Liddell v. Liddell, 8447.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1930
• Docket Number: No. 8447.,8447.
• Citation: 29 S.W.2d 868
• Parties: LIDDELL v. LIDDELL
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

29 S.W.2d 868

LIDDELL v. LIDDELL

No. 8447.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

May 28, 1930.

Appeal from District Court, Cameron County; A. M. Kent, Judge.

Suit for divorce by Jessie K. Liddell against N. S. Liddell. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Modified and affirmed.

Criss & Brown and John C. Myrick, all of Harlingen, for appellant.

Carter & Stiernberg, of Harlingen, for appellee.

SMITH, J.

This is a divorce case. In the judgment appealed from a decree of divorce was granted to Jessie Kelsey Liddell, appellee herein, against her husband, Newton Styles Liddell, appellant herein, as was also the exclusive custody and maintenance of a seven year old son of the parties. An estate of the net value of approximately $100,000 was partitioned between the parties, in the proportion of approximately $55,000 to the wife and $45,000 to the husband. The husband complains in this appeal of the decree in toto, of the divorce, of the disposition of the child, of the property adjustment. The cause was tried by the court without a jury, and upon testimony which covers 577 pages in the record the trial judge rendered a general judgment, with no separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon the issue of divorce, however, the court did include in the judgment specific findings that appellant "has been guilty of excesses, cruel treatment and outrages toward the plaintiff of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable, and that he continually neglected her in her sickness, and continually occasioned to her mental distress and wounded her feelings and pride, and that his acts and neglect were studied and were intended to, and did, actually seriously impair her health." And upon the question of the care and custody of the child the court also specifically found "that it would be right and proper to give the custody and education of said child to the mother, having due regard for the prudence and ability of the parents, and of the age and sex of said child."

As the trial petition covers 17 typewritten pages, and the statement of facts 577 pages, it obviously is impracticable to undertake to set out in detail the complaints embraced in the pleadings and evidence upon which the trial judge arrived at the judgment appealed from. It is as novel as it is refreshing and gratifying that in all of the criminations and recriminations of the parties neither charges the other with immorality or infidelity. Both appear to be workers in their respective churches; neither apparently having a very high regard or profound respect or much toleration, however, for the other's church affiliation. It is impossible to appraise the degree of responsibility of this lack of mutual respect of each other's religious attachments for the disruption of the nuptial accord. It is obvious, however, that this element of discord entered deeply into the relations of the parties, and poisoned those relations, as such disagreements always will do when unrestrained.

No material questions of law are presented in the appeal; the controlling issues are of fact, which the trial court has resolved against appellant.

It is contended by appellant that material corroboration of the testimony of the complaining spouse is essential to warrant a decree of divorce, that appellee was not corroborated in her testimony in this case against appellant, and that the decree in her favor is therefore without support, and should be set aside. While the statute is silent upon the subject, it is nevertheless true that the courts have established the general rule that divorces will not be granted solely upon the testimony of the spouse seeking the decree. Such testimony must be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence, or by inferences arising from such evidence. This rule is more or less flexible, however, and is applied rigidly or liberally according to all the facts and circumstances of each case. Corroboration need not be direct or positive in every case, and in some cases very slight corroboration is sufficient to warrant a finding upon specific facts. As a rule, the degree of corroboration required must be left to the discretion of the trial court, although appellate courts will not hesitate to set aside decrees in cases of apparent abuse of that discretion. We are of the opinion, after careful scrutiny of the almost interminable statement of facts, that the testimony of appellee in support of her petition was sufficiently corroborated to warrant affirmative findings upon the issues determined below.

The most serious question presented in the appeal is that of whether the facts testified to by appellee, regardless of the question of corroboration, warrant the decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony which had existed for eight years between the parties; whether the difficulties arising in their marital life are apparently insuperable, and are of such nature as to render their continued union insupportable.

It is obvious from the record that those difficulties have grown up, not from any fundamental or insuperable differences between man and wife, but, as is far too often the case, from the untimely presence, the awkward interference, the apparently innocent, but none the less destructive, meddling, of their respective relatives. The very first definite incident of discord arose from the trivial question of whether the then five year old son of the parties should go out on a certain Sunday morning dressed in a ready-made suit purchased for him by his mother or in one made for him by his paternal grandmother, whose somewhat prolonged visit in the household had grown irksome to appellee. This incident, grounded upon admittedly genuine but jealous affection borne the child by all the parties,...