Lewis v. Lewis, Record No. 1807-04-2 (VA 5/10/2005)
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 1807-04-2. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | THOMAS RANDOLPH LEWIS v. COURTENAY MUNFORD LEWIS. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Powhatan County, Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge.
Donald K. Butler (Mary Beth Joachim; ButlerCook, L.L.P., on briefs), for appellant.
David M. Branch for appellee.
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys.
Thomas Randolph Lewis, appellant (husband), appeals the trial court's dismissal of his cross-bill of complaint for annulment of his marriage to Courtenay Munford Lewis, appellee (wife). Wife contends husband lacks standing to challenge the validity of the previous marriage. For the reasons stated, we find the trial court did not err.
The facts are essentially uncontroverted. Wife married Frederick Latimer Wells on July 6, 1963. On September 25, 1975, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, entered a final decree of divorce, finding wife had been "an actual bona fide resident of the City of Richmond, State of Virginia . . . ."
Wife married husband on March 1, 1976 in Haiti. The couple lived together as husband and wife until March 1, 2003, when they separated.
Upon learning that the Richmond divorce of September 25, 1975 may be void for lack of jurisdiction, wife, while married to appellant, filed again for divorce against Frederick L. Wells on May 23, 1979. Her bill of complaint, this time filed in Powhatan County, Virginia, alleged that the earlier divorce suit was "erroneously filed in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division II and that the divorce . . . decreed by that court is null and void." She further alleged she was not aware of the invalidity of the divorce decree until May 17, 1979. The Circuit Court of Powhatan County entered a final decree against Frederick L. Wells on August 30, 1979, finding "the facts alleged in the bill of complaint have been proved and fully sustained." Following this decree, neither wife nor husband took action to validate this present marriage.
On March 9, 2004, wife filed a bill of complaint against husband, praying for a final decree of divorce based on one-year separation. Among other relief, wife asked for an equitable distribution award.
Husband answered the bill of complaint and filed a cross-bill for annulment, alleging the marriage to be void. He claimed that at the time of their marriage, wife was not validly divorced from Wells.
Wife filed an answer to husband's cross-bill, asserting husband had no standing to attack the validity of the prior Richmond divorce. She filed a motion in limine requesting the trial court to preclude husband from introducing evidence of the prior 1979 pleadings and divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court of Powhatan County divorcing wife from Wells. The motion in limine asserted the Powhatan proceedings were relevant and material to neither the pending divorce nor the pending cross-bill for annulment and therefore were inadmissible.
Without presenting testimony, counsel argued their respective positions at the hearing. The trial court dismissed the cross-bill, finding husband had no standing to challenge the validity of the 1975 Richmond divorce. While the trial judge ruled solely on the standing issue, she also concluded she saw nothing in the 1975 order that rendered it void. Further, the trial court opined there was no evidence in the 1979 divorce action from which the court could have concluded the 1975 decree was invalid. The trial court then said, "[s]o I do not believe Mr. Lewis has standing, but I mention these other two things for whatever help it is in the future." The court therefore granted the motion in limine and the motion to dismiss.
As a preliminary matter, we asked both parties to brief the issue of whether or not the trial court's dismissal of the cross-bill is an appealable order. After reviewing the briefs, we are satisfied that this matter is properly before this Court.
This Court is vested with jurisdiction over matters involving affirmance or annulment of a marriage. Code § 17.1-405(3)(a). The statute allows that interlocutory orders may be appealed if they "adjudicate the principles of a cause." Code § 17.1-405(4)(ii). An interlocutory decree adjudicates the principles of a cause when the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit. Whitaker v. Day, 32 Va. App. 737, 743, 530 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2000). "An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a domestic relations dispute `must respond to the chief object of the suit,' . . . which is to determine the status of the parties' marriage and the custody of the parties' children, and, if appropriate, to award spousal and child support." Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 86, 509 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1999) (quoting Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 391, 451 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1994)) (citation omitted).
The order dismissing husband's cross-bill "adjudicates the principles of a cause." By holding that husband cannot attack wife's former marriage and by dismissing his suit for annulment, the court has, by implication, determined that a valid marriage exists between husband and wife. This determines the rights of the parties and responds to the chief object of the suit because it determines the status of the parties' marriage. Because the court has determined that the parties are married, this ruling "would necessarily affect the final order in the case." See Erikson at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 713.
The dissent relies on Erikson to conclude the dismissal of husband's cross-bill is not an appealable order. Erikson does not involve the dismissal of a cross-bill. The facts in the Erikson opinion only recite that a bill of complaint was filed seeking a divorce. Id. at 390, 451 S.E.2d at 712. The trial court entered a decree that held only that the marriage was valid. Id. The decree Id. at 390-91, 451 S.E.2d at 712. We also determined the order was not an interlocutory decree that adjudicated the principles of the cause. Id. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 712. We concluded:
Although the factual finding and legal holding that the parties are validly married is an essential element of the complainant's cause of action, that ruling is not a legal determination of "the principles" that are necessary to adjudicate the cause, and the ruling does not "respond to the chief object of the suit which was to secure a divorce." See Webb v. Webb, 13 Va. App. 681, 682, 414 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1992); Polumbo v. Polumbo, 13 Va. App. 306, 411 S.E.2d 229 (1991); Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 407 S.E.2d 37 (1991); Pinkard [v. Pinkard], 12 Va. App. 848, 407 S.E.2d 339 [1991].
Erikson at 391-92, 451 S.E.2d at 713. Thus, we find Erikson is factually distinguishable and not controlling.
This issue before this Court is narrow in scope. Husband argues the trial court erred in ruling he had no standing to challenge the validity of the 1975 Richmond divorce. Wife argues the present marriage is valid.
Appellant's only contention in his question presented is that the trial court erred in dismissing the cross-bill for annulment and ruling that the marriage between the parties is valid. He argues on brief that the 1979 Powhatan divorce decree renders the previous 1975 decree void. Husband's logic is that since the 1979 Powhatan County divorce determined the 1975 Richmond divorce decree between wife and Wells to be void, then wife was still married to Wells when she "married" husband in 1976. Thus, the marriage between husband and wife is a nullity.1
The 1979 proceedings are not before us since the trial court granted the motion in limine, thus barring the introduction of those pleadings at the trial level. Husband did not challenge the granting of the motion in limine on appeal. The validity of that ruling is not part of the question presented and thus is not cognizable on appeal. See Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 35 Va. App. 31, 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785, 789 n.4 (2001) (); see also Rule 5A:20(c). The only issue before us is whether the trial court erred in dismissing appellant's cross-bill for lack of standing.
Thus, we cannot consider the 1979 Powhatan County divorce in determining whether the trial court erred in dismissing the cross-bill for lack of standing.2 Husband made it abundantly clear in his brief and oral argument that he is not attacking the 1975 Richmond divorce decree.
Husband, in this appeal, can only prevail by showing the 1979 Powhatan decree found the 1975 Richmond decree void. Without the 1979 divorce before us, husband's appeal fails. See Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 617, 359 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1987) ().
We find the trial court did not erred in dismissing the cross-bill for annulment.3
Affirmed.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1. Since the parties did not argue the marriage between husband and wife was void ab initio and did not need any proceedings to declare it void, we will not address that issue. See Code § 20-43 (...
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