Lewis v. Maguder, No. CV 05 4001921 (Conn. Super. 5/3/2006)

• Decision Date: 03 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV 05 4001921,CV 05 4001921
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Ernest Lewis, IV v. Frederick Maguder Opinion No.: 93378

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Unpublished Opinion

Ernest Lewis, IV v. Frederick Maguder Opinion No.: 93378

No. CV 05 4001921

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of Windham at Willimantic

May 3, 2006

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ROBERT A. MARTIN, JUDGE.

On April 13, 2005, the plaintiff, Ernest H. Lewis IV, filed a three-count complaint against the defendant, Frederick G. Maguder. In count one, the plaintiff seeks a reformation of a deed due to mutual mistake; in count two, he seeks a reformation of a deed due to inequitable conduct; and in count three, he seeks to quiet title. The following facts are alleged in the complaint. The original owner of 215 Wauregan Road in Canterbury, Connecticut was Mark A. Robinson. On June 15, 2001, Robinson, as the seller, and the defendant, as the purchaser, executed a written purchase and sale agreement for a parcel of property consisting of approximately twenty-four acres derived from a free split of Robinson's property.¹ Pursuant to the terms of the purchase and sale agreement, Robinson was to subdivide 215 Wauregan Road into two lots, retaining one lot for and conveying the other lot (lot 11) to the defendant; "[l]ot 11 was to be sold subject to an understanding of the property boundaries between the parties."

On June 16, 2001, Robinson and the defendant executed a written addendum to the aforementioned purchase and sale agreement.² According to the addendum, it was agreed that "a fifty-foot wide parcel of land extending from Wauregan Road to the Quinnebaug River over an existing driveway on the easterly boundary of Mark A. Robinson's property was to be transferred to the defendant as part of Lot 11." The parties also agreed that (1) Robinson and his heirs and assigns "were to have free and unobstructed use of the driveway located within the fifty-foot wide parcel for their purposes"; (2) the land located to the east of the driveway was to be kept clear of "all materials, equipment, livestock, etc."; (3) Robinson and the defendant would define each party's rights to the fifty-foot parcel's use; (4) one or more encroachments by Robinson that existed within the fifty-foot parcel would continue to remain in existence after the sale, which at the time included a barn and some fencing; and (5) these "encroachments would be defined and recorded in the Canterbury land records."

In drafting the deed³ conveying lot 11, the scrivener mistakenly failed to include and reduce to writing the agreement concerning the fifty-foot wide parcel and the encroachments referenced in the purchase and sale agreement and the addendum. At the time of the conveyance, on October 24, 2001, Robinson was in poor health and visually impaired, thus, he could not read the terms of the deed he signed. Robinson relied on the accuracy of the scrivener. He died on March 30, 2003, never discovering the error. Robinson's retained property passed to his widow, Victoria M. Robinson, by a certificate of devise, dated January 27, 2005. On January 31, 2005, Victoria M. Robinson conveyed her interest to the plaintiff by warranty deed, which is recorded in the Canterbury land records. The scrivener's mistake remained undetected until after the retained property was conveyed to the plaintiff.

In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the mistake was mutual and common to both Robinson and the defendant. When the plaintiff discovered the error, he requested that the defendant join him in an endorsement of the deed or other appropriate writing to correct the error, both of which the defendant refused to do. As a result, the plaintiff claims a reformation of the deed so that it will be in conformity with the agreement between Robinson and the defendant. In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's receipt of the deed has caused the plaintiff, as Robinson's successor in title, inequity. Because the deed did not conform to Robinson and the defendant's agreement, inadequate consideration was provided for the deed's execution.

In count three, the plaintiff alleges that he is the absolute owner and in possession of a barn and the real estate upon which the barn sits, both of which are described in the deed of conveyance. The plaintiff acquired his title and interest in the barn and underlying land from Robinson's widow through a warranty deed. The defendant claims estates or interests in all or part of the real estate upon which the barn is situated, which are averse to the plaintiff's title and interest in the barn and real estate. The plaintiff requests that the court resolve any disputes concerning the ownership of this real estate and quiet and settle title in favor of the plaintiff

On November 3, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts one, two and three of the complaint on the grounds that the complaint does not "state a claim upon which relief can be granted" because: (1) no privity of contract exists between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) all of the purchase and sale contract's conditions have merged into the deed; and (3) Robinson, a necessary party to the action, is absent. The defendant also submitted a memorandum of law in support of his motion. On November 15, 2005, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly . . . rather than narrowly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1289 (2006).

As to the first ground raised, the defendant argues that there is no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, because "[t]here was nothing in the contract that was to benefit the [p]laintiff or his immediate predecessor in title," without which "the plaintiff has no legal standing to bring an action against the [d]efendant to enforce any conditions in the Purchase and Sales Agreement between the [d]efendant and Mark A. Robinson." The defendant argues that to enforce a contract, a party must be in "privity of contract" with the opposing party and that neither a beneficiary nor a contemplated beneficiary to a contract can enforce the contract. In response, the plaintiff argues that the first and second counts of the complaint⁴ are for the reformation of a deed, not a breach of contract, and that privity is not required in the former cause of action. The plaintiff maintains that his reformation of the deed claim is based on two alternative theories, mutual mistake and inequitable conduct. The plaintiff states that "[i]t is established law that where the predecessor in title to the plaintiff was mistaken in the assumption of what he was conveying, the plaintiff succeeds to the equitable right to a reformation which his grantor had against the defendant."

At short calendar, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff has standing to bring this lawsuit. A defendant's concession alone, however, is an insufficient reason for the court to deny the motion on the ground of lack of privity. In fact, the Supreme Court has declared that "the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time . . . [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear . . . Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 502, 876 A.2d 1148 (2005). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted. McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 820, 889 A.2d 759 (2006). Therefore, the court must independently determine whether the plaintiff has standing to bring this action.

In Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 41 A.2d 113 (1945), a building and loan association foreclosed on a mortgage, which erroneously described a lot as number 31 instead of lot number 32. The plaintiffs purchased what they thought was lot 32 from the association, but the deed, which followed the mortgage's provisions, described lot 31. The plaintiffs brought a lawsuit "primarily on the ground of mistake, in order to secure title to . . . lot [32]." Id., 492. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. One of the defendants, the person who originally owned both lots 31 and 32, appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that both the plaintiffs and the association were mistaken in assuming that the association was conveying lot 32 to the plaintiffs. The court further held that "under these circumstances, the plaintiffs succeeded to the equitable right to a reformation which their grantor had as against [the mortgagors of the property]." Id., 494.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that Robinson, a party to the original purchase and sale agreement, was mistaken in assuming that the deed would address the rights related to the fifty-foot wide parcel and the encroachments. The plaintiff also alleges that the property interest retained by Robinson passed to his widow, who subsequently conveyed this property interest to the plaintiff. Therefore, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's allegations for purposes of this ...