Lewis v. Oates
Decision Date | 05 June 1946 |
Docket Number | No. A-638.,A-638. |
Citation | 195 S.W.2d 123 |
Parties | LEWIS v. OATES. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Garland Casebier, of Fort Stockton, for petitioner.
Travers Crumpton, of Fort Stockton, for respondent.
The following statement will suffice to present and make apparent the sole question presented for decision; that is whether John S. Oates and Tryon Lewis, on September 25, 1929, had a right under the facts to effectuate by contract the transaction they undertook to enter into on that date. Oates was then, as at all times mentioned herein, the surface owner and original awardee of 640 acres of Pecos County school land. About three years prior to the above date (January 28, 1926), Oates, as surface owner of the land and as agent of the state, leased the land for oil and gas to Pure Oil Company for a term of ten years. Thereby the company, as lessee, became the owner of the lease interests for the duration of that lease and Oates became the owner of the agency compensation payable to him by the lessee for the same duration. The lease was still in force with about seven years of its term unexpired, the state was still the owner of the entire oil and gas mineral estate in the land, and Oates was still the owner of the surface estate. No oil or gas had been produced or discovered on the land and no oil or gas operations for the production of either had been begun. Oates owned the entire surface estate, having made no sale of any part thereof; and, so far as the record discloses, the territory was unproven as to oil or gas production prospects. Tryon Lewis was desirous of buying a permanent oil and gas royalty interest in the land and Oates was desirous of selling such permanent interest. Accordingly, they undertook, by contract, to enter into a transaction to effectuate their respective desires. The means whereby they undertook to enter into the transaction, was the execution and delivery contemporaneously of two instruments bearing date, September 25, 1929, both signed by Oates, the promisor, and delivered to Lewis, the promisee. The instruments will be labeled as First Part of Proposed Mineral Conveyance, and Second Part of Proposed Mineral Conveyance, respectively. The first part, in so far as pertinent here, is as follows:
First Part of Proposed Mineral Conveyance.
The second part of the proposed conveyance, in so far as pertinent here, is as follows:
Second Part of Proposed Mineral Conveyance.
During the seven years that then remained of the term of the lease (executed in 1926), the only income from the State's mineral estate in the land was a leasing income. This was paid to Oates by the lessee company and Oates in turn paid to Lewis his pro rata part of the income. No question ever arose between them concerning the income from that lease. Such income was property which Oates, by leasing the land could lawfully acquire, and was assignable. On January 28, 1936, upon expiration of the first lease, Oates executed a second lease of the land to the same lessee for a ten-year term. While this was the second lease, it was, in relation to the purported conveyance the parties were undertaking to make, the first lease made after the purported sale of the permanent royalty interest. Oates did not pay over to Lewis any part of the income received by him under the first future lease. After it had run for about eight years Lewis, on September 11, 1944, filed suit in trespass to try title against Oates to establish, under the above transaction, a perpetual royalty interest in future leases, and to recover moneys paid over to Oates by the lessee under the first future lease. The case was tried without a jury. The above instruments were received in evidence. The testimony of Oates, Lewis and other witnesses was heard. The following additional facts were stipulated by the parties upon the trial, some of which have already been stated:
(Italics ours)
Lewis testified that in the transaction between him and Oates they were undertaking "to perpetuate an oil and gas rental." The ruling of the Supreme Court in Greene v. Robinson, 1928, 117 Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655, and that of the trial court in Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 126 Tex. 138, 47 S.W.2d 265, 267, was pending on appeal. The judgment of the trial court in Lemar v. Garner, 121 Tex. 502, 50 S.W.2d 769, 773, was pending also. The decisions of the courts in those cases stood in the way of Oates and Lewis in effectuating their mutual desire in regard to the assignment of a permanent royalty interest. They undertook nevertheless, by contract, to do so.
The trial court in the present case rendered judgment that Lewis take nothing by his suit (filed some fifteen years after the undertaking referred to); and recited as a part of the judgment that the "purported mineral conveyance * * * is hereby declared to be, and it always has been absolutely void and of no force and effect whatever * * *." Lewis appealed direct to the...
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