a timely request for trial de novo operates to vacate the arbitration award in its entirety, putting the case at large as though no arbitration proceedings had occurred." (Id., at p. 695, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 236.)

One decision has allowed a trial de novo on fewer than all claims. In Demirgian v. Superior Court (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 372, 231 Cal.Rptr. 698 (Demirgian), a mother and son were injured when their car was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The son settled with the defendant, but the defendant breached the settlement agreement and the son sued on the agreement. The mother sued in the same action for her personal injuries from the accident. Arbitration awards were made in favor of both plaintiffs. However, the mother requested a trial de novo.

The court held it was proper to enter judgment on the award to the son notwithstanding the mother's trial de novo request. Unlike the situation in Trump, the son's breach of contract claim was legally and factually independent of the mother's personal injury claim. A trier of fact could have found one claim valid but not the other. Therefore, since the purpose of the judicial arbitration program was to avoid civil trials, a request for trial of one claim should not require trial of the other. (Demirgian, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d 372, 376-377, 231 Cal.Rptr. 698.)

Subsequent authority has interpreted Demirgian as establishing "a limited exception to the rule of Trump, applicable only when two or more arbitration awards rendered in a single arbitration proceeding are based on facts and law wholly independent of each other." (Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Mendez Trucking, Inc., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 691, 696, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 236.) Father argues his case also merits an exception to the Trump rule. Although he acknowledges no decision has yet considered the issue in the precise context of this case, he asserts Demirgian is most closely on point and supports entry of a separate judgment here.

1. Viability of the Demirgian exception

Notwithstanding the dictum in Trump and the holding of Demirgian, we find nothing in the governing statutes and court rules that would permit entry of judgment in any case in which a trial de novo is requested, including cases involving "unrelated" claims. Section 1141.20, subd. (b), provides that "[a]ny party " may request a trial de novo, and subdivision (a) of that section provides that an arbitration award "shall be final unless a request for a de novo trial is filed within 30 days after the date the arbitrator files the award with the court." (Italics added.) Section 1141.23 provides: " If there is no request for a de novo trial and the award is not vacated, the award shall be entered in the judgment book in the amount of the award." (Italics added.) Rule 1615(c) of the California Rules of Court (rules) similarly provides that "[t]he clerk shall enter the award as a judgment forthwith upon the expiration of 30 days after the award is filed if no party has, during that period, served and filed a request for trial as provided in these rules." (Italics added.)⁴

These provisions plainly state that judgment may be entered if there is no trial de novo request. They nowhere state or imply that judgment may be entered despite a trial de novo request if the request comes from a party whose claim is not "related" to the claim on which judgment is sought. To so interpret them, we would have to insert qualifying language which simply is not there. It is well established that courts "are not authorized to insert qualifying provisions not included, and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language." (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 573, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086.) Rather, "[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (...