Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Docket No. 324744.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 324744.
• Parties: LEWIS v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

315 Mich.App. 202

888 N.W.2d 916

LEWIS

v.FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE.

Docket No. 324744.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 8, 2016, at Detroit.

Decided April 19, 2016, at 9:25 a.m.

Applebaum & Stone, PLC (by Katrina A. Murrel and Robin A. Miserlian), for Valencia Lewis.

Hewson & Van Hellemont, PC (by Robert D. Steffes and Nicholas S. Ayoub, Grand Rapids), for Farmers Insurance Exchange.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and STEPHENS and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., defendant appeals by leave granted¹ the trial court's order denying its motion for summary disposition against plaintiff Valencia Lewis and plaintiff R & R Transportation, LLC.² We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of plaintiff's claim for PIP benefits—under a no-fault policy issued by defendant to plaintiff's purported relative, Tamekiah Gordon—for injuries plaintiff suffered as a pedestrian during a hit-and-run car accident on October 26, 2012. On that date, plaintiff was a resident of Harrison Township, Michigan, and lived in a townhouse with Gordon and DeQuail Johnson, Gordon's son. At the time, neither plaintiff nor Johnson owned a motor vehicle covered by no-fault insurance. Gordon, however, owned a Ford Expedition that was insured under a no-fault policy issued by defendant.

Under the general definitions section in Gordon's no-fault policy, "family member" was defined as follows:

"Family member means a person related to you [the named insured] by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household." Additionally, Part III of the policy, which governed PIP coverage, provided, in pertinent part:

We [Farmers] agree to pay in accordance with the Code [i.e., Chapter 31 of the Michigan Insurance Code, which is the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. ] the following benefits to or for an insured person ....

* * *

Insured person as used in this part means: you or any family member ....

Approximately 10 months after the accident, plaintiff initiated the instant action, asserting that defendant failed to pay PIP benefits to which she was entitled. The basis of her claim was that, under the terms of Gordon's policy and MCL 500.3114(1), which provides that PIP benefits can be recovered by "the person named in the policy" or "a relative ... domiciled in the same household, " plaintiff qualified as a "relative" who was "domiciled in the same household" as Gordon at the time of the accident, entitling her to PIP benefits under Gordon's policy. (Emphasis added.)

In October 2013, defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint. Along with its answer, defendant asserted, as an affirmative defense, that it was not first in priority to pay the no-fault benefits at issue.

Discovery ensued, spanning roughly 11 months. Plaintiff was deposed twice, and both times she was questioned about her relationship to Gordon. During her first deposition, plaintiff described Gordon as her sister. However, at the second deposition, plaintiff described Gordon as her cousin:

Q. [I]s she [Gordon] related to you?

A. Yes.

Q. What is her relationship?

A. My cousin.

Q. When you say "cousin[,]" is there a blood relationship there? Is she the daughter of [one of your parents' siblings]?

A. No.

Q. So when you say "cousin[,]" she is a good friend of yours[,] correct?

A. No, we was [sic] married into the family.

Q. Okay. She is your cousin by marriage?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Explain to me how is she a cousin by marriage?

A. Her uncle is my uncles [sic].

Q. Her uncle was your uncle?

A. Yeah.

Q. I'm sorry. You[‘ve] got to clarify this for me.... Who is your uncle? What do you mean?

A. How can I put it? My aunt married—

Q. Wait. Your aunt. Now ... I think of my mother's good friend as my aunt. When you say "aunt" is that your mother['s sister] or your father's sister?

A. My father's sister.

Q. Your father's sister. Okay. That's your aunt.

A. Right.

* * *Q. Okay.... Your aunt is married to [whom]? How is that connection there?

A. [Gordon]'s father[,] his brother is married to my aunt, my father's sister.

Q. So [Gordon]'s uncle ... the brother of [Gordon]'s father[,] is married to your aunt?

A. Exactly.

Q. Okay. So on October 26th, 2012 [the date of the accident] was your father's sister still married to [Gordon]'s uncle?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they still married?

A. Yes.

Contrary to her testimony during the first deposition, plaintiff admitted at the second deposition that Gordon was not her blood relative, deeming Gordon her "cousin by marriage."³

In September 2014, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant argued that, given plaintiff's testimony at the second deposition, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the relationship between plaintiff and Gordon. Defendant further argued that (1) plaintiff was admittedly unrelated to Gordon by blood, (2) plaintiff was also, as a matter of law, unrelated to Gordon by affinity (i.e., by marriage), and (3) therefore, plaintiff did not qualify as Gordon's relative under MCL 500.3114(1). Finally, defendant argued that because plaintiff was not Gordon's relative, she was not entitled to PIP benefits under Gordon's policy.

In response, plaintiff argued that she and Gordon were "cousins by affinity," which is a degree of familial relation. Plaintiff also argued that both the no-fault act and the language of Gordon's policy were unclear regarding "the degree of relation that relatives must share in order to collect [PIP] benefits under [a] relative's insurance policy." Therefore, according to plaintiff, summary disposition in favor of defendant was improper because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits under Gordon's policy, and that question had to be decided by the trier of fact.

The trial court decided the matter without entertaining oral argument. Although the trial court briefly examined the definition of "family member" in Gordon's policy, its analysis focused primarily on the meaning of the term "relative" in MCL 500.3114(1). Noting that the no-fault act does not define "relative," the trial court determined that it must give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. After reviewing dictionary definitions and relevant authority regarding relationships by affinity, the trial court concluded that plaintiff and Gordon were "cousin[s] by marriage." Observing that it was required to construe the no-fault act liberally in favor of coverage, the trial court then held that "plaintiff is a ‘relative’ of Gordon according to the plain language of MCL 500.3114(1) and the subject policy language." Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition." Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 281 Mich.App. 49, 52, 760 N.W.2d 811 (2008). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court may only consider, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "the ‘affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties....' " Calhoun Co. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 297 Mich.App. 1, 11, 824 N.W.2d 202 (2012), quoting MCR 2.116(G)(5). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), "[s]ummary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Latham v. Barton Malow Co., 480 Mich. 105, 111, 746 N.W.2d 868 (2008). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., LLP, 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "This Court is liberal in finding genuine issues of material fact." Jimkoski v. Shupe, 282 Mich.App. 1, 5, 763 N.W.2d 1 (2008).

Additionally, "[i]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law, which [this Court] review[s] de novo." Corwin v. DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co., 296 Mich.App. 242, 253, 819 N.W.2d 68 (2012). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo, as a question of law, "the construction and interpretation of an insurance contract[.]" Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 460 Mich. 348, 353, 596 N.W.2d 190 (1999).

The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to determine and enforce the parties' intent by reading the agreement as a whole and applying the plain language used by the parties to reach their agreement. The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, with the presumption that unambiguous language should be enforced as written. [Dobbelaere v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 275 Mich.App. 527, 529–530, 740 N.W.2d 503 (2007) (citations omitted).]

III. ANALYSIS

"An insurer who elects to provide automobile insurance is liable to pay no-fault benefits subject to the provisions of the [no-fault] act." Corwin, 296 Mich.App. at 254, 819 N.W.2d 68 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original); see also MCL 500.3105(1). Insurance contracts in conflict with the no-fault act must be construed when reasonably possible "in a manner that renders them ‘compatible with the existing public policy as reflected in the no-fault act,’ " Corwin, 296 Mich.App. at 257, 819 N.W.2d 68 (citation omitted), but no-fault policies may expand coverage beyond "the mandatory coverages required" by the act, see Wilkie v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 41, 44, 664 N.W.2d 776 (2003).

The trial court's decision in this case was based not only on its interpretation of MCL 500.3114(1), but also on its determination that Gordon qualifies as a family member under the insurance policy. Accordingly, our analysis of this issue requires two separate,...