Lewis v. New Mexico Dept. of Health
| Decision Date | 05 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 99-0021 MV/JHG.,CIV 99-0021 MV/JHG. |
| Citation | 275 F.Supp.2d 1319 |
| Parties | Ben LEWIS, Aaron Norrid, Billy Jo Quisenberry and Fred Romero, by and through their legal guardian and next friend the ARC of New Mexico, Breanne Liddell, by and through her parent and legal guardian Judy Liddell, Matthew Allen, by and through his parents and legal guardians Jim and Angela Allen, Fay Morgan, Deborah Eminger and Protection and Advocacy System, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, New Mexico Department of Human Services, J. Alex Valdez, Secretary of the Department of Health and Secretary Designee of the Department of Human Services in his official capacities, and Governor Gary Johnson in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Duff Westbrook, Michael C. Parks, V. Colleen Miller, for Plaintiffs.
Charles A. Pharris, Kurt Wihl, Margaret Davidson, Gary J. Van Luchene, for Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 133], filed July 10, 2002, and fully briefed on August 9, 2002; Defendant Governor Gary Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of Legislative Immunity [Doc. No. 136], filed July 15, 2002, and fully briefed on August 9, 2002; Defendants' Motion to Strike all Claims Seeking Class Action-Like Relief [Doc. No. 134], filed July 15, 2002, and fully briefed on August 9, 2002; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits Supporting Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 159], filed August 20, 2002, and fully briefed on September 20, 2002. Having considered the motions, the memoranda in support and in opposition, and the relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, the Court finds that (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint is well taken and will be granted; (2) Defendant Governor Gary Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of Legislative Immunity is well taken and will be granted; (3) Defendants' Motion to Strike all Claims Seeking Class Action-Like Relief is not well taken and will be denied; and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits Supporting Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is not well taken and will be denied.
Plaintiffs filed this declaratory action against the New Mexico Department of Health (DOH) and the New Mexico Department of Human Services (HSD), alleging violations under both the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq., as well as due process violations actionable under 42 U.S.C § 1983.2 Initially, the Plaintiffs in this case were Protection and Advocacy (P & A), an advocacy group, and individuals who were eligible to participate in Medicaid programs because of their physical or developmental disabilities or because of their advanced age. Plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to less restrictive home and community-based services with "reasonable promptness" instead of the institutional care they were receiving. Instead, they had been on waiting lists to receive these waiver services for as many as seven years.
On June 14, 1999, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Based on Sovereign Immunity, a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and a Motion to Dismiss Governor Gary Johnson. Defendants claimed sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendant Governor Johnson moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim against him. By Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed April 24, 2000, the Court denied in part and granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The Court found the state agency defendants, DOH and HSD, did not have a state sovereign immunity defense from the ADA claims. As to the state officials, Defendants Valdez and Governor Johnson, the Court found Plaintiffs could not maintain ADA claims against them. However, the Court found Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the state official defendants were proper under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Finally, the Court found Plaintiffs' allegations, which the Court assumed to be true under a 12(b)(6) motion, were sufficient to maintain their § 1983 claims against Governor Johnson for failing to provide waiver services.
Because some of the individually named Plaintiffs in the case had received the waiver services and others had passed away, leaving only P & A as a party in the case, on March 2, 2000, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on the claims of the individual plaintiffs on the grounds of mootness, and on March 13, 2000, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss P & A for lack of standing. On March 14, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Second Amended Complaint.
On May 2, 2000, Defendants appealed the Court's denial of their motions to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On August 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Court's denial of Defendants' motion asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity but declined to exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction over the Court's denial of Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion. Thereafter, the parties filed the motions that are the subject of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
By Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed November 5, 2002, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss P & A for lack of standing. The Court granted Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the claims of Ben Lewis, Aaron Norrid, Fred Romero and Deborah Eminger. The Court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint, except for the addition of new plaintiffs.
On January 3, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Notice, advising the Court they did not intend to file the Second Amended Complaint that was the subject of their March 14, 2000 Motion to Amend. However, Plaintiffs reserved the right to appeal the Court's ruling not to allow the addition of new plaintiffs. On January 14, 2003, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Dismissal of Claims of Plaintiffs Breanne Liddell and Matthew Allen, and for Entry of Partial Judgment with Respect to Their Claims. On January 29, 2003, the Court entered its Order, granting the parties' Joint Motion and dismissing the claims of Plaintiffs Breanne Liddell and Matthew Allen. On the same day, the Court entered partial judgment in favor of Defendants on the claims of Plaintiffs Liddell and Allen.
This Court will grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The movant carries the burden of establishing there are no genuine issues of material fact, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), but may discharge its burden by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). In making its summary judgment determination, the court looks at the pleadings and documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Deepwater Invs., v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp. 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991), and the movant must show beyond a reasonable doubt it is entitled to summary judgment, Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). However, once the burden shifts to the non-movant, that party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, "the mere existence of some factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. If the non-movant cannot make such a showing, after adequate time for discovery, summary judgment is mandated. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court will consider the parties' motions for summary judgment in light of these standards.
The well settled doctrine of absolute legislative immunity bars actions against legislators on the basis of their roles in enacting or signing legislation. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). "The Supreme Court, however, `has been careful not to extend the scope of [legislative immunity] protection further than its purposes require,' and the government official seeking immunity bears the burden of showing that an exemption from personal liability is justified." Kamplain v. Curry County Board of Commissioners, 159 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1998)(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). Legislative immunity applies to legislators engaged "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), and protects legislators "not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967). Legislative immunity applies to § 1983 actions...
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