Libertarian Party of Florida v. Smith

• Decision Date: 04 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-547,95-547
• Citation: 665 So.2d 1119
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D113 The LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF FLORIDA, the Libertarian Party of Florida Executive Committee, and Robert Wilson, Appellants, v. Jim SMITH, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Dorothy Joyce, in her official capacity as Director of the Division of Elections, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1119

665 So.2d 1119

21 Fla. L. Weekly D113

The LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF FLORIDA, the Libertarian Party of Florida Executive Committee, and Robert Wilson, Appellants, v. Jim SMITH, in his official capacity as Secretary of State Dorothy Joyce, in her official capacity as Director of the Division of Elections, Appellees.

No. 95-547.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Jan. 4, 1996.

Daniel F. Walker of D. Fleming Walker, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, the Libertarian Party of Florida, its executive committee, and a Libertarian candidate for the Florida House of Representatives, seek reversal of a final judgment ruling against their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief which challenged the constitutionality of section 99.103, Florida Statutes (1993). The challenged statute excludes political parties with less than 5 percent of total registered voters--i.e., "minor political parties"--from receiving partial rebates of their candidates' filing fees. ¹ It is undisputed that were it not for the Libertarian Party's status as a minor party, the challenged statute would entitle its executive committee to a rebate of approximately half of its candidates' filing fees. The appellants claim that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is a discriminatory classification that unfairly burdens their fundamental First and Fourteenth Amendment right to associate politically by placing minor parties and their candidates at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the two major parties. ² We reject appellants' contention, and affirm.

The statute under attack is subject to a flexible standard of scrutiny which ranges from strict scrutiny to a rational basis analysis, depending on the circumstances. Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.1992). In our inquiry we must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the precise interests advanced by the state in support of the statute, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs' rights. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); see Fulani v. Smith, 640 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), rev. denied, 651 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995). The rigorousness of our inquiry depends upon the extent to which the challenged statute burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; severe restrictions must be narrowly tailored to advance compelling interests, while "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" need only advance important regulatory interests. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063-64, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quoting Anderson, supra, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570).

The challenged statute is not a ballot access provision that ordinarily implicates substantial voting, associational and expressive rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.1995). Rather, Sec. 99.103 is merely an appropriation of some portion of the filing fees that both sides concede are lawfully collected from candidates for office. The rigidity of our examination is lessened where, as here, we move further away from impacting voting and associational rights. Consequently, we must determine whether the rule set forth in Sec. 99.103 is reasonably related to an important state interest. ³

The state interest asserted to support the statute is a desire to strengthen and encourage major parties as a means of preventing factionalism and a multiplicity of splinter parties. Such an interest has been deemed important. See Burdick, supra, 504 U.S., at 439, 112 S.Ct., at 2066; Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F.Supp. 318, 321 (N.D.Fla.1970); Boudreau v. Winchester, 642 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 651 So.2d 1192 (Fla.1995). In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1282, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the Supreme Court declared that this interest was "not only permissible, but compelling."

As to whether Sec. 99.103 is reasonably related to the state's interest, the appellants argue that once the minor party candidate qualified to be on the ballot by obtaining the petition signatures of the required number of registered voters, all concerns about factionalism and splinter parties should have been satisfied. It is probably true that the interest in preventing factionalism is best effectuated by petition requirements and other limitations on ballot access. ⁴ This does not mean, however, that the interest cannot also be advanced by limited rebates of major party candidates' filing fees to their respective parties' executive committees "for the purpose of meeting ... expenses." Sec. 99.103(1), Fla.Stat. (1993). The appellants may have shown that the statute is not necessary or essential to the state's interest, but we are only concerned with whether the statute is reasonably related to the interest asserted. Because we believe it is so related, we reject appellants' attack and uphold the challenged provision.

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.

BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion.

BOOTH, Judge, dissenting.

I am persuaded by Appellants' arguments and authorities cited that Florida Statutes section 99.103 is unconstitutional as applied to prevent minor political parties from receiving partial rebates of their candidates' filing fees. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.

1 A party with less than 5 percent of Florida's total registered voters is elsewhere defined as a "minor political party." See Sec. 97.021(15), Fla.Stat. (1993).

2 The appellants have also invoked the rights of political association and participation in article I, sections 1 and 5 of the Florida Constitution. Because they fail to cite authority indicating that their Florida rights are more extensive than those provided under the U.S....