Lewis v. Wash. State Dep't of Labor & Indus.

Decision Date25 April 2023
Docket Number56774-1-II
PartiesDIANE J. LEWIS, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of RICHARD W. LEWIS JR., Appellant, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Veljacic, J.

Diane J. Lewis's husband, Richard W. Lewis, Jr. died from malignant mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure while working for maritime and nonmaritime employers. Lewis appeals the superior court's order affirming the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals's (Board) decision denying Lewis's application for permanent surviving spouse benefits under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (WIIA), title 51 RCW.

Lewis argues that the superior court erred in concluding that she did not qualify for permanent surviving spouse benefits under RCW 51.12.102. Lewis also argues that the superior court erred in concluding that the Department of Labor and Industries's interpretation of RCW 51.12.102 did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on her right to a jury trial and did not violate her right to equal protection of the law. Lewis further argues that the Department's interpretation of RCW 51.12.102 contravenes the beneficial purpose of the WIIA and thus, she is entitled to permanent surviving spouse benefits.

We hold that Lewis did not qualify for permanent surviving spouse benefits under RCW 51.12.102. We also hold that RCW 51.12.102 did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on her right to a jury trial and did not violate her right to equal protection of the law. We decline Lewis's invitation to second-guess the legislature's enacted public policy of limiting workers' compensation benefits to maritime workers and their beneficiaries under RCW 51.12.102. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS[1]

I. Factual Background

Lewis's husband was an insulator and member of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators. During his union apprenticeship in the late 1970s, he spent a year working for maritime employers at Todd and Lockheed Shipyards, where he had injurious exposures to asbestos-containing insulation. His maritime employers were obligated to provide their workers with coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.

For the remaining 30 years of his career as an insulator, from approximately 1980 to 2010, Lewis's husband worked at land-based industrial facilities throughout Western Washington. He had additional injurious exposures to asbestos-containing products while working for employers who were obliged to provide their workers with coverage under the WIIA.

As a result of his occupational exposures to asbestos-containing insulation, Lewis's husband developed mesothelioma-an incurable and fatal form of asbestos-related lung cancer. He was formally diagnosed with mesothelioma in May 2018.

On July 12, 2018, Lewis and her husband filed a complaint in Pierce County Superior Court against certain asbestos manufacturers and other third parties. In the complaint, they claimed damages for personal injuries and loss of marital consortium caused by his occupational exposures to asbestos.

On June 26, 2019, after reaching settlements with some of the third-party defendants, the Lewises dismissed their lawsuit. The third-party settlements were finalized without the prior written approval of the responsible maritime employers. Prior written approval of the responsible maritime employer is required under LHWCA, as explained below.

On August 15, Lewis's husband died. The cause of his death was mesothelioma.

II. Procedural History

On April 1, 2020, Lewis filed an application for surviving spouse benefits with the Department. Her application included documentation of objective clinical findings which substantiated that her husband had an asbestos-related occupational disease as well as documentation establishing a prima facie case showing that her husband had injurious exposures to asbestos fibers while working at jobs covered under the WIIA.

Neither Lewis nor her husband filed a claim for LHWCA benefits related to his asbestos-related disease.

On April 14, the Department issued an order denying Lewis's application for surviving spouse benefits because she did not qualify for coverage under RCW 51.12.102. The Department's order provided that,

Richard Lewis died on 08/15/2019 and Diane Lewis, the surviving spouse, has filed an application for benefits.
It is determined that the death of Richard Lewis was due to mesothelioma, an asbestos related disease, resulting from past exposures to asbestos fibers in the course of employment.
It has been determined that Mr. Lewis was exposed to asbestos in the shipyards, and therefore is considered a maritime worker, under maritime coverage.
As a claim has not been filed with the [LHWCA], and you have already recovered a third party settlement, you do not qualify for coverage under RCW 51.12.102 and are barred by RCW 51.12 100.
The application for death benefits filed by Diane Lewis is denied.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 144.

On April 30, Lewis appealed the Department's order denying her application for surviving spouse benefits to the Board. At the administrative hearing, Lewis asked the Board to award a surviving spouse's pension without regard to her husband's status as a maritime worker. Significantly, the industrial appeals judge (IAJ) noted that "the only potential claim for relief to which [] Lewis might be entitled is an award of temporary benefits for the period from April 1, 2020, the date that she filed her claim, through April 14, 2020, the date that the Department denied her claim." CP at 54. However, the IAJ noted that Lewis specifically waived her claim to any potential temporary benefits.

On April 8, 2021, the IAJ issued a proposed decision and order affirming the Department's order.

On April 30, Lewis filed a petition for review of the proposed decision and order to the Board. On June 16, the Board denied Lewis's petition for review and the proposed decision and order became the Board's decision and order.

On July 20, Lewis appealed the Board's order to Pierce County Superior Court. On February 24, 2022, the superior court entered an order affirming the Board's order. The court also entered findings of fact, which are discussed above, and the following conclusions of law:

2.2.1 At all material times, Mr. Lewis was a maritime worker eligible for Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act benefits for the condition diagnosed as mesothelioma.
2.2.2 At all material times, Mrs. Lewis was the beneficiary of a maritime worker and was eligible for [LHWCA] benefits due to her husband's death from the condition diagnosed as mesothelioma.
2.2.3 By June 26, 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Lewis had forfeited their right to receive [LHWCA] benefits due to the condition diagnosed as mesothelioma, per 33 U.S.C. § 933(g)(1), because they had settled their third party claims for damages caused by the condition diagnosed as mesothelioma without the prior written approval of Mr. Lewis's responsible maritime employer(s).
2.2.4 On April 14, 2020; Mrs. Lewis did not qualify for [surviving spouse] benefits as provided under RCW 51.12.102.
2.2.5 The Department order dated April 14, 2020 is correct and is affirmed.
2.3 The Board's June 16, 2021 Decision and Order, which affirmed the Department's April 14, 2020 decision, is correct and is affirmed.
2.4 RCW 51.12.100 and RCW 51.12.102, as interpreted by the Board and the Department, did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on the right of Mr. Lewis or Mrs. Lewis to a jury trial.
2.5 RCW 51.12.100 and RCW 51.12.102, as interpreted by the Board and the Department, did not violate the right of Mr. Lewis or Mrs. Lewis to equal protection of the law.

CP 462-63. Lewis appeals.

ANALYSIS

Lewis argues that the superior court erred in affirming the Board's order because the Department's denial of her application for permanent surviving spouse benefits contravenes two of her constitutional rights, the plain language of RCW 51.12.102, and the beneficial purpose of the WIIA. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

"When '[r]eviewing a decision under the [WIIA], the superior court considers the issues de novo, relying on the certified board record.'" Spohn v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 20 Wn.App. 2d 373, 378, 499 P.3d 989 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. Qwest Corp., 15 Wn.App. 2d 365, 371, 478 P.3d 96 (2020)); RCW 51.52.115. "On appeal, we review the superior court's order, not the Board's order." Spohn, 20 Wn.App. 2d at 378. "The superior court's order 'is subject to the ordinary rules governing civil appeals.'" Id. at 378 (quoting White, 15 Wn.App. 2d at 371); RCW 51.52.140.

This case involves statutory interpretation, which is also a question of law that we review de novo. Bradley v. City of Olympia, 19 Wn.App. 2d 968, 977, 498 P.3d 562 (2021). The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. We discern legislative intent through the language of the statutory provision, the context of the statute, and related statutes. Id.

RCW 51.12.010 states that the WIIA "shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment." "'The [WIIA] is remedial in nature, and thus we must construe it liberally . . . in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.'" Bradley, 19 Wn.App. 2d at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spivey v. City of Bellevue, 187 Wn.2d 716, 726, 389 P.3d 504 (2017)).

II. Lewis Does...

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