Lial v. County Of Stanislaus
| Decision Date | 11 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV F 09-1039 LJO JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | PAMELA LIAL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al, Defendants. |
ORDER ON DEFENDANT COUNTY'S ATTORNEY FEES MOTION (Doc. 32.)
Defendant County of Stanislaus ("County") seeks to recover $85,855.50 attorney fees to defend and defeat on summary judgment pro se plaintiff Pamela Lial's ("Ms. Lial's") employment harassment, discrimination and retaliation claims against the County and Ms. Lial's former supervisor defendant Tod Woodward ("Mr. Woodward"). Ms. Lial filed no timely papers to oppose an attorney fees award. This Court considered the County's attorney fees motion on the record and VACATES the January 20, 2011 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court AWARDS the County a $31,360 attorney fees award.
On June 12, 2009, Ms. Lial filed her complaint ("complaint") to allege claims, which will be discussed in greater detail below, for hostile work environment, sexual harassment, sexual and disabilitydiscrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination and harassment to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 12900, et seq. The County retained Liebert Cassidy Whitmore ("LCW") to defend the County and Mr. Woodward (collectively "defendants"). Eight-year associate attorney Jesse Maddox ("Mr. Maddox") was the primary LCW attorney assigned to the defense.
This Court's November 23, 2010 summary judgment decision ("decision") granted the County and Mr. Woodward summary judgment on all of Ms. Lial's claims. The County seeks to recover all its fees expended to defend Ms. Lial's claims against the County and Mr. Woodward given the "frivolity" of Ms. Lial's claims and her "bad faith tactics" during litigation, including pursuit of her claims when she knew or should have known she lacked evidence to support them.
Mr. Maddox' declaration outlines the following which the County characterizes as Ms. Lial's bad faith tactics prior to summary judgment.
Mr. Maddox attended December 2, 2009 and January 14, 2010 scheduling conferences which were continued at Ms. Lial's request for additional time to secure counsel. At the February 16, 2010 scheduling conference, Ms. Lial's further request for a continuance to secure counsel was denied and discovery, motion and trial dates were set.
On February 11, 2010, Mr. Maddox traveled from Fresno to Modesto for an informal settlement conference to address this action and Ms. Lial's workers' compensation case against the County. The County offered $50,000 with Ms. Lial's resignation or $10,000 without her resignation. Ms. Lial rejected the alternative offers and countered with $1.5 million.
Although F.R.Civ.P. 26(1)(A) initial disclosures were due on March 30, 2010, Ms. Lial did not provide her initial disclosures until April 5, 2010. In addition, Ms. Lial delayed until August 27, 2010 to provide written discovery responses which were due July 20, 2010.
In June 2010, Mr. Maddox arranged with Ms. Lial for a July 6, 2010 mediation. The County agreed to pay all mediation expenses. Prior to the mediation, the mediator spent 1½ hours speaking with Ms. Lial, and the County paid for the mediator's time.
By her June 30, 2010 email, Ms. Lial passed on mediation because she was required to usevacation time to attend she did not have "that many hours of vacation on the books." Nonetheless, Ms. Lial took vacation on July 7, 2010, a day after the scheduled mediation. The County cancelled the mediation and paid the mediator's preparation fees.
On June 25, 2010, Mr. Maddox informed Ms. Lial that he wanted to depose her in July 2010. Ms. Lial responded that she was available except on July 23, 2010. Mr. Maddox noticed her deposition for July 22, 2010. Ms. Lial's July 8, 2010 email indicated that she could not attend a July 22, 2010 deposition but could attend on July 23, 2010 or any other Friday. Mr. Maddox rescheduled her deposition for July 23, 2010.
During a July 1, 2010 telephone conversation, Ms. Lial informed Mr. Maddox that the County's February 2010 offer of $50,000 was an "insult" and that her case was worth substantially more because she knew the County had incurred $800,000 in attorney fees in an unrelated case. Ms. Lial's July 22, 2010 email demanded $600,000 to settle.
Ms. Lial brought several documents to her July 23, 2010 deposition but refused to allow Mr. Maddox to copy the documents unless Ms. Lial watched the copying. Mr. Maddox claims that he could not make the copies. Ms. Lial did not produce the documents until August 27, 2010 when she brought them to work for the County to copy at its expense.
On September 30, 2010, Mr. Maddox informed Ms. Lial by telephone that "the County did not believe there was any merit to her claims and would be seeking costs and attorneys' fees from her if it prevailed" and that the fees could total $80,000-$100,000 and costs would be approximately $5,000. Mr. Maddox informed Ms. Lial that the County authorized a waiver of costs and fees in exchange for dismissal. Ms. Lial responded that she was being "railroaded" and that she would take Mr. Maddox' "threat" public to the newspaper. Ms. Lial rejected the County's offer.
During an October 5, 2010 settlement conference in Ms. Lial's workers' compensation case, the County offered $5,000 to settle her workers' compensation claim and to dismiss this action. Ms. Lial rejected the offer.
On October 29, 2010, Mr. Maddox explained to Ms. Lial defense arguments for summary judgment and that the County believed her claims were without merit. Mr. Lial responded that she intended to pursue her claims but would drop her quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.
On November 1, 2010, the County and Mr. Woodward filed their summary judgment papers which Ms. Lial did not oppose. The disposition of Ms. Lial's individual Title VII and FEHA claims will be addressed below.
Title VII permits an attorney fees recovery: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. E.E.O.C. v. Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1993).
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-422, 98 S.Ct. 694 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court outlined standards to guide district court discretion whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action:
[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.
"Thus, Christiansburg should be applied in pro se cases with attention to the plaintiff's ability to recognize the merits of his or her claims." Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1987).
"In determining whether a suit is frivolous, 'a district court must focus on the question whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.'" Sullivan v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir.1981)). Cases finding "frivolity" Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189 (citing several decisions).
Factors to determine whether a claim is frivolous include: "(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits." Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189.
California Government Code section 12965(b) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs in a FEHA action:
In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except where the action is filed by a public agency or a public official, acting in an official capacity.
Unlike a prevailing plaintiff, a "prevailing defendant, however, should be awarded fees under the FEHA only 'in the rare case in which the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.'" Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 168 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1474, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 (2008) (quoting Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 864, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 (2001)). Despite the discretionary language of California Government Code section 12965(b), "the statute applies only if the plaintiff's lawsuit is deemed unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious." Mangano v. Verity, Inc., 167 Cal.App.4th 944, 949-950, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 (2008).1
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