Lewiston Urban Renewal Authority v. City of Lewiston

• Decision Date: 09 January 1976
• Citation: 349 A.2d 763
• Parties: LEWISTON URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF LEWISTON et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 763

349 A.2d 763

LEWISTON URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF LEWISTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 9, 1976.

Clifford & Clifford by Jere R. Clifford, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Kenneth C. Young, Jr., Lewiston, for defendants.

Before WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

A decision of the cause now before us requires a brief analysis of 23 M.R.S.A. 3004 ¹ and the effect, if any, of 30 M.R.S.A. 4815(3) ² and 30 M.R.S.A. 4815(9) ³ on the process for vacation and discontinuance of public ways.

The question to be answered may be described as follows: May the City of Lewiston, by contract with the Urban Renewal Authority, legally bind itself to the discontinuance of a town way in the future?

We face this question because the City of Lewiston has appealed from the granting of a motion for summary judgment and mandatory injunction entered against it in favor of the Urban Renewal Authority. The presiding Justice before whom the motion for summary judgment was brought declared that the municipal officers could so bind themselves and had done so.

We agree.

Accordingly, we deny this appeal in part and sustain it in part.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. In June 1972 the City and the Authority entered into a contract for the sale of land. A part of the land included a section of Park Street. Park Street at the time was to town way within the meaning of 23 M.R.S.A. 3004. The contract was part of a renewal plan which the parties had earlier agreed upon and which the City had approved following public hearings held in accordance with 30 M.R.S.A. 4806(6). The plan called for the City to discontinue and vacate a segment of Park Street and to convert that segment into a 'surface parking area with adjacent sidewalks, landscaping and lights.'

In June 1974 the Authority petitioned the municipal officers of the City to discontinue that portion of Park Street included in the plan. After public hearing the Authority's petition was denied.

This action followed.

We commence our analysis by recognizing:

(1) That as a general rule a municipal corporation may not enter into a contract which binds its officers in advance as to future discretionary decisions. Pippenger v. City of Mishawaka, 119 Ind.App. 397, 88 N.E.2d 168 (1949).

(2) It cannot be doubted that the discontinuance of a town way for which provision is made in 23 M.R.S.A. 3004 contemplates the exercise of discretion by the municipal officers.

It does not follow, however, as the Appellants contend, that these two premises compel the ultimate conclusion that the municipal officers of the City of Lewiston were without power to agree to vacate and discontinue Park Street and thus the part of the contract which purportedly binds them to do so is void.

This argument overlooks the powers granted municiplaities by the express terms of the Urban Renewal statute (30 M.R.S.A. 4801 et seq.)

30 M.R.S.A. 4815(3) and 4815(9) by their very terms authorize municipalities to enter into agreements with the renewal authority to vacate streets. The Justice below interpreted this statutory language as indicative of the Legislature's intention to carve out an exception from the provisions of 23 M.R.S.A. 3004 whenever the discontinuance of a town way is part of an urban renewal plan agreement.

We agree with that interpretation.

As we said in Central Maine Power Company v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, Me., 281 A.2d 233 (1971);

'It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature to lodge control of the roads of the State in the municipalities and to prescribe rules as to the exericse of such control. Larson v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1945, 141 Me. 326, at page 331, 44 A.2d 1, at page 4. It is equally within the exclusive power of the Legislature to modify such municipal control to the extent of empowering urban renewal authorities and municipal officers, in carrying out their governmental function of municipal rehabilitation, conservation and redevelopment, to propose, approve and adopt urban renewal plans calling, amongst other things, for changes in the layout of streets in the renewal area.' 281 A.2d at 239-240.

We consider 30 M.R.S.A. 4801, et seq., to be an exercise of the legislative power to modify 23 M.R.S.A. 3004 by excepting from its provisions the discontinuance of town ways as part of an approved urban renewal plan.

Appellants argue that to interpret the statutory scheme in this manner is to deny the public an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the convenience and necessity of the way before it is vacated.

Certainly, the public has a right to be heard on the 'necessity' issue.

We are mindful, however, of the fact that a hearing, with an opportunity for the public to express its view on the necessity issue, was held when the renewal plan was submitted to the City.

At that time it was...