Lewis v. United States
| Decision Date | 25 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-152 |
| Parties | James S. Lewis, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota |
ORDER DENYING UNITED STATES' MOTION TO DIMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is “The United States' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint” filed on February 2 2021. See Doc. No. 16. The Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on February 23, 2021. See Doc. No. 17. The United States filed a reply brief on March 15, 2021. See Doc. No. 22.[1] For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant United States' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.
Plaintiff James S. Lewis commenced this action against the United States to quiet title to the clinker, commonly known as “scoria, ” on lands owned by Lewis in McKenzie County, North Dakota, pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409a (“QTA”). See Doc. No 14. The scoria at issue in this matter is located on two tracts of land:
(1) S½ of Section 22 in Township 147 North, Range 103 West; (2) NE¼, N½NW¼, SE¼NW¼, E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27 in Township 147 North, Range 103 West.
See Doc. No. 14, ¶ 8. Before Lewis acquired these lands from his parents by quit claim deed in 2014, the property had long been in his family since 1956.
On June 18, 1956, the United States granted the SW¼, N½ SE¼, and SW¼SE¼ of Section 22, NW¼NW¼ of Section 26, and the NE¼, N½NW¼, SE¼NW¼E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27 in Township 147 North, Range 103 West to Glenn McRae and Ellen McRae by Exchange Deed pursuant to the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (“BJFTA”). The Exchange Deed reserved to the United States “all coal, oil, gas and other minerals, including sand, gravel, stone, clay and similar materials. . . .” See Doc. No. 11-1, p. 4. In exchange for the lands acquired from the United States in the Exchange Deed, the McRaes conveyed 800 acres of land to the United States by Warranty Deed. See Doc. No. 14, ¶ 10. Then, on August 5, 1956, The SE¼SE¼ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West was first patented to Glen McRae and Ellen McRae under the BJFTA. See Doc. No. 17-4. The Patent reserved to the United States “all coal, oil, gas and other mineral in or under said lands, as authorized by the provision of Section 44 of said Act.” See Doc. No. 16-2, p. 18.
On January 8, 1980, Ellen McRae entered into a Contract for Deed with William R. Lewis and Donna J. Lewis for all of Section 22, the NW¼NW¼ of Section 26, and the NE¼, N½NW¼, SE¼NW¼, E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27 in Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. No. 17-5. Pursuant to the Contract for Deed, William and Donna Lewis were to make yearly payments to Ellen McRae with an executed warranty deed for the land held in escrow until the contract was paid in full. The lands were eventually transferred by warranty deed to William and Donna Lewis. Then, on August 11, 2004, William and Donna Lewis granted all of Section 22, the NW¼NW¼ of Section 26, and the NE¼, N½NW¼, SE¼NW¼, E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27 in Township 147 North, Range 103 West to their son, James Lewis. The warranty deed reserved “unto William R. Lewis and Donna J. Lewis and James F. Lewis, a life estate and the management, control, and right to income and profits of the above real property, for the remainder of the life of the survivor of William R. Lewis and Donna J. Lewis . . . .” See Doc. No. 17-8, p. 2. Then, on December 17, 2014, William and Donna Lewis granted James Lewis by quit claim deed all of the property described in the 2004 warranty deed. See Doc. No. 17-9, p. 2.
According to the first amended complaint, Ellen McRae, and subsequently William and Donna Lewis, sold the scoria located on Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West to McKenzie County beginning in 1974 and until 2007. See Doc. Nos. 14, ¶ 15, and 17-10. William and James Lewis also entered into agreements with other private entities between 2010 and 2013 for the removal and sale of the scoria located on Sections 22 and 27 of Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. Nos. 14, ¶ 16, and 17-13, 17-14, 17-15. However, in October of 2012, a representative of the United States Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) visited Lewis' property to discuss a possible mineral trespass in the S½ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. No. 14, ¶ 28.
Lewis received a letter from the BLM regarding the suspected mineral materials ( scoria) trespass in which the BLM stated “the United States is the owner of all minerals in the S½ sec. 22, T. 147, R. 130 W.” See Doc. No. 17-16. The letter also indicated a BLM official would conduct an onsite inspection of the area. Id. A representative of the BLM and Lewis met at the site of the scoria pit located on S½ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West on January 24, 2013. See Doc. No. 17-17. The BLM later sent a letter to Lewis on February 11, 2013, summarizing the discussions between the BLM and Lewis from the site visit and requesting documents related to the mining of scoria on S½ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. Nos. 14, ¶ 32, and 17-17. Throughout 2013, Lewis communicated with the BLM regarding the possible mineral trespass in S½ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West.
Lewis then received another notice of possible mineral trespass from the BLM dated April 14, 2014, for the removal of scoria in the NE¼, N½ NW¼, SE¼NW¼, E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27, Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. No. 17-22. According to the first amended complaint, Lewis did not respond to the BLM's letter notifying him of possible mineral trespass on Section 27. See Doc. No. 14, ¶ 38. Lewis had no further communications with the BLM regarding possible mineral trespasses described in the April 14, 2014 letter or the earlier letter of January 8, 2013. Id.
Lewis commenced this action against the United States of America on August 17, 2020. See Doc. No. 1. The sole cause of action in the complaint is to quiet title to the scoria on specific tracts of land in McKenzie County, North Dakota, namely: (a) S½ of Section 22, Township 147 North, Range 103 West, and (b) NE¼, N½ NW¼, SE¼NW¼, E½SW¼, and W½SE¼ of Section 27, Township 147 North, Range 103 West. See Doc. No. 1, p. 12. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on December 29, 2020. See Doc. No. 11. Lewis then filed his first amended complaint on January 19, 2021. See Doc. No. 14. On February 2, 2021, the United States filed the pending motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. See Doc. No. 16. Lewis filed a response in opposition to the motion on February 23, 2021. See Doc. No. 17. The United States filed a reply brief on March 15, 2021. See Doc. No. 22.
Against this backdrop, the Court now turns to consider the pending motion by the United States to dismiss Lewis' first amended complaint. In its motion, the United States requests the Court dismiss the action because the time for Lewis to bring his claim has run, divesting this Court of jurisdiction to hear the case. The United States alternatively requests the Court dismiss Lewis' first amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The United States requests the Court dismiss Lewis' first amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must generally construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). Dismissal will not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In its motion to dismiss, the United States contends this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter because the statute of limitations under the Quiet Title Act has run. According to the United States, the statute of limitations has run because the QTA statute of limitations was triggered by either (1) the Exchange Deed and Patent conveying the property at issue from the United States to Lewis' predecessors in interest or (2) a conversation between William Lewis and a government employee in 1992 regarding a potential mineral trespass.
Here, the United States asserts both of its legal arguments challenging the Court's jurisdiction are factual challenges. However, Lewis contends the United States' jurisdictional challenge based upon its contention the QTA limitation period was triggered by the Exchange Deed and Patent is a facial challenge to the Court's jurisdiction, while the United States' contention the limitation period was triggered by the 1992 conversation is a factual challenge.
In a factual 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court's jurisdiction - its very power to hear the case - is at issue and the trial court is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990). As a result, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations” and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 744 (8th Cir. 2001). The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate jurisdiction exists. Id. Whereas, when a challenge to the court's jurisdiction is a facial challenge, the court must “accept all factual allegations in the pleadings as true.” Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055,...
To continue reading
Request your trial