Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conley, D-495

• Decision Date: 30 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. D-495,D-495
• Citation: 152 So.2d 521
• Parties: LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Sandy Ralph CONLEY and Thomas Edwin Hutchins, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 521

152 So.2d 521

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Sandy Ralph CONLEY and Thomas Edwin Hutchins, Appellees.

No. D-495.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 30, 1963.

Mathews, Osborne & Ehrlich, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Madsen & Briggs, Tanzler & Maddox, Jacksonville, for appellees.

RAWLS, Judge.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company brought this action for a declaratory decree to determine its rights with respect to a non-owner policy of automobile liability insurance issued by it to defendant Conley, a minor, 19 years of age as to the time said policy became effective. The insurance company appeals from a final decree in favor of defendant Conley. We reverse.

Pertinent portions of the chancellor's final decree reflect the facts, and his conclusions of law, viz.:

'1. On November 7, 1959, plaintiff issued a policy of insurance covering the defendant, Sandy Ralph Conley, for bodily injury and property damage liability, which policy contained a provision that the insurance did not apply to any automobile owned by the named insured.

'2. On December 13, 1959, defendant Conley entered into a contract with Tyrie E. Harris whereby defendant Conley purchased a 1949 Chevrolet tudor sedan. The defendant Conley paid $80.00 cash for the automobile and received a receipt from Mrs. Faye Harris and also received the keys and possession of the said automobile. Defendant Conley further received a copy of the title registration of the automobile in the name of Tyrie E. Harris with a signature purporting to be Tyrie E. Harris signed in blank on the back. The signature on the back was not notarized, however, the defendant Conley intended to have the signature notarized and have the registration changed to his name. As a result of such contract of purchase, the defendant Conley became the owner of the 1949 Chevrolet automobile on December 13, 1959 subject to the right of disaffirmance of the contract by Sandy Ralph Conley. [Emphasis supplied.]

'3. On December 20, 1959, the defendant Conley was the driver of the said automobile when it came into collision with an automobile being driven by the defendant Thomas Edwin Hutchins.

'4. At all times heretofore mentioned the defendant Conley was a minor.

'5. On October 12, 1961, shortly after reaching his majority, the defendant Conley disaffirmed the contract of purchase of the 1949 Chevrolet automobile by letter directed to Tyrie E. Harris at his address of record which letter was placed in the United States mail properly addressed to Tyrie E. Harris with a return address on the envelope for the defenent Conley's attorneys. No reply was received to this letter of disaffirmance.

'Based on the foregoing findings of fact the court makes the following conclusions of law:

'1. The defendant Conley effectively disaffirmed the contract of purchase of the 1949 Chevrolet automobile upon reaching his majority.

'2. The disaffirmance of the contract rendered the contract void ab initio, and placed the parties to the contract in the same position as though the contract was never made.

'3. By operation of law the voidance of the contract changed the status of the defendant Conley at the time of the collission from owner to non-owner, within the terms of the policy of insurance.

'4. By virtue of such non-ownership status, the plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company is, under the terms of the aforesaid insurance contract, liable to the defendant Sandy Ralph Conley to defend that action instituted against the said Sandy Ralph Conley by the defendant Thomas Edwin Hutchins, and to hold the said Sandy Ralph Conley free and clear of any liability that may be found against him as a result of the aforesaid automobile collission within the terms and limits of the aforesaid contract of insurance.'

Thus, the sole question to be decided is the effect of the minor's disaffirmance of his purchase upon the contract of insurance.

The basic rule allowing an infant to disaffirm a contract is stated in Putnal v. Walker, ¹ viz.:

'The right of an infant to avoid his contract is one conferred by law for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs of others; and, though its...