Lewis v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 10 March 1914
• Citation: 139 P. 571,69 Or. 476
• Parties: LEWIS v. CHAMBERLAIN ET AL.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

139 P. 571

69 Or. 476

LEWIS v. CHAMBERLAIN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 10, 1914

Department 2.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; F. M. Calkins, Judge.

Application by Eliza J. Lewis against George E. Chamberlain and all whom it may concern to register the title to lots numbered 6, 7 and 8 in block No. 1 of Cottage addition to the City of Medford. From an order denying a motion to set aside a decree for registration of title in defendant Chamberlain, the applicant appeals. Affirmed.

This case was before this court upon a previous appeal, which was dismissed. Lewis v. Chamberlain, 61 Or. 150, 121 P 430. Thereafter plaintiff moved the circuit court to set aside the decree on the following grounds: (1) That the decree was made without notice to and in the absence of the plaintiff and her attorneys; (2) that the decree provided for the registration of title in defendant Chamberlain, without any prayer or demand on his part to have it so registered (3) that the wife of Chamberlain did not consent to have the property so registered; (4) that certain grantors of plaintiff were not served with process; (5) that the decree purports to grant relief not prayed for in any pleading; (6) that the decree purports to bar the dower of the wife of George E. Chamberlain; (7) that the decree does not state whether defendant Chamberlain is married or unmarried, and does not give the name of his wife; (8) that A. B. Seal and Jessie Seal, who are alleged in defendant's answer to claim some interest in the premises, have not been made parties; (9) that the registration act (commonly called the "Torrens Land Law") is unconstitutional.

John G Wilson, of Medford (O. C. Boggs, of Medford, on the brief), for appellant. C. L. Reames, of Portland, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The decree of the court entered in the absence of counsel was not void, but irregular, and it was in the discretion of the court upon seasonable motion and good cause shown to set it aside. On the merits no showing is made, except as we can consider the testimony taken in the court below to be a showing, and this indicates that the plaintiff's title rested upon a void tax title, accompanied with an insufficient adverse possession. Chamberlain was the actual owner of the property, and was therefore entitled upon the pleadings to have a decree to that effect, and to have the relative rights of the plaintiff and himself settled in the...