Lewis v. Western Reg'l Jail, Case N0. 3:11-cv-01016
| Decision Date | 24 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case N0. 3:11-cv-01016 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | EDWARD LEE LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL; MR. CLARK, Administrator; LIEUTENANT ALDRIDGE; OFFICER RYDER; OFFICER ELKINS; ALL MEDICAL STAFF; and OTHER UNKNOWN STAFF MEMBERS, Defendants. |
On December 12, 2011, Plaintiff Edward Lee Lewis ("Lewis"), proceeding pro se and then incarcerated at the Western Regional Jail in Barboursville, West Virginia, filed a motion for injunctive relief claiming that he was being denied basic hygiene and was the victim of harassment by jail officials and other inmates. (ECF No. 1). By order of the presiding District Judge, the motion was docketed as a complaint made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2). On January 12, 2012, Lewis supplemented his complaint by filing a second motion seeking an injunction in which he named additional defendants and fleshed out his claims for relief. (ECF No. 5). Subsequently, Lewis filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs and a motion to amend his petition asking the court to direct the fiscal clerk at the Western Regional Jail to forward all money in his inmate accountto his federal inmate account. (ECF Nos. 7 and 10). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by standing order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Having thoroughly reviewed Lewis's motions, which were jointly construed as one complaint, the undersigned FINDS that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge deny Lewis's application to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, and remove this matter from the docket of the Court.
Lewis is a federal prisoner who was placed in state custody at the Western Regional Jail ("WRJ") pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to testify before a grand jury in an ongoing state murder investigation. (ECF No. 5 at 6; ECF No. 15 at 2). Lewis's detention at the WRJ began on November 10, 2011. (ECF No. 5 at 6). Shortly after his testimony to the grand jury, Lewis was eligible to return to federal custody. (ECF No. 15 at 2). However, because he had family that lived near the WRJ and he anticipated that he would have to testify at a subsequent murder trial, Lewis requested permission to remain at the WRJ until the murder case was resolved. (Id.).
On December 12, 2011, Lewis commenced the instant action, seeking a court order compelling staff at the WRJ to perform their duties in a professional manner and to address what Lewis perceived as numerous violations of his constitutionalrights.1 According to Lewis, he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution when staff at the WRJ: denied Lewis access to basic hygiene products and services, withheld medical treatment, subjected him to unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure his safety, called him a "snitch" and "rat," verbally abused and harassed him, and discriminated against him and other inmates held in protective custody. (ECF Nos. 1 and 5). In addition to injunctive relief, Lewis sought $1,000 in damages from each named defendant. (ECF No. 5 at 10). Lewis also requested the court to enter an order related to funds contained in his inmate account. (ECF No. 10 at 3).
In January 2012, after repeated demands by Lewis that he be returned to federal custody, the State's Prosecuting Attorney released his request under the writ of habeas corpus and arranged for Lewis's transfer. (ECF No. 15 at 6). According to records of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Lewis currently is incarcerated at the federal correctional institution located in Three Rivers, Texas.2 He has no fixed arrangements to return to the WRJ and would have no reason to do so unless and until he is required to testify at the murder trial, should it proceed.3 (ECF No. 10 at 1-2).
The defendant, Western Regional Jail, has now responded to the complaint and wholly denies Lewis's allegations. (ECF No. 15). In addition, the defendantargues that Lewis lacks standing to prosecute his claims as they are moot. (Id.) Lewis has not replied to defendant's response or otherwise addressed defendant's contentions of mootness and lack of standing.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,4 a court must screen each case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity. The court must dismiss the case, or any part of it, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when, accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, the complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plausibility requires allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Consequently, the complaint must include "facts sufficient to state all the elements of [the plaintiff's] claim." Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). Determining whether a complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2nd Cir. 2007)).
In the context of a pro se complaint, such as the one filed in this civil action,the court must liberally construe the allegations. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint still must contain sufficient factual allegations to support a cause of action currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). The court may not rewrite the complaint to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), develop the plaintiff's legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Here, Lewis alleges wrongdoing that entitles him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, Lewis must present facts showing that: (1) a person (the defendant) deprived him of a federally protected civil right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the defendant did so under color of state law. Perrin v. Nicholson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105121, at *4 (D.S.C. 2010); American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-52, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails to state a claim forrelief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, a complaint that states plausible facts and accepted legal theories under § 1983 may nonetheless be subject to dismissal on initial screening if the defendant is immune from liability.
Before addressing the substance of Lewis's complaint, the undersigned must consider the threshold issue of mootness. "To be justiciable under Article III of the Constitution, the conflict between the litigants must present a both at the time the lawsuit is filed and at the time it is decided. Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d. 689, 694 (4th Cir. 1983). "The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation. . . must continue throughout its existence." Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997). "Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
"[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there."5 Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). ...
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