Lewis v. New York City Housing Authority, 8951

Decision Date18 April 2019
Docket NumberIndex 155630/14,8951
Citation96 N.Y.S.3d 860 (Mem),171 A.D.3d 556
Parties Nakia LEWIS, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York (Linda M. Brown, of counsel), for appellant.

Alexander J. Wulwick, New York, for respondent.

Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Webber, Gesmer, Singh, JJ.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered March 29, 2018, which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff testified at her deposition and General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing that at around noon on the alleged date of the accident, she went to visit a friend, who lived in the same building, one floor up on the fifth floor. When plaintiff entered the fourth floor stairwell, she saw a NYCHA maintenance employee sweeping the stairs. She observed a bucket and mop on the fifth floor landing. The employee told her not to go up the stairs and to use a second staircase. They exchanged words before plaintiff ascended the stairs to the fifth floor.

Plaintiff's friend did not answer the door. Plaintiff returned to her apartment using the same staircase. The NYCHA maintenance employee was now sweeping the stairwell on the fifth floor. Plaintiff did not see any water on the stairs before she started walking down to the fourth floor. As plaintiff proceeded, she first heard water and then saw water running down the stairs between her legs. She turned around and saw the NYCHA maintenance employee holding a dripping mop over the landing. Plaintiff continued to walk down. She suddenly felt herself slip and allegedly fell down the rest of the staircase (cf. Brown v. New York Marriot Marquis Hotel, 95 A.D.3d 585, 943 N.Y.S.2d 531 [1st Dept. 2012] [where plaintiff acknowledged that before she fell, she observed the open door, yellow cone, and liquid, which led her to suspect that the steps were wet, but she proceeded to descend them in any event] ). On this record, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the employee's actions were a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident.

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