Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Peacock
Decision Date | 17 October 1929 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 419. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Parties | LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE v. PEACOCK. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Roger Snyder, Judge.
Action on a policy of accident insurance by Fayth L. Peacock, a minor, suing by her next friend, R. H. Peacock, against the Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326. Affirmed.
Jacobs & Carmack, of Birmingham, for appellant.
Ewing Trawick & Clark, of Birmingham, for appellee.
The suit was upon a policy of insurance, and resulted in small verdict for plaintiff under the disability clause of said instrument.
If the complaint was duly challenged by demurrer for lack of averments of fact, that the premiums had been duly paid on said policy, and that the same was in full force and effect at the time of the injury, under rule 45, these facts being fully supplied by the evidence, the overruling of demurrer will not cause a reversal. Best Park Co. v. Rollins, 192 Ala. 534, 68 So. 417, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 929; Vance v Morgan, 198 Ala. 149, 73 So. 406; Clinton v Bradford, 200 Ala. 308, 76 So. 74; Birmingham-Southern R. Co. v. Goodwyn, 202 Ala. 599 81 So. 339; Ex parte Minor, 203 Ala. 481, 83 So. 475, 10 A. L. R. 687. These omitted allegations are supplied by the indisputable or uncontradicted evidence, and no injustice has been done by overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint. That is to say, assuming that the demurrer efficiently took the stated objection to the complaint, and that it was erroneously overruled, the error was cured as we have indicated.
The important question for decision was raised by objection to the policy in evidence as showing a variance, and by the general affirmative charge. The general proposition insisted upon by appellee is thus stated: That a clause in a policy of accident insurance providing indemnity by reason of the loss of two feet does not limit recovery to a showing of the loss of two entire feet. 1 C.J. p. 467, § 175. The disability clause contained in the policy sued upon is:
"If, while this policy is in full force and effect and while there is no default in the payment of premium beyond the four weeks' grace period, the insured shall lose by severance both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot, or lose permanently the sight of both eyes, total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist, and one-half of the amount of insurance then payable in the event of death shall be paid immediately upon receipt by the Company of due proof of such loss and surrender of this Policy."
Counsel for appellant, contending for reversible error, in refusing the general affirmative instruction requested under the evidence and the rule of law that obtains (McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 40, 88 So. 135), states the evidence was that she lost the left foot, but only the toes of the right foot, leaving the right foot seven and a quarter inches long, and in such condition that the insured has reasonably good use of it as a foot, and walks on it with little impediment all the time, though aided by the use of a spring or brace in her shoe. The physician said of this use: She could not walk as good on that foot now as she could before, that her use of it is limited, and she would tire quickly. The only witnesses were the insured's father, the insured, and Dr. J. H. Stephens. The father testified in part as follows:
"That policy was in force and effect and the premiums paid at the time she lost her foot."
While the said witness was on the stand, he called the insured to the witness stand, and she "got up and walked to the witness stand unassisted and without crutch or other means of assistance."
The father as a witness testfied further:
He then measured the plaintiff's bare right foot from the heel to the front, and it showed seven and a quarter inches in length.
Dr. J. H. Stephens, who treated the insured and amputated the toes of her right foot, testified as follows, when asked to look at the right foot of plaintiff and tell what part of the foot is missing:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Turner v. Blanton, 4 Div. 207
...error in such ruling on the pleading. Federal Automobile Ins. Ass'n v. Meyers, 218 Ala. 520, 119 So. 230; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Peacock, 220 Ala. 104, 124 So. 229; Southern Railway Co. v. Dickson, 211 Ala. 481, 100 So. 665; Clinton Mining Co. v. Bradford, 200 Ala. 308, 76......
-
Crawford v. Lloyds London
...183, 106 N.W. 168; Lord v. American Mut. Acc. Ass'n. (1894) 89 Wis. 19, 61 N.W. 293, 26 L.R.A. 741; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Peacock (1929) 220 Ala. 104, 124 So. 229; Noel v. Continental Casualty Co. (1933) 138 Kan. 136, 23 P.2d 610; Travelers' Protective Ass'n. v. Brazingto......
-
Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
... ... 1904, 104 Mo.App. 54, 78 S.W. 297; Life & Casualty Ins ... Co. of Tennessee v. Peacock, 1929, 220 Ala. 104, 124 So ... 229; Beber v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, ... 545; Moore v. AEtna ... Life Ins. Co., 75 Or. 47, 146 P. 151, L.R.A.1915D, 264; ... Ann.Cas.1917B, 1005; and Jones v. Continental Casualty ... Co., 189 Iowa 678, 179 N.W. 203, 18 A.L.R ... ...
-
Pilling v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
...148 S.W.2d 41 24 Tenn.App. 639 PILLING v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section.May 25, 1940 ... Certiorari ... Denied Jan. 11, 1941 ... v. Linn, 226 ... Ky. 328, 10 S.W.2d 1079; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v ... Peacock, 220 Ala. 104, 124 So. 229; Citizens Mutual ... Life Ass'n v. Kennedy, Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d ... 570; Newman ... v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 192 Mo.App. 159, 177 S.W ... 803; Metropolitan Cas. Co. v. Shelby, 116 Miss. 278, ... 76 So. 839; Hardin v. Continental Cas. Co., ... Tex.Civ.App., ... ...