Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 21 October 1933 |
| Docket Number | 23037. |
| Citation | 172 S.E. 101,48 Ga.App. 10 |
| Parties | LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA v. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1933.
Syllabus by the Court.
Policy should be liberally construed to effect object thereof, and provisions capable of two constructions should be interpreted most favorably to insured.
Under life policy provision for waiver of premiums on proof of disability, waiver became operative on date of disability not on date proof was furnished.
Life policy is in full force during entire grace period provided thereby.
Life insurer's refusal to furnish blanks for proof of disability on ground that no liability existed waived requirement for proof of disability (Civ. Code 1910, § 2490).
Life policy prohibiting modification of contract except as written by officers referred only to provisions entering into contract, and did not preclude other agents from orally waiving proof of disability.
Life insurer's general state agent held such agent as could waive proof of disability by refusal to furnish blanks therefor.
Written notice of disability and death of life insured, given to insurer's general state agent within six months after last date premium was payable and forwarded to home office held substantial compliance with policy (Civ. Code 1910, § 2490).
Policy provided that, upon receipt of proof satisfactory to the insurance company at its home office that, while policy was in full force and effect, before default in payment of premiums, insured had become totally disabled, waiver of premiums would become effective, provided that in no case should waiver begin as of a date more than six months prior to date of receipt of proof of loss.
1. Provisions in a policy of insurance should be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and where such provisions are capable of two constructions, that interpretation should be adopted which is most favorable to the insured.
(a) Properly construed, a provision in a life insurance policy that means that, where the insured becomes totally disabled while the policy is in force and effect, the insurer will waive the payment of any premium falling due after the date of the commencement of the disability and during the continuance of such disability, on proof of such disability to the company although this proof is not made before the expiration of the time for paying the premium, if it is made within the time under the terms of the policy as a whole.
(b) A policy of insurance, providing a grace period of one month for the payment of premiums, during which time "the policy will remain in full force," is in full force and effect during the entire grace period.
2. Where notice of disability is furnished an authorized agent of an insurance company, and a request is made for blanks on which to make out a proof of disability, which is done within the proper time for furnishing proof, and the agent refuses to furnish the blanks on the ground that no liability exists, because the policy has lapsed by reason of nonpayment of the premium, this constitutes a waiver binding on the insurance company, and the insured is relieved of the necessity of furnishing proof of disability.
(a) A provision in a life insurance policy, containing a total disability benefit clause, that "agents are authorized to receive and forward application for insurance, but only the president, a vice president, secretary, assistant secretary or actuary has power on behalf of the company to make or modify this or any contract of insurance or to extend the time for paying any premium, and the company shall not be bound by any promise or representation heretofore or hereafter made, unless made in writing by one of the said officers," refers only to the provisions which enter into the contract of insurance, and does not affect conditions which are to be performed after disability, such as giving notice or furnishing proof thereof.
(b) The written notice of total disability of the insured and of his death, given to the general state agent of the insurer not more than six months after the last date on which the premium on the policy could have been paid, was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the policy in this case with reference to the giving of notice and proof of disability and death.
Error from City Court of Hall County; B. F. Whelchel, Judge.
Suit by Frances Williams against the Life Insurance Company of Virginia. Judgment for plaintiff, defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Green & Michael and John L. Green, all of Athens, and Wheeler & Kenyon, of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
Frank B. Stow and W. V. Lance, both of Gainesville, for defendant in error.
On April 16, 1929, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia, a foreign corporation, issued a policy on the life of James D. Williams, with his mother, Frances Williams, as the beneficiary. Williams paid the premium for the first year. The policy contained this provision: "A grace of one month (not less than 30 days) without interest, during which time the policy will remain in full force, will be allowed in the payment of any premium, except the first." Attached to the policy was a rider wherein the insurance company, in consideration of a small additional annual premium, which was paid by the insured, agreed that: "Upon receipt of proof satisfactory to the company at its home office that while the said policy was in full force and effect, before default in the payment of the premiums and before the anniversary of said policy on which the age of the insured at nearest birthday is sixty years, the insured has become totally disabled as defined below, and will be continuously so totally disabled for life, or if the proof submitted is not conclusive as to the permanency of such disability but establishes that the insured is, and for a period of not less than three consecutive months immediately preceding receipt of proof has been, totally disabled as defined below, the company will waive the payment of any premium falling due under said policy during such disability, subject to the following conditions: Such waiver of premium shall become effective with the first premium falling due under said policy after the date of the commencement of such disability, provided, however, that in no case shall waiver begin as of a date more than six months prior to the date of receipt of the required proof." April 16, 1930, was the date when the next annual premium was payable, but, as seen above, this was extended until May 16, 1930, by reason of the period of grace provided for in the policy. On May 10, 1930, the insured became totally disabled. Torrance, the general agent of the insurer for the state of Georgia, was informed of this fact by Skelton, a brother-in-law of the insured, on said May 10, when Torrance stated to Skelton that the insured would have to be disabled for three months to receive the benefits of the disability clause. On August 2, 1930, Skelton carried a notice of the insured's disability to this general agent of the insurer and asked for proper blanks, in order to file proof of disability, and the agent refused to give him the blanks, stating that the policy had been lapsed by the insurer on May 16, 1930, for nonpayment of the premium on or before that date. On November 8, 1930, the insured died, having been totally disabled from May 10, 1930, to the date of his death.
On November 15, 1930, a written notice, accompanied by a doctor's certificate, was delivered to the general agent of the insurer, informing him of the death of the insured and of his total disability from May 10, 1930, and of the fact that the beneficiary held the policy and wished to have furnished to her proper papers to be executed for proof of death and disability. This written notice and the doctor's certificate were forwarded by this agent to the home office of the insurer in Richmond, Va. On November 20, 1930, this agent, Torrance, wrote to Skelton that he was in receipt of a letter from the home office in reference to the claim under said policy, in which it stated that all rights under the policy had been forfeited, and that the contract of insurance provided that, in order to make claim for disability, the claim must be made while the policy is in force and before default of premium, and, as no claim was made for disability until after the policy lapsed and after Mr. Williams' death, it could not recognize any claim under the policy. It appeared that Skelton was acting for the insured in calling on Torrance and delivering the notice to him and asking for blanks to make proof of disability. The company having refused to pay the claim, the beneficiary sued out an attachment against it. The insurance company denied liability, on the ground that the policy was not in force at the time of the death of the insured, and that no proof of disability had been furnished it while the policy was in force or at any other time. On the trial the above-stated facts appeared. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the face amount of the policy, with interest. The defendant moved for a new trial, the motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.
1. Counsel for the insurance...
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