Lewis v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 19 November 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-cv-00110-TES
• Parties: BRANDON M. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. J. MICHAEL STEWART et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

BRANDON M. LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. J. MICHAEL STEWART et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-cv-00110-TES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

November 19, 2018

ORDER

Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by two separate groups of defendants. The first group, comprised of Defendants Ben Allen, Gregory Mauldin, and J. Michael Stewart ("state Defendants"), filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [Doc. 26] as it relates to Plaintiff's state law claims on sovereign immunity grounds. In the same motion, the state Defendants also asked the Court to stay Plaintiff's federal claims while the criminal charges against him are pending. [Doc. 26, at 3]. The second group, comprised of Defendants Nekeyra Rumph and Sodexo, Inc. ("Sodexo Defendants") filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [Doc. 27]. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the state Defendant's Motion [Doc. 26]. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS the Sodexo Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion [Doc. 27].

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint. Acosta v. Campbell, 309 F. App'x 315, 317 (11th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff's claims will survive a motion to dismiss if the complaint pleads "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But the Court need not accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" or "conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, when the Court considers a motion to dismiss

we use a two-step framework. First, we identify the allegations that are 'no more than conclusions.' Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Second, after disregarding conclusory allegations, we assume any remaining factual allegations are true and determine whether those factual allegations 'plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'

McCullough v. Finley, No. 17-11554, 2018 WL 5318146, at *5 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2018) (internal citations omitted). The Court recounts the facts of this case below in light of this standard. Dismissal is also appropriate if "it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred." La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).

BACKGROUND

In February 2016, Plaintiff Brandon M. Lewis was a student at Middle Georgia State University ("MGSU") where he was enrolled in a chemistry class with an impending final exam. [Doc. 23, at ¶¶ 11, 12 & 16]. At the time, Plaintiff had a meal planthat allowed him to eat at the on-campus dining hall managed by Defendant Sodexo, Inc., who was responsible for staffing the dining hall. [Id. at ¶¶ 12 & 18-19]. On the day of the incident, Plaintiff was waiting in line at the dining hall when he struck up a conversation with Defendant Nekeyra Rumph, a dining hall employee who he saw on a regular basis. [Id. at ¶ 17]. During this conversation, Defendant Rumph asked Plaintiff how he was doing to which Plaintiff responded that he was tired. [Id. at ¶ 21]. Defendant Rumph asked Plaintiff why he was tired and he stated "either that they were, or it felt like they were making bombs all day" in his chemistry class. [Id. at ¶ 20]. Defendant Rumph and Plaintiff then parted ways without any indication that Defendant Rumph felt threatened by Plaintiff's reference to bombs. [Doc. 23 at ¶ 23]. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Defendant Rumph, pursuant to a policy established by Defendant Sodexo, reported Plaintiff's "bomb threat" to the campus police. [Id.].

Shortly thereafter, as Plaintiff ate his food, several officers from the Middle Georgia Campus Police Department, including Defendants Mauldin and Allen, approached him, handcuffed him, and began asking him questions about his conversation with Defendant Rumph. [Id. at ¶¶ 25-27]. Plaintiff maintains that he remained calm throughout this encounter and allowed the Officers to search his person and his belongings. [Id., at ¶¶ 27 & 29]. At some point during this encounter, the Officers moved Plaintiff to the back of a police car and, with Plaintiff's consent, proceeded to search his car, dorm room, and school-issued locker with the assistance of bomb-sniffingdogs, but found no evidence of bombs or bomb-making activity. [Id. at ¶¶ 29-32]. Nevertheless, Defendants Mauldin and Allen contacted Defendant Stewart, MGSU's Director of Student Conduct, who informed them that MGSU "wanted to pursue criminal charges of Terroristic Threats against [Plaintiff] and directed them to move forward with the arrest and prosecution." [Id. at ¶ 34]. Accordingly, Defendants Mauldin and Allen charged Plaintiff with making terroristic threats, transported him to the Bleckley County Law Enforcement Center, and booked and jailed him on this charge. [Doc. 23 at ¶ 35]. Plaintiff was released from custody the following day, but maintains that the terroristic threats charge is still pending against him. [Id. at ¶ 36].

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Superior Court of Bleckley County, Georgia, asserting claims under state law for false imprisonment against Defendants Stewart, Mauldin, Allen, Rumph, and Sodexo (based on respondeat superior) and for negligent training¹ against Sodexo. [Doc. 1, at ¶ 1; Doc. 23, at ¶¶ 46, 59, 75, 78 & 81]. Plaintiff also asserted federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Mauldin and Allen for arresting Plaintiff without probable cause and against Defendant Stewart for directing Plaintiff's arrest without probable cause, in violation of his constitutional rights. [Doc. 23, at ¶¶ 51 & 64]. The Court received this case when the StateDefendants, with the consent of the Sodexo Defendants, filed a Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1, at ¶ 4].

DISCUSSION

I. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 26]

In their motion, the State Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims against the State Defendants and stay Plaintiff's federal claims based on the Younger abstention doctrine. As discussed below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff's state-law claims should be dismissed, but finds that Younger abstention is inappropriate in this case.

1. State-Law Claims

The State Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims against them on the basis that his claims are barred by sovereign immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA") Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-20 et seq. [Doc. 26-1, at 5-7]. The State Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the GTCA's ante litem notice and service of process requirements as well as the GTCA's statute of limitations. [Doc. 26-1, at 7-10]. In his response, Plaintiff "concedes that state law claims for torts committed by state officials are, in effect, claims against the state itself and that the state [] would be entitled to all statutory notice provisions and requirements pertaining thereto." [Doc. 30, at 4]. Plaintiff does not address the State Defendants' sovereign immunity arguments or his assertion that the state-law claims are time-barred as to the State Defendants. In any case,Plaintiff's concession that he was required to (but did not) properly effectuate service or provide the required ante litem notice is sufficient for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims. See Cummings v. Ga. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 653 S.E.2d 729, 731-32 (Ga. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs are required to strictly comply with GTCA requirements and dismissal is appropriate if plaintiff fails to comply). See also Bradley v. Hale, No. 5:06CV310 (WDO), 2006 WL 3709160, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2006) (dismissing state-law tort claims for failure to comply with GTCA ante litem notice); White v. Ga. Dep't of Tech. & Adult Educ, Civil Action No. 1:08-cv-3503-GET, 2009 WL 10671031, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 4, 2009) (same). Accordingly, the Court grants this part of the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 26].

2. Younger Abstention

The State Defendants' also argue that the Court should stay the balance of Plaintiff's claims based on the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court finds that Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case because the state has not taken any steps to initiate criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, "federal courts should abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal prosecutions" by allowing the state proceedings to conclude before hearing a plaintiff's federal claims. Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1316 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Although the parties agree that charges against Plaintiff are "pending," the state has not taken any steps to prosecute Plaintiff in the more than two-and-a-half years since the arrest and the State Defendants provided no evidence that the state is actually preparing to prosecute Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there are no "ongoing" state proceedings against Plaintiff that would justify abstention. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (holding that Younger abstention did not apply where prosecution was threatened but not pending); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]hen there will be no interruption of ongoing state criminal proceedings, and thus no threat to proper federal-state relations, Younger does not bar federal intervention."); Mulholland v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 817 ("The possibility that a state proceeding may lead to a future prosecution of the federal plaintiff is not enough to trigger Younger abstention.").

Undeterred by the lack of prosecutorial action, the State Defendants maintain that Younger ought to "apply not only to pending criminal cases but also to prosecutions that are...