Lewis v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 12 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2227 EDA 2019,2227 EDA 2019
• Citation: 234 A.3d 706
• Parties: William D. LEWIS, Appellant v. Cameron H. LEWIS
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

234 A.3d 706

William D. LEWIS, Appellant

v.Cameron H. LEWIS

No. 2227 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 24, 2020

Filed June 12, 2020

Megan Michael, Allentown, for appellant.

Nicholas J. Masington, III, Palmerton, for appellee.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

At issue in this appeal is the validity of a post-nuptial settlement agreement executed between Appellant William Lewis (Husband) and Appellee Cameron Lewis (Wife). Husband petitioned for enforcement of the settlement agreement and for Wife's contempt of the same. Wife counter-petitioned, claiming she only signed the agreement under duress, in constant fear of Husband's punishing retribution, in a daze from his manipulation of her medication, and without the opportunity to consult an attorney. Alternatively, Wife alleged fraud in the inducement, claiming Husband deceived her into believing the document was a legal fiction, a mere paper trail he needed for his employment, and not a settlement of their marital property incident to a divorce. After two days of testimony, the trial court took the extraordinary measure of invalidating the settlement agreement on both of these grounds. Husband appeals, and after careful review, we affirm.

The complex factual and procedural history of this case is as follows: The parties met in March 2013 when Husband hired Wife to provide childcare to his two children. At that time, Wife was 20 and Husband was 46. Within three weeks they married. Wife dropped out of college and became a stay-at-home stepmom. The parties had a daughter of their own the following year. Their marriage soon became tumultuous, as evinced by multiple legal proceedings. Throughout those proceedings, Husband maintained Wife suffered from various psychiatric disorders and that he was the victim of her physical abuse. In June 2016, Husband obtained a Protection From Abuse (PFA) order against Wife, which he claimed she repeatedly violated. This led to criminal charges, findings of contempt, and ultimately Wife's incarceration.

Then the truth was unveiled. In a July 2018 PFA hearing, evidence revealed Husband was the actual perpetrator of the abuse, and that once he was armed with the June 2016 PFA order, Husband used it as a weapon against Wife. Husband would invite Wife back to the marital home and then file contempt charges against her. The court concluded "Husband had been playing the system, using the Monroe Court of Common Pleas as one tool in furtherance of his very calculated, complex, web of domestic violence, control and intimidation against Wife." See Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O. 1), 6/24/19, at 1. The court granted Wife's July 2018 PFA petition and awarded her exclusive possession of the marital residence and temporary sole custody of the parties’ child.¹ Husband appealed that decision, and we affirmed. See C.H.L. v. W.D.L. , 214 A.3d 1272 (Pa. Super. 2019).

This appeal concerns the circumstances under which the parties executed their post-nuptial settlement agreement. Although we particularize the facts in our analysis below, we provide this summary by way of general background. In December 2016, following Husband's extensive abuse, including his manipulation of Wife's mental health and medication, Wife attempted suicide. While she recovered in a psychiatric hospital, Husband broached the idea of her signing a settlement agreement, which he assured her was simply a paper trail he needed to show his employer (the federal government) that he was separated from his "crazy wife," or else his security clearance would be jeopardized.

Wife was released from the hospital before Christmas 2016, but her mental and physical state did not improve. Husband continued dispensing Wife's medication to make her feel nauseous and apathetic. On January 10, 2017, Wife met with her psychiatrist to change her medication. Still, the medication's side effects remained unbearable, so three days later, on morning of January 13, 2017, Wife went back to the psychiatrist. Husband forced his attendance at these psychiatry appointments.

According to Wife, when the parties returned to their car after the second appointment, Husband gave her the settlement agreement. He allowed Wife ten minutes to review it as he drove her to a notary public. Husband reiterated that the settlement agreement was simply a paper trail he needed for work and that they would not divorce. When Wife told him she did not feel comfortable signing anything without consulting an attorney, Husband responded, "If you dare get a lawyer, I'm divorcing you and you will never see your daughter again." Wife said she believed this threat, because in the past, Husband inflicted punishments when she disobeyed him.

While Husband waited in the car, Wife had the agreement notarized by Steven Garvey, an acquaintance of Husband. Husband told Wife he could not come into the notary's office with her, or else it would look like he was forcing her to sign it. After Wife had her signature notarized, the parties drove to Husband's counsel, where he had his signature notarized while Wife waited in the car. The parties then returned home. Wife claimed she did not read the January 13, 2017 settlement agreement before she signed it. Wife asked Husband for a copy, but he refused to provide one. Until July 2018, the only time the parties discussed the settlement agreement was when Husband threatened Wife with divorce and reminded her she was entitled to nothing.

By virtue of the July 2018 PFA order, Wife received exclusive possession of the marital residence. Husband then filed a petition to enforce the settlement agreement, asserting his right to exclusive possession of the marital home; he also sought to hold Wife in contempt of that agreement. Wife filed a counter-petition challenging the validity of the settlement agreement on grounds of duress and fraud in the inducement. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on November 19, 2018 and February 1, 2019.

On June 24, 2019, the court issued an order invaliding the settlement agreement on the grounds of duress and fraud; the court dismissed Husband's petition as moot. The court issued a contemporaneous opinion explaining its decision. See T.C.O. 1, at 1-45. Upon receiving Husband's timely-filed concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, the court issued another opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) to supplement its previous one. See Supplemental Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O. 2), 9/16/19, at 1-10.

Husband presents three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in invalidating the divorce settlement agreement dated January 13, 2017, which was duly executed by the parties, on the grounds of duress?

2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by invalidating the divorce settlement agreement dated January 13, 2017, which was duly executed by the parties, on the grounds of intentional fraud in the inducement?

3. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by relying upon past court proceedings informing the basis of its opinion, thereby exhibiting an appearance of bias?

Husband's Brief at 7.

At the outset, we observe the relevant standards of review. Settlement agreements are subject to contract principles. See Sams v. Sams , 808 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2002). "In determining whether the trial court properly applied contract principles, the reviewing Court must decide, based on all the evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion." Id. (citation omitted). We have said an abuse of discretion

is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion. It is a strict legal term indicating that an appellate court is of the opinion that there was commission of an error of law by the trial court. It does not imply intentional wrong or bad faith, or misconduct, nor any reflection on the judge but means the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment—one that is clearly against logic and the effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing; an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law.

Adams v. Adams , 848 A.2d 991, 993-993 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). In conducting appellate review, "[w]e will not usurp the trial court's fact-finding function." Stackhouse v. Zaretsky , 900 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. Super. 2006). (citations omitted). To the extent that we must decide a question of law, however, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. See, e.g., Stoner v. Stoner , 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529, 530 n.1 (2003).

In his first issue, Husband contends the court abused its discretion when it invalidated the parties’ settlement agreement on grounds of duress. His argument is twofold: first, Husband argues the record did not support the court's findings; and second, even if the court's factual findings stand, they do not constitute duress as a matter of law. We discuss each argument in turn.

By claiming the record did not support the trial court's findings, Husband takes primary aim at the court's credibility determinations. It is well-settled that this Court is bound by the trial court's credibility determinations. See, e.g., Stamerro v. Stamerro , 889 A.2d 1251 (Pa. Super. 2005). This Court has explained how we review credibility determinations:

We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court's deductions or inferences from its factual findings.

V.B. v. J.E.B. , 55 A.3d 1193, 1198 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations...