Lewis v. State
| Citation | 87 Fla. 37,98 So. 917 |
| Parties | LEWIS v. STATE. |
| Decision Date | 19 January 1924 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Error to Criminal Court of Record, Dade County; Tom Norfleet Judge.
A. E Lewis was convicted of an offense, and he brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Unparticularized objection that pleading vague and uncertain held insufficient basis for assignment of error. An objection to any pleading that it is 'vague, indefinite, and uncertain,' without specifying in what particular its vagueness or indefiniteness consists, is too general and inexact to constitute the basis of an assignment of error.
Failure of indictment to name state or county from which woman induced to come not ground for arrest of judgment. In the prosecution of an indictment for procuring or inducing to come into this state or to leave her home or other place where she may be residing in this state any woman or girl for purposes of prostitution or concubinage, under section 5413 Rev. Gen. St. 1920, after verdict of guilty, a motion in arrest of judgment will not be sustained which is based upon the objection that the indictment does not specify the state or the county or city from which the woman was induced to move for the purposes alleged.
Gravamen of offense stated. The gravamen of the offense denounced by section 5413, Rev. Gen. St. 1920, is the enticing a woman from her place of residence to engage in immoral practices such as prostitution or concubinage, in this state.
Motion in arrest of judgment reaches only record errors. A motion in arrest of judgment reaches only errors appearing upon the record.
Procedure where witness sought to be impeached by contradictory statements stated. When evidence of contradictory statements is sought to be introduced in impeachment of the testimony of a witness, the attention of the witness sought to be impeached should be called to the time and place of such alleged different statements, as well as the person or persons to whom made, so that he may not be taken by surprise and ample opportunity afforded him to refresh his memory and make intelligent answers, and to offer such explanations as he may desire.
Evidence held insufficient to sustain conviction of enticing female from home for immoral purposes. Evidence examined, and found insufficient to support the verdict.
Bart A. Riley, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and J. B. Gaines, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was convicted upon an information charging him in the first count with the offense of enticing a female person to come into the state for purposes of prostitution, concubinage, and other immoral purposes, and in the second count for enticing the same person to leave the place where she was residing in Florida for such purposes.
The person whom it is alleged was induced to come into the state for immoral purposes, and who was afterwards induced to leave her place of residence in this state for such purposes, was a girl about 18 years of age, who had married and had parted from her husband, whose name was Hudson. She came from Atlanta, Ga., with the defendant, the plaintiff in error here, and his wife, and a man named Fain. Arriving in Jacksonville they went to the same hotel, Fain and the young woman registering as husband and wife, and occupying the same room.
According to the testimony of the defendant and the Hudson woman, the latter and Fain occupied the same room as husband and wife for two weeks, Fain paying the hotel expenses of himself and pseudo wife, and according to the defendant he and his wife left that hotel, and afterwards met Mr. and Mrs. Murphy, with whom, about two months afterwards, they came to Miami in the Murphy authomobile; the Hudson woman going with them, as she stated, on the defendant's invitation, which the defendant denied. Arriving in Miami, the five of them stopped at a tourist camp with the Murphys; the defendant and his wife remained there one week, and then moved, again leaving the Hudson woman.
The statute under which the information was framed is section 5413, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920, and is as follows:
'Whoever shall induce, entice or procure to come into this state or to leave her home or other place where she may be residing in this state, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage or for other immoral purposes, or to enter any house of prostitution in this state, shall upon conviction be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for a period of not more than five years, or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, or shall be both so fined or imprisoned.'
The eighth assignment of error attacks the information as insufficient. The questions were raised by a motion in arrest of judgment. The one discussed in the brief is that the information does not in the first count name the state from which the 'defendant enticed the girl to come into' Florida; as to the second count it is contended that it does not charge the 'offense with sufficient definiteness.' We infer from the brief that the indefiniteness consists in a failure to name the place of residence of the young woman in this state from which she was alleged to have been enticed for immoral purposes. The objection to the first count is raised by the ninth ground of the motion, while the objection to the second count was presented in the fifth ground, which avers that each count of the information is vague, indefinite, and uncertain.
The latter ground is too general. A pleading which is attacked by such general language is permitted to stand over the objection which is considered too inexact to form the basis of any discussion. It is the rule to state specifically in the motion the ground of the objection, and, if the indictment does not wholly fail to allege a crime or an essential element of a crime, but sufficiently states the nature and cause of the accusation against the defendant, and is not so vague, indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense, or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense, such indictment will not, on a motion in arrest of judgment after verdict, be held legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. See Smith v. State, 72 Fla. 449, 73 So. 354; Adams v. State, 72 Fla. 32, 72 So. 473; Clifton v. State, 76 Fla. 244, 79 So. 707; Studstill v. State, 83 Fla. 623, 92 So. 151.
However counsel contend that the failure to name the county in which the defendant enticed the woman to leave her residence renders the second count fatally defective, and the failure in the first count to name the state from which he enticed her to come for the purposes alleged renders that count defective. That contention cannot be sustained upon a motion in arrest of judgment, because it is not an essential element of...
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