License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC
Decision Date | 26 November 2014 |
Docket Number | Nos. SC13–968,SC13–1028.,s. SC13–968 |
Parties | LICENSE ACQUISITIONS, LLC, et al., Appellants, v. DEBARY REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Appellees. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, et al., Appellants, v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Barry Scott Richard of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of License Acquisitions, LLC; J. Riley Davis and Thomas A. Range of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of West Volusia Racing, Inc.; J. Layne Smith and Garnett Wayne Chisenhall, Jr., Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of Department of Business and Professional Regulation, for Appellants.
David S. Romanik of David S. Romanik, P.A., Oxford, FL, for Appellees.
This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeal, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari–Mutuel Wagering, 112 So.3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which held section 550.054(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), to be an invalid special law. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the following reasons, we reverse the First District and hold that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law.
Appellants, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari–Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), License Acquisitions, LLC, and West Volusia Racing, Inc., f/k/a Volusia Jai–Alai, Inc., appeal the First District's per curiam decision declaring section 550.054(14)(a) to be invalid as a special law enacted without either providing advance notice of intent to enact the law or conditioning the law's effectiveness upon a referendum of the electors of the areas affected in violation of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Based on this ruling, the district court concluded that the trial court should have granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment. Debary, 112 So.3d at 160.
Effective July 1, 2010, section 550.054(14) provides as follows:
§ 550.054(14), Florida Statutes (2010).
West Volusia Racing, Inc. (West Volusia Racing), and License Acquisitions, LLC (License Acquisitions), applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits under section 550.054(14)(a) on the day section 550.054 became effective. Approximately three weeks later, the DBPR granted the applications. Shortly thereafter, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Debary), instituted a declaratory judgment action alleging in pertinent part that section 550.054(14) is an unconstitutional special law—a law designed to operate upon particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal—enacted without notice or conditioning the law's effectiveness upon a referendum. The appellants argued that the statute is a general law—a law that operates uniformly within a permissible classification and is not subject to the notice or referendum requirements of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, Debary alleged that section 550.054(14)(a) 1. was only applicable to two jai alai permits and that the classification adopted was not rationally related to the purpose of the statute because the statute would never be capable of application to additional parties. Therefore, according to Debary, the classification adopted was illegal. Debary subsequently amended its complaint to add an additional plaintiff.
The appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment supporting their contention that the statute was a special law with the following facts. At the time of the statute's enactment, there were twenty-one total section 550.054 permits existing in nine counties in Florida, eleven of which were jai alai permits. West Volusia Racing and License Acquisitions held jai alai permits that were eligible for conversion at the time of the statute's enactment because the permits were dormant for ten years and were located in counties where the DBPR had issued exactly two section 550.054 permits, which include permits for greyhound racing, jai alai, thoroughbred horse racing, and harness horse racing. According to the appellees, no other permits were eligible for conversion at the time of the statute's enactment and no other permits would ever be eligible for conversion. As a result, the appellees argued at the trial court level, to the First District, and here on appeal that two permits met all the criteria set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) at the time the statute was enacted, and that no reasonable possibility exists that any other permits will ever qualify for conversion absent a change in the law due to the restriction in subsection (14)(a)1. Thus, the appellees contended that the statute was invalid as a special law enacted under the guise of a general law. The trial court denied the appellees' motion for summary judgment.
The appellees then sought leave to amend their first amended complaint, which was granted.1 Thereafter, License Acquisitions moved for summary judgment regarding the allegation that section 550.054(14)(a) was an unconstitutional special law, arguing that the statute was a general law because sections 550.054(14)(a) and (b), when read together, created a classification rationally related to the purpose of the statute because the statute would be capable of application to additional parties. The trial court granted License Acquisitions' motion for summary judgment.
After the appellees filed another amended complaint, which no longer alleged unconstitutionality of the statute,2 the court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but noted that the appellees could seek relief under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The appellees timely appealed the final judgment entered in favor of the appellants.
On appeal, the First District held that the trial court erred in denying the appellees' motion for summary judgment and instructed the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellees.
The First District began its analysis by discussing the appropriate standards for determining whether a law is special or general. The court observed that a law is general when it operates on the basis of a classification system if the class affected or regulated is potentially applicable to people or entities in the future, and there is a reasonable basis for the classification when the purpose of the legislation and the subject of the regulation are considered. Debary, 112 So.3d at 163–64 (citing Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, 165 So.2d 762, 763–64 (Fla.1964) ). Further, the court noted that whether the class is potentially open is the dispositive fact in determining whether a reasonable relationship exists between the classification in pari-mutuel legislation and the subject of the statute. Id. at 164 (citing Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, 541 So.2d 1155, 1158 n. 4 (Fla.1989) ). Finally, the court stated that the standard for determining the openness of the class is whether there is a reasonable possibility that others will join the class in the future. Id.
Turning to the appellants' arguments, the First District rejected the argument that subsections (a) and (b) of section 550.054(14), read together, were the relevant classification for determining whether the law was a special or general law. Id. at 165. The First District noted that subsections (a) and (b) provided two distinct benefits and that it was legally possible for a jai alai permit holder to take advantage of subsection (a) while being restricted from obtaining the benefits of subsection (b). Further, the First District reasoned that a closed class could then always be paired with an open class to steer clear of constitutional challenges. This determination was not challenged here on appeal.
The First District...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Desantis
- Weaver v. Myers
- Gretna Racing, LLC v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation
- Dean Wish, LLC v. Lee Cnty.