Lewis v. T-Mobile U.S., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00224-GZS |
| Parties | CALVIN LEWIS, JR., Plaintiff v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff alleges Defendant, Plaintiff's former employer discriminated against him in connection with his employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).[1] Defendant moves for summary judgment. (Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 34.)
Following a review of the summary judgment record and after consideration of the parties' arguments, I recommend the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “After the moving party has presented evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.'” Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. 144 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 1998)).
A court reviews the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015). If a court's review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to support findings in favor of the non-moving party on one or more of the claims, a trial-worthy controversy exists, and summary judgment must be denied as to any supported claim. Id. at 78 . Unsupported claims are properly dismissed. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
In 2018, Defendant promoted Plaintiff, who began working for Defendant in 2005, to a Coach, Team of Experts (TEX) position at a call center in Maine. (Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (DSMF) ¶¶ 1, 2, ECF No. 35.) Defendant's job description for the position provides that physical attendance at the call center is a requirement of the job. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant characterizes the Coach, TEX position as an interactive, high stress job.[2] (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff lists his job duties as communicating with the ten employees on his team, instructing them on how to be successful, communicating incentives to them, and reporting to Defendant regarding his team members' performance. (Id. ¶ 10; see also Lewis Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 38.)
On June 21, 2019, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence until July 11, 2019, due to a flare-up of symptoms of his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), which request Defendant granted. (DSMF ¶ 11.) Defendant provides a short-term disability benefit (the benefit) in the form of partial income replacement for employees with serious health conditions. (Id. ¶ 12.) Employees may apply for the benefit through a process conducted by Broadspire, Defendant's employee benefits provider. (Id.) Broadspire evaluates claims based on applicable laws and plan provisions.[3] (Id.)
Plaintiff's healthcare provider completed an application form supporting Plaintiff's request for the benefit on July 23, 2019. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's provider did not check “yes” in response to the form question asking whether Plaintiff had been directed by a healthcare provider to stop working. The provider, however, wrote that he “did not advise [Plaintiff to stop working] initially, but support[s] [Plaintiff] until he feels he can return” to work. (Id. ¶ 15; DSMF Ex. 1-G, PageID #: 293, ECF No. 35-8.) Plaintiff's provider also wrote that Plaintiff was expected to return to work by August 10, 2019, but that Plaintiff might need additional breaks depending on flare-ups in his PTSD symptoms. (DSMF Ex. 1-G, PageID #: 294.) He noted Plaintiff's reasoning and/or judgment would be impaired when Plaintiff is symptomatic. (Id., PageID #: 295.)
Broadspire denied Plaintiff's claim for the wage replacement benefit, concluding after review of Plaintiff's claim that there “was a lack of clinical evidence to support [Plaintiff's] inability to perform the essential duties of [his] occupation.” (Id. 16.) Defendant placed Plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 48.)
On December 10, 2019, Plaintiff's provider approved Plaintiff's return to work. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff returned to work on December 18, 2019, but he experienced a panic attack and had to leave. (Id. ¶ 25.) He did not return to work after the panic attack. (Id. ¶ 26.)
On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff's new healthcare provider submitted a completed questionnaire for intermittent leave form. (Id. ¶ 27.) On the questionnaire, the provider checked “yes” to the following impairments as limiting Plaintiff's performance of his job duties: concentration, interacting with others, sleeping, eating, breathing, and digestive. (Id. ¶ 28.) When asked to identify the essential functions of the job that Plaintiff was unable to perform without an accommodation, she wrote “coaching, trainings, payroll, self + group training, chair meetings;” she explained that Plaintiff could not perform the functions “because of severe anxiety and times of PTSD.” (Id. ¶ 29.) She asserted that Plaintiff would need an accommodation to help him perform his essential job functions until she “recertified” him to return to work on January 17, 2020. (DSMF Ex. 1K, PageID #: 323, ECF No. 35-12.) In response to the question “[i]f T-Mobile is unable to accommodate all or some of the requested intermittent time away from work, would a continuous leave of absence enable the employee to return to work and perform his/her essential functions,” the provider checked “yes.” (DSMF ¶ 30.) She also stated that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job if he were permitted to “work from home or [a] different call center.” (DSMF Ex. 1K, PageID #: 324.)
On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff requested an accommodation to work remotely. (DSMF ¶¶ 31, 33.) Plaintiff informed Defendant he wanted to complete “training and modules” at home rather than at work. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff asserts another group of coaches and TEXs, known as T-Force, worked from home. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 3 & Ex. 10, ECF No. 3810.) Defendant's human resources department (HR) informed Plaintiff that he needed to be onsite to coach his team, but that because he was a salaried employee, he could complete the training modules after hours, on the weekends, or prior to the start of his shift. (DSMF ¶ 35.) Defendant only requires that an employee re-train before returning to work if the employee had been out on continuous leave for at least one year. (Id. ¶ 36.) HR explained to Plaintiff that because he was out on leave for six months, he was not required to retrain before he returned to work.[4] (Id. ¶ 37.)
At a meeting between HR personnel and Plaintiff on January 22, 2020, Plaintiff and the HR attendees disagreed on the amount of work Plaintiff performed after his leave ended on January 17. (Id. ¶ 40; Lewis Aff. Ex. 3, ECF No. 38-3.) Plaintiff believed he was entitled to an accommodation immediately upon submission of his request. (DSMF ¶ 41.) Plaintiff's understanding was based on his experience obtaining an accommodation shortly after requesting it. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 4.) Defendant does not provide temporary accommodations while working through the accommodation process. (Id. ¶ 32.) HR asked Plaintiff to clarify what he was seeking through the accommodation process. (Id. ¶ 42.) HR explained to Plaintiff that Defendant needed to know the job responsibilities he was having difficulty performing due to his disability and the accommodations a physician believed would benefit him. (DSMF ¶ 43.)
Defendant asserts Plaintiff became agitated during the meeting and maintained that because HR required information from his healthcare provider first, he believed HR was denying his request for an accommodation. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff believed the process would delay confirmation of his requested accommodation. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 6.) HR informed Plaintiff that it was not denying a request for accommodation but was instead engaging in the interactive process, and that additional information from his provider was required to understand his needs. (Id. ¶ 45.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff reported that the accommodation was only needed through January 31, 2020, but he could not explain the significance of the date to HR as it related to his workplace accommodation needs. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff maintains he was unsure about the exact end date and needed to complete the form with his provider to determine the time for which the accommodation would be necessary. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 7.)
On January 22, 2020, HR met with Plaintiff and asked him to clarify his request for an accommodation. (DSMF ¶ 74.) Plaintiff replied that he was a veteran who had a disability and wanted to know what Defendant was going to do for him. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he was attempting to learn whether disabled veterans had any different benefits. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 9.)
On January 23, 2020, Defendant received a document entitled “Cognitive & Behavior Capacities Form” from Plaintiff's healthcare provider. (DSMF ¶ 49.) The provider opined that Plaintiff had a temporary impairment until February 17, 2020, which restricted his ability to: 1) effectively learn and master information in a classroom setting; 2) effectively learn and master information from...
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