Allen v. Bloomfield Hills School Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 September 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 275797.
• Parties: ALLEN v. BLOOMFIELD HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

760 N.W.2d 811

281 Mich. App. 49

ALLEN v. BLOOMFIELD HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT.

Docket No. 275797.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 12, 2008, at Detroit.

Decided September 23, 2008, at 9:15 a.m.

Pearlman and Pianin (by Arvin J. Pearlman and Elaine L. Livingway), Southfield, for the plaintiffs.

Clark Hill P.L.C. (by Robert A. Lusk and Neil H. Goodman), Birmingham, for the defendant.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and MARKEY, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

In this suit alleging negligent operation of a governmentally owned and operated school bus, plaintiffs, Charles and Lisa Allen, appeal by right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on governmental immunity because Charles had not suffered a "bodily injury." We agree with the trial court that a plaintiff seeking to avoid governmental immunity from tort liability through the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, must establish a "bodily injury." Here, however, plaintiffs presented objective medical evidence that Charles Allen suffered a brain injury, specifically post traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident. If believed, we conclude that this evidence would establish a "bodily injury" within the meaning of MCL 691.1405; consequently, the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition on this issue. Therefore, we reverse.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Charles Allen (Allen) was operating a train near the intersection of Kensington and Opdyke roads in the city of Bloomfield Hills when he observed a Bloomfield Hills School District (the district) school bus enter the railroad-grade crossing at Opdyke Road and attempt to proceed across the grade by maneuvering around the lowered gate. The train, which was traveling at a speed of approximately 65 miles an hour, was unable to stop and collided with the school bus. After stopping the train and running approximately one-half mile back to the accident scene, Allen was informed that there were no children on the bus at the time of the accident, but that the bus driver was severely injured. Allen was subsequently diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from the accident. Allen and his wife filed this suit for recovery of noneconomic and excess economic damages alleging Allen had suffered a serious impairment of body function.¹ MCL 500.3135. But the trial court concluded that Allen did not suffer a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, and granted defendant summary disposition.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3135 controls this case, rather than the language of the motor vehicle exception to governmental tort immunity, MCL 691.1405. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Davis v. Detroit, 269 Mich App. 376, 378, 711 N.W.2d 462 (2005). MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits summary disposition of a claim that is barred by immunity granted by law. In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court is required to consider not only the pleadings, but also any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 749, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). The contents of the complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence, Davis, supra at 378, 711 N.W.2d 462, which must in turn be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Herman v. Detroit, 261 Mich.App. 141, 143-144, 680 N.W.2d 71 (2004). The trial court properly grants a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when the undisputed facts establish that the moving party is entitled to immunity granted by law. By Lo Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 267 Mich.App. 19, 26, 703 N.W.2d 822 (2005).

The proper interpretation of statutes is also a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Neal v. Wilkes, 470 Mich. 661, 664, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004). When interpreting statutory language, courts must ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent, the statute speaks for itself and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id. Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute. Id. Undefined words in a statute should be accorded their plain and ordinary meanings, and dictionary definitions may be consulted in such situations. Id.

A governmental agency is generally immune from tort liability arising out of the exercise or discharge of its governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). This would include a public school district's operation of a bus system. Cobb v. Fox, 113 Mich.App. 249, 257, 317 N.W.2d 583 (1982). But the broad immunity afforded by the statute is limited by several narrowly drawn exceptions. Jackson v. Detroit, 449 Mich. 420, 427, 537 N.W.2d 151 (1995). One of these exceptions, at issue here, is that for motor vehicles: "Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner...." MCL 691.1405.

Plaintiffs do not dispute, as the statute unequivocally provides, that the exception is limited to "bodily injury" and "property damage." See Wesche v. Mecosta Co. Rd. Comm., 480 Mich. 75, 84, 746 N.W.2d 847 (2008). Plaintiffs argue that notwithstanding these limitations, Allen was not required to establish a "bodily injury" to avoid governmental immunity because our Supreme Court determined in Hardy v. Oakland Co., 461 Mich. 561, 565, 607 N.W.2d 718 (2000), that the limitations on tort liability in the no-fault act stated in MCL 500.3135 control the broad statement of liability set forth in MCL 691.1405.

The no-fault act provides in part:

(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.

* * *

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101 was in effect is abolished except as to:

* * *

(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsections (1) and (2).

(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor's loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.... [MCL 500.3135 (emphasis added).]

In Hardy, supra at 562-563, 607 N.W.2d 718, the plaintiff filed suit against Oakland County for noneconomic damages after one of the county's sheriff's deputies rear-ended his car. The plaintiff argued that because he sued the county under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, he was not obligated to show a serious impairment of a body function under the no-fault act. Id. at 563, 607 N.W.2d 718. The Court disagreed, reasoning that the phrase "Notwithstanding any other provision of law," MCL 500.3135(3),² "reflects the Legislature's determination that the restrictions set forth in the no-fault act control the broad statement of liability found in the immunity statute." Id. at 565, 607 N.W.2d 718. From this analysis, the Court determined that the plaintiff in Hardy was required to show a serious impairment of a body function, the threshold for a tort action for noneconomic damages under the no-fault act. Id. at 566, 607 N.W.2d 718.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Hardy is misplaced. The issue in Hardy was not whether the plaintiff had to show "bodily injury" to invoke the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity stated in MCL 691.1405, but whether he also had to satisfy the serious impairment of body function threshold for tort liability under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135. In holding that the plaintiff did, our Supreme Court did not determine that a plaintiff pursuing a tort remedy for noneconomic damages under the no-fault act need not meet the requirements of MCL 691.1405. Indeed, such a holding would have been tantamount to stating that the Legislature impliedly repealed MCL 691.1405 to the extent that it pertained to such cases. But a repeal by implication may be found only when there exists a clear conflict between two statutes that precludes their harmonious application. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Dep't. of Corrections, 451 Mich. 569, 577, 548 N.W.2d 900 (1996); Knauff v. Oscoda Co. Drain Comm'r., 240 Mich.App. 485, 491-492, 618 N.W.2d 1 (2000). The plain language of MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers "bodily injury" under the motor vehicle exception of MCL 691.1405, but he must also satisfy the no-fault act threshold for bringing a third-party tort claim, i.e., a plaintiff must establish a serious impairment of a body function as stated in MCL 500.3135. Thus, we must reject plaintiffs' argument that Allen was not required to show a "bodily injury" within the meaning of MCL 691.1405 for the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity to apply to his tort claim against the district.

The question remains whether plaintiff met his burden of showing a "bodily injury" within the meaning of MCL 691.1405. Because the statute does not define the term "bodily injury," we resort to dictionary definitions and accord the term its plain and ordinary...