Lewis v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date26 March 2009
Docket NumberCA No. 09-164.
Citation610 F.Supp.2d 476
PartiesTimothy LEWIS and Timothy Trapuzzano on behalf of themselves and all others in the State of Pennsylvania similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Kurt Mitchell, Mitchell & Bolliger PLLC, Kittanning, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Jaret J. Fuente, Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, FL, John M. Thomas, Bryan Cave LLP, Chicago, IL, Nancy R. Winschel, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, PA, Thomas J. Palazzolo, Bryan Cave LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM L. STANDISH, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a motion by putative class action representative plaintiffs Timothy Lewis and Timothy Trapuzzano (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), seeking to remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County, Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). ("Motion to Remand," Doc. No. 5.) Defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford") opposes the motion to remand and has concurrently filed a motion to dismiss this matter in its entirety pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). ("Motion to Dismiss," Doc. No. 4.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Remand is denied and the Motion to Dismiss is denied without prejudice.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Factual History1

During model years 2005, 2006, and 2007, Defendant manufactured Ford F-250 and Ford F-350 vehicles and sold them to consumers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. According to Plaintiffs, these vehicles are subject to front-end suspension defects which cause severe oscillation under ordinary driving conditions and create a safety hazard for the drivers of the vehicles as well as other motorists. Specifically, the front-end suspension malfunctions, causing the vehicle to shake violently, which in turn causes the driver to lose control. This "Oscillation Defect" also results in premature wear of other parts of the vehicle, including the steering boxes. When the owner of a Model Year 2005-2007 Ford F-250 or Ford F-350 with the Oscillation Defect ("a Class Vehicle") reported this problem to Defendant's dealers, he or she was told that the problem was an "isolated event," that it was the fault of the consumer, or that the tires on the vehicle were improperly inflated. However, internal Ford documents acknowledge the existence of the Oscillation Defect and show that Defendant knew the suspensions on the Class Vehicles were defective before they were sold.

B. Procedural History

On January 20, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against Ford in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. Both Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of "all persons who purchased a Class Vehicle in the State [sic] of Pennsylvania, or who owned a Class Vehicle and were forced to sell or trade the vehicle at a loss because of the extreme front end oscillation the vehicles exhibit when contacting typical road surfaces of expansion joints, road reflectors or potholes." (Complaint, ¶ 14, "Class Members.") Their suit first alleges that the selling and marketing of a dangerously defective vehicle constitutes a breach of an express warranty given by Defendant to each Class Member under the "Consumer Product Warranty Act," 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., also known as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (the "Act.") In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Oscillation Defects were present when the Class Vehicles left Defendant's possession and were unfit for their ordinary purpose, a violation of the implied warranty provisions of the Act. As damages for these violations of the Act's express and implied warranties, Plaintiffs seek:

an injunction requiring Ford to pay for replacement of the front suspension of the Class Vehicles and to repair any additional damage to the Class Vehicles free of charge;

monetary damages, including but not limited to compensatory, incidental or consequential damages commensurate with proof at trial for the acts complained of;

a declaration that Ford must disgorge, for the benefit of the Class Members, all or part of the "ill-gotten profits" it received from the sale or lease of Class Vehicles equipped with defective front end suspensions;

attorneys fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310;

costs;

pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and

all other relief the Court deems just and appropriate.

(Complaint at 9.)

In Count III of their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1 et seq. ("Consumer Protection Law.") Plaintiffs allege that they and the other Class Members are persons who purchased a good or service primarily for personal, household or family uses. They further allege that Ford recklessly, wantonly, and willfully violated the Consumer Protection Law by failing to comply with the terms of the written warranty associated with the sale of the Class Vehicles, by ignoring the Oscillation Defect, and by marketing the Class Vehicles despite prior knowledge that the vehicles were subject to the Oscillation Defect. (Complaint, ¶¶ 33-35.) As damages in Count III, Plaintiffs seek

actual damages; trebled pursuant to 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a);

costs, interest and attorneys fees pursuant to 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a); and

such other relief as this Court deems appropriate.

(Complaint at 11.)

On February 2, 2009, Defendant filed a timely motion for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1146, arguing that removal was appropriate under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") inasmuch as Plaintiffs had alleged a putative class with over 100 members, an amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000.00, and diversity of at least one member of the class and any defendant. Ford then moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to the Court of Common Pleas on February 14, 2009. In the brief in support of the motion, they argue Ford has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Remand, Doc. No. 6, "Plfs.' Remand Memo.") Defendant argues, to the contrary, that it has presented evidence to support its contention that the three criteria of CAFA have been met. (Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Remand, Doc. No. 10, "Def.'s Opp. Memo.")

Because this Court cannot address the Motion to Dismiss if it does not have subject matter jurisdiction question, we begin our analysis with Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand.

II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

Unless expressly precluded by an Act of Congress, a civil action may be removed from state court to the federal district court for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending, if that court would have had original jurisdiction over the claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, the case must be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) stating, "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." (Emphasis added.)

Pursuant to CAFA,

a federal district court has original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the matter in controversy-exceeds the sum or value of $ 5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which ... any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

This provision, however, does not apply to any class action in which the total number of class members is less than 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). In determining the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), the claims of the individual class members are to be aggregated. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).

Although CAFA itself is silent on the question, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined that, as in ordinary removal cases, the burden of proof in establishing federal jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA is on the party seeking removal. Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir.2006); see also Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir.2007), citing Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2004) ("the party asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court.") This includes the burden of establishing that all three criteria of CAFA are met, i.e., diversity of citizenship, a minimal amount in controversy of $5,000,000, and a class size of at least 100 members. Federico, id., citing Morgan, id.

"Generally speaking, the nature of plaintiffs' claim must be evaluated, and the propriety of remand decided, on the basis of the record as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed." Westmoreland Hospital Asso. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir.1979). However, this court may engage in factual analysis beyond the pleadings to determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction. Anthony v. Small Tube Mfg. Corp., 535 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (E.D.Pa. 2007).

A. The Parties' Arguments For and Against Federal Jurisdiction under CAFA

According to Defendant, the three criteria for federal jurisdiction under CAFA are clearly met. That is, the putative class representatives here both allege to be citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania while Defendant is incorporated in the State of Delaware with a principle place of business in the State of Michigan; thus the diversity criterion is satisfied.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Ford further argues that the number of Class Members and the amount in controversy criteria are met based on the number of Class Vehicles sold in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Papurello v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • 16 Noviembre 2015
    ...subject-matter jurisdiction the court must resolve before addressing defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 610 F.Supp.2d 476, 480 (W.D.Pa.2009) (“Because [the court] cannot address [the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss] if it does not have [subject......
  • Cnty. of Wash. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, Civil Action No. 11-1405
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • 17 Agosto 2012
    ...summary judgment." Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Remand Action to State Court, (ECF No. 16), at 4 (citing Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 476, 483 (W.D. Pa. 2009)). In the Third Circuit, the type of evidence properly considered for a motion for summary judgment is admissible ......
  • Lewis v. Ford Motor Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 5 Enero 2010
    ...member, 3 even when interest and costs were excluded (see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6)), damages per member would total $1,300. 610 F.Supp.2d 476, 484-86 (W.D.Pa.2009). An unrefuted declaration provided by Ford design analysis engineer which stated that the company had sold approximately 22, 000 ......
  • Mun. Water Auth. of Westmoreland Cnty. ex rel. Situated v. CNX Gas Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • 20 Septiembre 2016
    ...[an] amount in controversy [exceeding] $5,000,000, and a class size of at least [one hundred] members." Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 610 F.Supp.2d 476, 480 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Frederico, 507 F.3d at 193). There are two exceptions to a district court having subject-matter jurisdiction over c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT