Lewis v. Blue

• Decision Date: 02 March 2011
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:09-CV-862-WKW [WO]
• Parties: CYNTHIA LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY JASON BLUE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

CYNTHIA LEWIS, Plaintiff,

v.DEPUTY JASON BLUE, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-862-WKW [WO]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: March 2, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

PlaintiffCynthia Lewis ("Plaintiff")¹ claims that Sheriffs Deputy Jason Blue ("Deputy Blue") with the Butler County Sheriff's Department used excessive force in arresting her and subsequently performed an unlawful search and seizure inside her home. Plaintiff brings her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Deputy Blue in his individual capacity alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights.

Before the court is Deputy Blue's motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 43), which is accompanied by a supporting brief and an evidentiary submission (Doc. # 44). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. # 46), to which Deputy Blue replied (Doc. # 52). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the applicable law and the record as a whole, the court finds that the motion is due to be granted.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction). Personal jurisdiction and venue are adequately pleaded and not contested.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.

If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to each of its claims for relief exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment."). Furthermore, "[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "At the summary judgment stage,... once [the court has] determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record,... the reasonableness of [the defendant's] actions... is a pure question of law." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).

A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). However, if the evidence on which the nonmoving party relies "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242 (citations omitted). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the [nonmovant's] positionwill not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party, " Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990), and the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, "Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (A plaintiff's "conclusory assertions... in the absence of supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.").

Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.").

Thus, in cases where the evidence before the court is admissible on its face or can be reduced to admissible form and indicates there is no genuine issue of material fact, and where the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine issue as to a requisite material fact).

IV. FACTS²

While the material facts surrounding the arrest of Plaintiff and subsequent search of her home are hotly contested, at this juncture, Plaintiff's version of the events is credited to the extent that it does not plainly contradict the video and audio of the incident. The events giving rise to this cause of action occurred on August 11, 2008, when Lorenzo Lewis ("Mr. Lewis"), accompanied by Deputy Blue, returned to a mobile home where Plaintiff resided to retrieve a vehicle and a pair of shoes so Mr. Lewis could go to work. Before detailing the events of that day, some pertinent background is necessary.

A. Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis

Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis have been married since 1985.³ (Pl. Dep. 17 (Doc. # 46, Ex. 1).) In the months leading up to August 11, 2008, they had been living together in a mobile home (the "home") off Simpson Road in Butler County. (Pl. Dep. 20, 88.) Plaintiff had purchased the property in 1996, and she bought the mobile home in 2001. (Pl. Dep. 20.) The mortgage on the property was in Plaintiff's name.⁴ (Pl. Dep. 30.) Having resided there with Plaintiff for several months, Mr. Lewis had some clothes, shoes, and other possessions at this home. (Pl. Dep 133-35.) Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis also had two cars, a Pontiac Grand Prix (the "car") and a Chevrolet Silverado truck (the "truck"), which were located on the property on the date in question. (L. Lewis Dep. 23-24.) Mr. Lewis purchased both vehicles, and they were registered in his name; however, Plaintiff used both vehicles, and the car was specifically purchased for Plaintiff's use. (L. Lewis 23-24; Pl. Dep. 102.) In the days leading up to August 11, 2008, Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis encountered marital difficulties that resulted in a disagreement about possession and use of the aforementioned property.

B. Mr. Lewis Goes to Stay with His Mother

On the evening of Saturday, August 9, 2008, while riding home from Florida with her sister, Plaintiff saw Mr. Lewis driving the truck into a convenience store parking lot in Georgiana, Alabama, with another woman in the truck.⁵ (Pl. Dep. 78-79.) Based on prior dealings, Plaintiff was suspicious of the other woman riding in the truck with her husband. (Pl. Dep. 78-81.) Upon seeing Mr. Lewis park the truck, Plaintiff told her sister to pull into that parking lot. (Pl. Dep. 82.) After Plaintiff got out of the car, her sister drove away. (Pl. Dep. 82.) Plaintiff then got into the truck, told the other woman to get out of the vehicle, and drove the truck home without her husband.⁶ (Pl. Dep. 82-83.) Mr. Lewis then hitched a ride from an unidentified individual and was dropped off at the home, where he had been living with his wife for a few months. (Pl. Dep. 88; L. Lewis Dep. 45 (Doc. # 46, Ex. 3).) Mr. Lewis was not able to get into the home because Plaintiff had his house key and she told himshe did not want him coming into the house or staying on the porch. (Pl. Dep. 87-89.) Plaintiff then called the Butler County Sheriff's Department to have Mr. Lewis removed from the property. (Pl. Dep. 89-91.) Two sheriff's deputies arrived and gave Mr. Lewis a ride to his mother's house, where he stayed at least two nights. (L. Lewis Dep. 48.) Nobody was arrested, and no charges were filed. (Pl. Dep. 93; L. Lewis Dep. 48.) Plaintiff and Mr. Lewis had no further contact until the morning of August 11, 2008. (Pl. Dep. 95.)

C. August 11, 2008

1. Mr. Lewis Returns to Plaintiff's House Without the Sheriff's Department On the morning of Monday, August 11, 2008, an unknown Butler County Sheriff's Deputy called Plaintiff to ask if Mr. Lewis could come to the house to retrieve a vehicle.⁷(Pl. Dep. 95-97.) Plaintiff told the Deputy that Mr. Lewis could come get the car and that a Deputy...