Leyva v. Pacheco
| Decision Date | 06 December 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 5491,5491 |
| Citation | 352 S.W.2d 898 |
| Parties | Teresa Losoya LEYVA and husband, Manuel Leyva, Appellants, v. Luz P. PACHECO, Sr., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Guinn, Guinn & Truex, El Paso, for appellants.
Andress, Lipscomb, Peticolas & Fisk, El Paso, for appellee.
This is suit in the form of a trespass to try title action, brought by appellants against appellee. Appellee plead not guilty, and title by limitation. The case was submitted to the jury on eleven issues and, at the conclusion of their deliberations, the court granted appellee's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, at the same time overruling appellants, motion for judgment on the verdict.
The common source of title was stipulated to be Manuel, and his wife, Maria, Gallegos. The deed from Gallegos was to the father of the litigants here, Antonio Pacheco, as grantee. There was also introduced in evidence a deed from Antonio Pacheco and wife, Valentina, to appellee, in 1949, some five years after the deed to Pacheco from Gallegos. Appellee claims title by virtue of this 1949 deed, and title by limitations thereunder on a claim of three years' adverse possession.
The jury found that appellants paid the $300.00 purchase price to Gallegos; that appellee knew it, and that the property was taken in the name of Antonio Pacheco in trust for the use and benefit of appellant; that appellant paid the sum of $975.00 to a contractor for the building of a fourroom house on the property; that appellee knew this. That the signature of Valentina M. Pacheco on the 1949 deed was a forgery (Mrs. Valentina Pacheco died in 1951); that Antonio Pacheco did not receive any consideration from appellee for the 1949 deed, and that said Pacheco did not knowingly sign and deliver such instrument to appellee. That appellant was claiming an interest in the property prior to the date of the deed in 1949, and that appellee knew it. Then, in the eleventh issue, the jury found that appellee, either through himself or tenants, had peaceable and adverse possession of the premises, using it and enjoying the same for as long as three years prior to the filing of this suit in 1954.
We will attempt to dispose of this matter as logically as is possible under the circumstances and the state of the record.
Appellant first argues that the court should have rendered judgment for her, because the evidence shows a resulting trust arose in her favor. The record appears to indicate that she testified, as did her sister, to the payment by her of the purchase price of the lots. Mr. Pacheco testified to the same effect, but contradicts himself in the record by a sworn statement issued and signed by him in 1954. In all charity it must be stated that his testimony, taken along with the testimony of others with reference to his health, makes it difficult to get very much substantial or reliable help from his statements. Appellee, of course, denied that appellant paid Gallegos the $300.00 for the lots. Appellant further testified that she paid $975.00 to the contractor, Gonzales, for the building of the house. Appellant, however, introduced in evidence receipts totaling that specific amount, issued by the contractor to Antonio Pacheco, rather than the appellant. This is a record replete with contradiction and denial, along with considerable confusion. Appellee takes the position that no trust could have arisen because such would have been in violation of Article 7425b-7, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas. Both sides cite some authorities.
It is our conclusion that the appellant here failed to establish what she calls a resulting trust. It is pointed out, in the case she cites, to-wit, Cohrs v. Scott, Tex., 338 S.W.2d 127 (St.Ct.), that the parties are presumed to have intended that the grantee (Antonio Pacheco, here) hold title for the use of him (appellant) who paid the purchase price, and further that the trust arises out of the transaction and must arise at the time when the title passes. Justice Greenhill, in this same opinion, concludes that the parties there did not present sufficient evidence to have caused or proven the creation of a resulting trust. Of course the provisions of the statute quoted above are familiar to all, in that they expressly forbid the creation of a parol trust relating to realty. In Broden v. Broden (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, error dismissed), 330 S.W.2d 674, 676, the court points out that, '* * * Third, appellant, by his parol testimony, seeks to engraft upon deeds absolute on their face, an express trust in violation of the Texas Trust Act, Article 7425b-7.' The Gallegos deed here seems to be regular on its face and recites that, in consideration of the sum of $300.00 paid by Antonio Pacheco * * * grants and sells the said property to the said Antonio Pacheco.
In summing up this difficult question, we must again state that the testimony of the grantee in the Gallegos deed, to-wit, Antonio Pacheco, as found in the record, is confused, contradictory and therefore not very reliable. With reference to the payment of the purchase price of the lots, appellant and her sister testified to one thing, appellee to another. Appellee testified that his father paid for the lots and paid for the house, and produced the receipts to verify the latter assertion. So we have here a deed, regular on its face, upon which appellant attempts to engraft what she styles a resulting trust. Taking all of the evidence into consideration, we do not think that s...
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Brewer v. Foreman
...sustained. Appellants contend that since the will was self proving as authorized by the Probate Code, the rule found in Leyva v. Pacheco, Tex.Civ.App., 352 S.W.2d 898, reversed Tex., 358 S.W.2d 547, requiring clear and unmistakable evidence to overcome the effect of a certificate of acknowl......
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Leyva v. Pacheco, A-8867
...of the property be awarded to the respondent Luz T. Pacheco. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 352 S.W.2d 898. It is the opinion of this court that the judgments be reversed and that judgment be rendered for petitioner, Teresa Losoya Leyva. There is an......