Lifschitz v. City of Miami Beach, 76--787

• Decision Date: 12 October 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76--787,76--787
• Parties: Milton LIFSCHITZ et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 232

339 So.2d 232

Milton LIFSCHITZ et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Florida, Appellee.

No. 76--787.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 12, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1976.

Cypen & Nevins and Stephen H. Cypen, Miami Beach, for appellants.

Joseph Wanick, City Atty., Miami Beach, Richard A. Kanner, Miami, Ritter & Ritter, Coral Gables, for appellee.

Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Orlando, for Florida Association of Realtors, amicus curiae.

Richard M. White, Miami, for Miami Bd. of Realtors, amicus curiae.

Before HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ., and SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Milton Lifschitz and Melvin Schwartz, take this appeal from an adverse final judgment in an action for injunction against the enforcement by the defendant, City of Miami Beach, of Ordinance No. 74--2018, the Rent Stabilization Law.

In City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So.2d 764 (Fla.1974), the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Section 166.021, Florida Statutes, the home rule statute, was constitutionally valid and that the City of Miami Beach was authorized to enact rent control measures, provided sufficient objective guidelines and standards were utilized for delegation of the legislative powers of the City to the rent control administrator. Pursuant to that decision, the City of Miami Beach passed a revised rent control ordinance, which is the subject of the instant action for injunction.

The final judgment in this case contained the following findings of fact: that the City of Miami Beach had the power and legal authority under Section 166.021(1), Florida Statutes, to enact Ordinance 74--2018; that the ordinance was validly enacted in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 9 of the Charter of Miami Beach, which provides for the adoption of ordinances to meet public emergencies; that due to the unusual character of Miami Beach, as demonstrated by the evidence, there did exist at the time of passage of the ordinance and thereafter until the time of final hearing, appropriate and sufficient circumstances, conditions and factors to justify its enactment; that Ordinance 74--2018 is neither improper nor an unlawful delegation of the legislative power and authority of the City of Miami Beach, as it provides sufficient and adequate guidelines in its delegation of power to the Rent Control Administrator, as provided in City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., supra; that although certain portions of the ordinance, namely the sections on evictions, prohibitions and survivorship conflict with and are superseded by The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the Florida Probate Act (Chapters 83 and 731, Florida Statutes), the evidence reflects that the conflicting provisions are not so mutually connected or dependent upon the rest of the ordinance as to require their continued inclusion to make the rent control provisions work; that the ordinance can be effectively administered without the conflicting provisions; that the evidence failed to prove that the ordinance was vague, indefinite, ambiguous, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory, unreasonable or discriminatory, or that it unreasonably impaired the rights of landlords under contracts in existence prior to the effective date of the ordinance.

The first point on appeal concerns whether the ordinance is void because in fact no emergency existed and because the ordinance was not adopted in accordance with the extended notice and public hearing requirements of the city charter. The appellants contend that although the ordinance was enacted on December 11, 1974, as a purported emergency, the ordinance did not go into effect until January 1, 1975, 22 days after enactment, a period over twice as long as the minimum time required before a regularly enacted ordinance may become effective. Appellants further argue that the ordinance could have been passed on first reading on December 11, 1974, and still have become effective as a regular ordinance on January 1, 1975, while still fulfilling mandatory requirements of the charter for the passage of such regular ordinances, including notice, publication, filing and hearings.

In responding to these contentions, we look to Section 9 of the Charter of the City of Miami Beach, which in pertinent part states:

'. . . To meet a public emergency affecting life, health, property, or public safety, the City Council, by two-thirds vote of the members of the City Council, may adopt the emergency ordinance at the meeting at which it is introduced and may make it effective immediately . . ..'

We also consider the relevant portions of the preamble to Ordinance 74--2018 as follows:

'WHEREAS, a grave and serious public emergency exists with respect to the housing of a substantial number of citizens of Miami Beach; and

'WHEREAS, the deterioration and demolition of existing housing; an insufficient supply of new housing; the inhibition upon the construction of new housing resulting from the operation of the Florida Pollution Control Act, other environmental protection laws, and an insufficient supply of financing; and the existing economic inflationary spiral have resulted in a substantial and critical shortage of safe, decent and reasonably priced housing accommodations as evidenced by the low vacancy rates prevailing in the City; and

'WHEREAS, this emergency cannot be dealt with effectively by the ordinary operations of the private rental housing market, and unless residential rents are regulated, such emergency and the inflationary pressures therefrom will produce a serious threat to the public health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Miami Beach, Florida;

'NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, that existing Chapter 17A of the Code of the City of Miami Beach, Florida, is deleted and the following substituted therefor . . ..'

As clearly demonstrated by the preamble, the City found that an emergency...