McBurney v. Cirillo
| Citation | 889 A.2d 759,276 Conn. 782 |
| Decision Date | 24 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 17315.,17315. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | James R.G. McBURNEY et al. v. Frank A. CIRILLO et al. James R.G. McBurney v. James G. Baldwin et al. James R.G. McBurney et al. v. Antoinette F. Verderame et al. James R.G. McBurney v. Peter P. Paquin et al. |
William F. Gallagher, Syracuse, NY, with whom, on the brief, was Hugh D. Hughes, for the appellees-appellants (defendants).
BORDEN, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and TIERNEY, Js.
In these consolidated appeals, four of the defendants appeal, the plaintiffs appeal, and four of the defendants cross appeal1 from the judgment of the trial court.2 The plaintiffs, James R.G. McBurney and Erin McBurney, brought these consolidated quiet title actions asserting claims for trespass and adverse possession, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, all of whom own property in the same development as the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendants have implied and prescriptive easements over a portion of the plaintiffs' property. In their appeals and cross appeals, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly found for the plaintiffs against the Baldwin and Cirillo defendants on the trespassing count, and challenge the trial court's conclusion that all of the defendants lacked standing collaterally to attack the orders of the Probate Court permitting the plaintiffs to purchase the disputed area of land. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiffs brought these four separate quiet title actions against the defendants, alleging claims for trespass and adverse possession and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.3 The Verderame and Paquin defendants counterclaimed that they had acquired a prescriptive easement over the property; the Baldwin and Cirillo defendants raised the same claim by way of special defense. Those actions were subsequently consolidated for trial.4 After a court trial, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession as against all defendants.5 On the plaintiffs' actions for trespass, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs against the Baldwin and Cirillo defendants, but found against the plaintiffs as to the Verderame and Paquin defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief as against the Baldwin, Verderame and Paquin defendants, but granted the plaintiffs' requested relief as against the Cirillo defendants. Regarding the rights of the parties to the disputed property, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs held title to the land, and that the defendants had an easement, by virtue of both implication and prescription, over the property. These appeals followed.
The trial court found the following relevant facts. The plaintiffs own property at 2 Crescent Bluff Avenue in the Pine Orchard section of Branford. That property is identified as lot 4 on an 1885 plan (Baker plan), which was drafted following a survey of thirty-five building lots on a five acre tract of land (development) owned by Ellis B. Baker, trustee.6 In its description of the Baker plan and the development, the trial court quoted from this court's description in Fisk v. Ley, 76 Conn. 295, 56 A. 559 (1903), in which we considered a claim regarding the same development. (Citation omitted.) Id., at 297, 56 A. 559.
Currently, beyond the lawn in front of lots 2 and 4 is a concrete slope, alongside which a concrete ramp runs down to the seawall walkway atop the seawall. Immediately adjacent to the concrete ramp, a set of stairs leads down to the water. The portion of the lawn in front of lot 4 extends eighteen feet between the southern border of lot 4 and the beginning of the concrete slope, which is now separated from the lawn by a fence that runs between the lawn and the concrete slope in front of lots 2 and 4.
The relevant records in the chain of title to the plaintiffs' property trace back to a 1950 conveyance in fee, of lot 4, along with a ten foot strip of the lawn area south of lot 4 (first lawn parcel), from John Moran to Margaret Walker, which conveyance the parties agree constitutes the plaintiffs' root of title for purposes of the Connecticut Marketable Record Title Act (act), General Statutes § 47-33b et seq. Moran retained ownership of the remaining eight feet of lawn and the remaining strip of land in front of lot 4 lying between the lawn and the Sound (second lawn parcel).7 The first lawn parcel was subsequently conveyed several more times before the plaintiffs' predecessor in title, William Craig, eventually sold it to the plaintiffs in 1997. After the plaintiffs had purchased the first lawn parcel, Moran's estate was reopened under a claim that it owned the second lawn parcel. That parcel was subsequently conveyed by way of a fiduciary's deed, for the sum of $1, to Roger Lowlicht and his wife, Kay Haedicke, who then, by way of a quitclaim deed, conveyed the second lawn parcel to the plaintiffs.8 Only the parties' interests in this second lawn parcel are at issue in these appeals. Put another way, the defendants did not challenge in the trial court and do not challenge on appeal the plaintiffs' ownership of and exclusive right to use the first lawn parcel, constituting the ten feet of lawn directly in front of lot 4. Only the second lawn parcel, constituting the remaining eight feet of lawn in front of lot 4 and the remaining strip of land in front of lot 4 lying between the lawn and the Sound, is at issue.9
The defendants own rear lots in the development, that is, lots that line the avenue and are not shorefront properties. Over the years, rear lot owners, including the defendants, have crossed the lawn area in front of lots 2 and 4 to go down to the Sound. Others have crossed that same portion of the lawn area to walk over to an adjoining lot where a stairway led directly to the water. Some rear lot owners have even gathered at the top of the ramp to socialize, converse and sunbathe. None of the rear lot owners had been prevented from crossing the lawn or gathering at the top of the concrete ramp until 1996, when Lowlicht and Haedicke, the owners of lots 2 and 6, erected a fence that runs across the lawn area in front of lots 2 and 4 and prevents access from the lawn in front of lots 2 and 4 to the concrete ramp, the concrete slope, the seawall and the seawall walkway.10
Prior to erecting the fence, Lowlicht, as well as Craig, had presented a property agreement (agreement), drafted by Craig, to the rear lot owners. The agreement provided that Craig and Lowlicht would pay, in part, for some needed repairs to the seawall and for the construction of new stairs leading down to the Sound from the portion of the lawn that lies directly south of the avenue.11 In exchange, the rear lot owners would agree to release and quitclaim to the owners, successors and assigns of lots 2 and 4, all the rights, title and interest of the rear lot owners in and to the lawn areas lying in front of lots 2 and 4. The Baldwin and Cirillo defendants, along with several other rear lot owners who are not parties to this action, signed the agreement; the Verderame and Paquin defendants did not. The agreement was subsequently recorded in the Branford land records. The repairs were completed shortly thereafter. Subsequently, a number of the rear lot owners, including the Baldwins, Cirillos and Verderames, demanded that the agreement be rescinded. Lowlicht and Craig refused.
The plaintiffs brought these four separate quiet title actions against the defendants, alleging claims for trespass and adverse possession, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.12 Those actions were subsequently consolidated for trial. After a court trial, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession as against all defendants.13 The court further ruled that the plaintiffs held title to the second lawn parcel and that the defendants had an implied easement over the second lawn parcel by virtue of the Baker plan and a decision of this court interpreting that plan; Fisk v. Ley, supra, 76 Conn. 295, 56 A. 559; and also had acquired an easement by prescription over the second lawn parcel by virtue of the use of that parcel by the different rear lot owners over the years.
Because the Cirillo defendants had signed the agreement relinquishing their rights to the second lawn parcel, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' requested injunction against them. Although the Baldwin defendants had also signed the agreement, and, therefore, had also relinquished their rights to the second lawn parcel, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' requested...
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