Lewis v. Miller

• Decision Date: 26 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2:11-cv-0423 LKK EFB P,2:11-cv-0423 LKK EFB P
• Parties: CANDICE LEWIS, Petitioner, v. WALTER MILLER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

CANDICE LEWIS, Petitioner,

v.WALTER MILLER, Respondent.

No. 2:11-cv-0423 LKK EFB P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: September 26, 2012

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She challenges a 2008 judgment of conviction entered against her in the Sacramento Superior Court on charges of first degree murder with the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery; second degree robbery; attempted use of a forged access card; and use on four occasions of a forged access card. She seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated by the admission into evidence of her statements to police; (2) the admission into evidence of statements by her co-defendant's brother violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of the witnesses against her; (3) her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (4) her trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (5) the cumulative effect of errors at her trial violated her right to due process.

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

I. Factual Background¹

Defendant Candice Lewis and codefendant Eric Ramsey lured a 62-year-old victim to an area where they robbed him of his money and car and killed him by either strangling him or running him over with his car. They then used or attempted to use his credit card at various locations. Tried in front of dual juries, defendant and Ramsey were found guilty of first degree murder, second degree robbery, attempted use of a forged access card, and use on four occasions of a forged access card.² Defendant's jury found a felony-murder special circumstance to be true.

Sentenced to prison for 25 years to life, defendant appeals.³ She contends the court should have excluded her statements during an initial interview with police as well as her statements thereafter, that is, statements made during a recorded conversation with Ramsey at the police station, their joint interview with the police, and their interview with the police at the crime scene. She claims that in the initial interview with the police, she did not voluntarily waive her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. She also claims that her statements were involuntary. We reject her claims and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2006, Detective Michael Lange interviewed defendant at the police station. The interview was recorded and shows the following:

Defendant, who is young and pregnant, waits in a room for about an hour before the interview begins.⁴ About 40 minutes into her wait, she is upset and knocks on the door. She wants to see a nurse, complaining that the baby is kicking. She explains the baby kicks when she feels stress. The detective lets her leave the room to walk around. She returns a short time later and says she is better. Defendant asks if the detective has spoken with her mother.

The detective responds that he had spoken with defendant's mother, that she knew that defendant was at the police station, and that she went to church but planned to return. Defendant did not ask to see or talk to her mother and responded, "Okay," to the detective's explanation. The detective then returns to start the interview. He states, "I have to read you your rights since you're down here at the police station." "I'm gonna read those rights to you and then we can - and move on and talk." Defendant [sic] then reads defendant her rights pursuant to Miranda. Defendant responds "Un-huh" or nods affirmatively after each right. More than an hour into the interview, during which defendant is caught in one lie after another and confesses to the crimes, she asks if she is going to be able to talk to her mother. The detective responds that defendant's mother plans to call when she is finished at church. Defendant responds, "Oh, she's still in church?" The detective states that defendant's mother planned to call and he needed to leave to check his messages. Defendant states, "Okay." The detective returned and informed defendant that he and defendant's mother had traded messages. The detective then brings up an allusion defendant had made earlier that it was Ramsey's plan to rob the victim. Defendant states that while Ramsey mentioned such a plan, he never told her the details, and she assumed it was just talk. The detective then tells her that Ramsey told another officer she was the mastermind. The detective then tells defendant to think about that while he leaves the room to respond to a call from defendant's mother. He steps into the hall. When he returns, he tells defendant that her mother is concerned about defendant and the baby. The officer reiterates that Ramsey is "putting most of this on you." Defendant denies it was her idea. At the end of the interview, the detective has defendant write a letter of apology to the victim's family. Defendant asks if her mother was coming to the police station. The detective responds that defendant's mother will not be coming immediately but "know[s] what's going on." Defendant responds, "Okay."

Apparently, while defendant was being interviewed by Detective Lange, Ramsey was interviewed by Detective Pat Higgins. After their individual interviews, defendant and Ramsey were interviewed together. Later, they sat together in the interview room with the tape running unbeknownst to them. Subsequently, they led the detectives to the crime scene where the interviews continued. Defendant was then transported to juvenile hall.

Prior to trial, defendant filed an in limine motion "to not allow [defendant]'s statement to law enforcement and all fruits of the statement."

After a hearing, the court found defendant understood her Miranda rights and waived them. The court therefore denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements.

Dckt. 19-1 at 2-5.

II. Procedural Background

After the California Court of Appeal affirmed her judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 5. Therein, she claimed that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements to police. Id. On November 19, 2009, that petition was summarily denied. Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 6.

On February 18, 2010, petitioner, proceeding in pro per, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento County Superior Court (Case No. 10F01060), claiming that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress her statements to police; and that the combination of her trial counsel's ineffective assistance, "cumulative error," and "prejudicial error by the court" violated her right to due process.⁵ Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 7. By order dated April 6, 2010, the Superior Court denied that petition on the grounds that petitioner's claim regarding her statements to police had been raised and rejected on appeal, and her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unsupported by any specific factual allegations. Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 8.

On February 3, 2011, petitioner, now proceeding through counsel, filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento County Superior Court (Case No. 11F00682). Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 9. Therein, she claimed that: (1) the admission into evidence of statements by her co-defendant's brother violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of the witnesses against her; (2) her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) her trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (4) the cumulative effect of the errors at her trial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. By order dated March 7, 2011, the Superior Court denied that petition on the grounds that it was an impermissible successive petition, that it was untimely, that it sought toraise issues which could and should have been raised on appeal, and that the claims contained therein lacked merit in any event. Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 10.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, raising the same four claims that she raised in her second habeas petition filed in the Superior Court. Dckt. 14-1 at 2-52. By order dated May 12, 2011, the Court of Appeal summarily denied that petition "on the merits," without issuing an order to show cause. Dckt. 14-2. On May 18, 2011, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, raising the same four claims. Dckt. 14-3. The Supreme Court ordered respondent to file an answer to the petition, in which he should address:

Whether petitioner established a prima facie case for relief, such that this court should grant the petition for review, and transfer the matter to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause.

Resp.'s Lodg. Doc. 17, at 1. After respondent filed his answer, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. Id. at 2.

Petitioner commenced the instant action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on February 14, 2011.

III. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief:

An application

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