Lewis v. Wash. State Dep't of Labor & Indus.
Decision Date | 25 April 2023 |
Docket Number | 56774-1-II |
Parties | DIANE J. LEWIS, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of RICHARD W. LEWIS JR., Appellant, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Diane J. Lewis's husband, Richard W. Lewis, Jr. died from malignant mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure while working for maritime and nonmaritime employers. Lewis appeals the superior court's order affirming the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals's (Board) decision denying Lewis's application for permanent surviving spouse benefits under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (WIIA), title 51 RCW.
Lewis argues that the superior court erred in concluding that she did not qualify for permanent surviving spouse benefits under RCW 51.12.102. Lewis also argues that the superior court erred in concluding that the Department of Labor and Industries's interpretation of RCW 51.12.102 did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on her right to a jury trial and did not violate her right to equal protection of the law. Lewis further argues that the Department's interpretation of RCW 51.12.102 contravenes the beneficial purpose of the WIIA and thus, she is entitled to permanent surviving spouse benefits.
We hold that Lewis did not qualify for permanent surviving spouse benefits under RCW 51.12.102. We also hold that RCW 51.12.102 did not have an unconstitutional chilling effect on her right to a jury trial and did not violate her right to equal protection of the law. We decline Lewis's invitation to second-guess the legislature's enacted public policy of limiting workers' compensation benefits to maritime workers and their beneficiaries under RCW 51.12.102. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS[1]
Lewis's husband was an insulator and member of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators. During his union apprenticeship in the late 1970s, he spent a year working for maritime employers at Todd and Lockheed Shipyards, where he had injurious exposures to asbestos-containing insulation. His maritime employers were obligated to provide their workers with coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
For the remaining 30 years of his career as an insulator, from approximately 1980 to 2010, Lewis's husband worked at land-based industrial facilities throughout Western Washington. He had additional injurious exposures to asbestos-containing products while working for employers who were obliged to provide their workers with coverage under the WIIA.
As a result of his occupational exposures to asbestos-containing insulation, Lewis's husband developed mesothelioma-an incurable and fatal form of asbestos-related lung cancer. He was formally diagnosed with mesothelioma in May 2018.
On July 12, 2018, Lewis and her husband filed a complaint in Pierce County Superior Court against certain asbestos manufacturers and other third parties. In the complaint, they claimed damages for personal injuries and loss of marital consortium caused by his occupational exposures to asbestos.
On June 26, 2019, after reaching settlements with some of the third-party defendants, the Lewises dismissed their lawsuit. The third-party settlements were finalized without the prior written approval of the responsible maritime employers. Prior written approval of the responsible maritime employer is required under LHWCA, as explained below.
On August 15, Lewis's husband died. The cause of his death was mesothelioma.
On April 1, 2020, Lewis filed an application for surviving spouse benefits with the Department. Her application included documentation of objective clinical findings which substantiated that her husband had an asbestos-related occupational disease as well as documentation establishing a prima facie case showing that her husband had injurious exposures to asbestos fibers while working at jobs covered under the WIIA.
Neither Lewis nor her husband filed a claim for LHWCA benefits related to his asbestos-related disease.
On April 30, Lewis appealed the Department's order denying her application for surviving spouse benefits to the Board. At the administrative hearing, Lewis asked the Board to award a surviving spouse's pension without regard to her husband's status as a maritime worker. Significantly, the industrial appeals judge (IAJ) noted that "the only potential claim for relief to which [] Lewis might be entitled is an award of temporary benefits for the period from April 1, 2020, the date that she filed her claim, through April 14, 2020, the date that the Department denied her claim." CP at 54. However, the IAJ noted that Lewis specifically waived her claim to any potential temporary benefits.
On April 8, 2021, the IAJ issued a proposed decision and order affirming the Department's order.
On April 30, Lewis filed a petition for review of the proposed decision and order to the Board. On June 16, the Board denied Lewis's petition for review and the proposed decision and order became the Board's decision and order.
On July 20, Lewis appealed the Board's order to Pierce County Superior Court. On February 24, 2022, the superior court entered an order affirming the Board's order. The court also entered findings of fact, which are discussed above, and the following conclusions of law:
CP 462-63. Lewis appeals.
Lewis argues that the superior court erred in affirming the Board's order because the Department's denial of her application for permanent surviving spouse benefits contravenes two of her constitutional rights, the plain language of RCW 51.12.102, and the beneficial purpose of the WIIA. We disagree.
"When '[r]eviewing a decision under the [WIIA], the superior court considers the issues de novo, relying on the certified board record.'" Spohn v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 20 Wn.App. 2d 373, 378, 499 P.3d 989 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. Qwest Corp., 15 Wn.App. 2d 365, 371, 478 P.3d 96 (2020)); RCW 51.52.115. "On appeal, we review the superior court's order, not the Board's order." Spohn, 20 Wn.App. 2d at 378. "The superior court's order 'is subject to the ordinary rules governing civil appeals.'" Id. at 378 (quoting White, 15 Wn.App. 2d at 371); RCW 51.52.140.
This case involves statutory interpretation, which is also a question of law that we review de novo. Bradley v. City of Olympia, 19 Wn.App. 2d 968, 977, 498 P.3d 562 (2021). The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. We discern legislative intent through the language of the statutory provision, the context of the statute, and related statutes. Id.
RCW 51.12.010 states that the WIIA "shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment." "'The [WIIA] is remedial in nature, and thus we must construe it liberally . . . in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.'" Bradley, 19 Wn.App. 2d at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spivey v. City of Bellevue, 187 Wn.2d 716, 726, 389 P.3d 504 (2017)).
To continue reading
Request your trial