Long v. Long
| Decision Date | 02 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 538 MDA 2021 |
| Citation | 282 A.3d 694 |
| Parties | Monica L. LONG v. Christopher A. LONG, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Ruth S. Borland and Sarah L. Borland, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.
Barry A. Lewis, Bloomsburg, for appellee.
Appellant Christopher Long (Husband) appeals the order denying his petition to modify the $1,800 monthly support obligation owed to Appellee Monica Long (Wife), per their Marriage Settlement Agreement. The Agreement treated the obligation as child support, but provided that if Husband requested a modification, the difference between any downward modification and the $1,800 payment would be converted to alimony. The issue is whether Wife is entitled to alimony after she remarried. The Columbia County Court of Common Pleas denied Husband's modification petition and concluded that the payments should not be treated as alimony at all, but as "equitable reimbursement" payments. After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.
The parties entered into a Marriage Settlement Agreement on June 2, 2018, and the trial court issued the divorce decree two months later.1 When the parties entered into the Agreement, both of their children were minors (born in 2000 and in 2006). The Marriage Settlement Agreement reflects the parties’ effort to preserve the marital home for Wife, so that the children could reside there until both graduated high school.
Husband agreed to transfer his interest in the martial residence to Wife. See Marriage Settlement Agreement, 6/2/18 at ¶ 27. In exchange, Wife agreed to refinance the residence and remove Husband's name from the mortgage; but the parties stipulated that if Wife could not refinance, or otherwise sold the house before the youngest child graduated high school, then the parties would split the proceeds of the sale. See id .
To ensure Wife could afford to stay in the marital residence until both children graduated, the Agreement provided that Husband would pay support as follows:
Id . at ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
Wife refinanced the mortgage, and the parties operated under the Agreement without issue. Husband continued paying the full amount of support ($1,800) even after the parties’ older child reached the age of majority in July 2018 and was removed from the Pennsylvania Automated Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES).
The two events triggering the instant litigation occurred in the Fall of 2020. First, in September 2020, Husband obtained shared physical custody of the parties’ remaining minor child; typically, a shared custody arrangement reduces the amount of an obligor's child support. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 . Second, Wife remarried, although it is unclear when.
In October 2020, Husband sought a child support modification before a support officer, but the support officer dismissed the action without prejudice, concluding that Husband first needed to file a motion with the trial court to modify the alimony provision. See Order of Court, 11/16/21. On January 15, 2021, Husband filed a "Petition to Modify and Interpret Marriage Settlement Agreement to Allow Modification of Child Support." The court set the matter for a predisposition conference, which was held in February 2021.
Husband's argument was threefold: 1) He was entitled to request a child support modification; 2) Wife was barred from receiving alimony due to her remarriage; and 3) because Wife was not entitled to alimony, his child support obligation should be modified downward. Wife argued that her remarriage was not a bar to alimony, relying on Zullo v. Zullo , 531 Pa. 377, 613 A.2d 544 (1992) (). The trial court ultimately denied Husband's petition, and Husband timely-filed this appeal.2
Husband presents the following two issues for our review:
We address these issues contemporaneously. We begin our discussion by recognizing that the principles governing contractual agreements are different from those governing court-ordered awards. Because the instant support obligation arose from an agreement, rather than a court-ordered award, this matter is governed by contract law. See Little v. Little , 441 Pa.Super. 185, 657 A.2d 12, 15 (1995) ; see also Rosiecki v. Rosiecki , 231 A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa. Super. 2020). It is well-settled that under contract law, the court must ascertain the intent of the parties when interpreting an agreement:
In cases of a written contract, the intent of the parties is the writing itself. If left undefined, the words of a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning. When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document itself. When, however, an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is patent, created by the language of the instrument, or latent, created by extrinsic or collateral circumstances. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.
Kripp v. Kripp , 578 Pa. 82, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004) (citations omitted).
In determining whether the trial court properly applied contract principles, the reviewing Court must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lewis , 234 A.3d 706, 711 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). We have explained the dichotomy as follows:
Rosiecki , 231 A.3d at 933 (citation omitted).
Moreover, we are not limited by a trial court's rationale, as we may affirm its decision on any basis. Id.
At the outset, we observe that child support obligations are modifiable by the court upon a showing of a changed circumstance, even when that obligation arose from a marriage settlement agreement. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(b) ; see also Love v. Love , 33 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Nicholson v. Combs , 550 Pa. 23, 703 A.2d 407 (1997) ).
In this matter, the trial court operated under the mistaken view that unlike a court-ordered child support award, an agreement for child support could not be modified downward, because parties may not bargain away the child's right to support. See, e.g., Knorr v. Knorr , 527 Pa. 83, 588 A.2d 503, 505 (1991). Put another way, the trial court seemingly believed that, if a contract provides for child support above and beyond what a parent would owe under the Statutory Guidelines,3 then the parent may not seek a downward modification. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/21 (T.C.O.) at 5. This is not entirely accurate.4
However, the principal reason why the trial court denied Husband's modification request, was because the request was, in the court's view, "academic." Id. The court explained that, under Paragraph 28, whatever downward child support modification Husband obtained would be irrelevant, because alimony would then make up the difference.
The trial court's rationale overlooks Wife's remarriage and any pre-2019 tax consequences. Under the Divorce Code, an alimony obligation terminates upon the payee's remarriage or cohabitation. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(e), 3706. Relying on the Code, Husband reasoned that without alimony, he was entitled to an actual reduction of his monthly support obligation.
Regarding Wife's eligibility to receive alimony, despite her remarriage, the trial court agreed with Wife's reliance on Zullo, supra. See T.C.O. at 3-4. The court concluded that Wife's remarriage did not bar her from receiving the payments, because payments were "an amalgam of child support and equitable alimony designated for the benefit of the child." Id . at 6 (emphasis added).
On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court's reliance on Z...
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