Liggins v. Burge

Decision Date11 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 07 Civ. 2538(VM).,07 Civ. 2538(VM).
Citation689 F. Supp.2d 640
PartiesKorey LIGGINS, Petitioner, v. John BURGE, Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Edward Joseph Joyce, Stillman, Friedman & Shechtman, P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Deborah L. Morse, New York County District Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Petitioner Korey Liggins ("Liggins"), who is currently incarcerated at Elmira Correctional Facility in. New York ("Elmira"), seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against John Burge, Superintendent of Elmira ("Respondent"). Liggins was convicted in New York State Supreme Court, New York County (the "Trial Court") of murder in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 125.27(1), and attempted robbery in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.152. The Trial Court sentenced Liggins to life imprisonment without parole and a term of fifteen years, each to run concurrently. The Appellate Division, First Department ("Appellate Division"), affirmed the conviction on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals denied Liggins leave to appeal.

In the instant petition, Liggins asserts several constitutional claims as grounds for habeas relief. First, Liggins argues that post-arrest statements he made while in police custody were improperly admitted as evidence because they were obtained after he invoked his right to counsel. Second, Liggins argues that he was improperly denied his constitutional right to be present at trial due to his absence at pre-trial hearings discussing the potential use of Sandoval1 and Molineux2 evidence. Third, he argues that the Trial Court gave an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction that unconstitutionally diluted the prosecution's burden of proof. Finally, Liggins argues that his sentence was imposed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. Respondent asserts that all of Liggins's claims are meritless. In addition, Respondent argues that Liggins's challenge to the Trial Court's reasonable doubt instruction is procedurally barred. For the reasons discussed below, Liggins's petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND3
A. FACTS

The conviction challenged in the instant petition arises from the November 25, 1996 robbery and murder of Juvenal Borerro ("Borrero"), a 54-year-old bodega owner. Liggins and an accomplice, Jose Martinez ("Martinez"), entered into Borrero's bodega, located in East Harlem. Once inside the bodega, Liggins aimed a loaded gun at Borrero and demanded money. When Borrero refused to comply with the demand, Liggins fatally shot him in the neck.

Liggins fled the scene and went into hiding, where he remained despite his awareness that the police were actively pursuing him in connection with the crime. At one point, a witness saw Liggins with a copy of a reward poster bearing his own portrait. During his time in hiding, Liggins made several incriminating admissions to others that were reported to investigators. Detective Terrence McGhee ("McGhee") ultimately arrested Liggins during the evening of February 20, 1997, three months after the murder. Following his arrest, Liggins continued to make incriminating statements, both oral and written. Liggins made these statements to McGee during the car ride to the station house and once at the station house, as well as during the videotaped interviews conducted by an assistant district attorney. The relevant facts following Liggins's arrest are disputed by the parties.

Liggins asserts that he immediately and repeatedly requested the presence of an attorney following his arrest and during the trip to the station house. He also contends that he was not informed of his Miranda rights until the assistant district attorney conducted the first videotaped statement.

According to the Respondent, McGhee read the Miranda warnings to Liggins in the presence of two colleagues at 10:45 p.m. on the night of February 20, 1997, and that at that time Liggins agreed to waive his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form to that effect.4 McGhee then questioned Liggins over several hours during which Liggins made many inconsistent statements about the events leading up to the murder.

McGhee asked Liggins at several points to memorialize his evolving story in signed written statements. Liggins complied with these requests. The next morning, Liggins was questioned by an assistant district attorney on videotape. Liggins again agreed to waive his Miranda rights and made a lengthy statement describing his version of the events of November 25, 1996 and his participation in them. At one point, the assistant district attorney confronted Liggins about his differing versions of the events. Liggins's response included a vague reference to a previous request for counsel that had gone ignored. The assistant district attorney continued questioning Liggins, and Liggins continued to make more incriminating statements. At the conclusion of the videotaped statement, McGhee again questioned the defendant and obtained an additional written statement. Later, the assistant district attorney began a second videotaped interview. After being re-advised of his Miranda rights, Liggins asked to have an attorney present for any future questioning. The interview ceased thereafter.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 28, 1997, the People of New York (the "State") filed Indictment No. 1635/97 charging Liggins with murder in the second degree and attempted robbery in the first degree. A second superseding indictment, No. 119/98, was filed on January 21, 1998, charging Liggins with murder in the first degree.

1. Pre-Trial Hearings

The Trial Court considered several legal issues relevant to the instant petition in pre-trial hearings. First, the Trial Court held a hearing on Liggins's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. Second, the Trial Court conducted Sandoval and Molineux hearings to determine the potential role of evidence of prior criminal conduct and bad acts in the trial.

a. Suppression Hearing

The Trial Court conducted a pre-trial suppression hearing to consider the admissibility of Liggins's post-arrest statements, which included a number of oral and written statements to McGhee and a lengthy videotaped interview with the assistant district attorney. Liggins argued that he twice made requests for counsel that went unheeded. First, he asserted that he requested counsel following his arrest and while being taken to the station house. As evidence of this request, Liggins points to his later reference—during the first videotaped interview with the assistant district attorney—to his invocation of the right to counsel. McGhee accompanied Liggins on that trip and testified that Liggins unequivocally waived his Miranda rights, as evidenced by a signed waiver form, and at no point requested counsel. Second, Liggins argues that his remark relating to his alleged previous request for counsel constituted an independent invocation of his right to counsel that was ignored when the assistant district attorney continued to question him.

The Trial Court concluded that credible evidence demonstrated that Liggins had not asked for an attorney while he was with McGhee on the way to the station house. In addition, the Trial Court found that Liggins's videotaped allusion to an earlier supposed request for counsel did not by itself constitute an invocation of the right to counsel. The Trial Court instead found that Liggins's offhand comment was made in the process of defending his inconsistent versions of the events of November 25, 1996—not an independent request in itself. The Trial Court thus concluded that Liggins did not invoke his right to counsel until the second videotaped interview by the assistant district attorney, after which questioning ceased. Accordingly, the Trial Court held that Liggins's post-arrest statements could be properly introduced at trial, and denied Liggins's motion to suppress the statements.

b. Sandoval and Molineux Hearings

On July 27, 1998, the parties appeared before the Trial Court to discuss a variety of pre-trial matters. At this proceeding, the Trial Court set a September 14, 1998 start date for the trial and requested to meet with the lawyers on Friday, September 11, 1998 ("the September 11th conference") to settle any remaining pre-trial issues. Counsel informed the Trial Court that Liggins would not be able to attend the September 11th conference because of a religious holiday. The Trial Court concluded this would not pose a problem because the September 11th conference would deal only with legal issues.

At that point, the Trial Court turned to discussion of Molineux and Sandoval issues. Although defense counsel was not prepared to address the issues in full, he agreed at the urging of the Trial Court to allow the State to raise the relevant legal issues. The prosecutor notified the Trial Court of its intent to present Molineux evidence to support its case in chief. Defense counsel strenuously opposed this request, arguing that the prosecution's proffered evidence had limited probative value and was highly prejudicial. The Trial Court offered to let counsel address the issue in a letter. The prosecutor then summarized the Sandoval evidence it would use to cross-examine Liggins should he decide to take the stand. Defense counsel reserved response on the Sandoval issues and proposed to respond in writing. The Trial Court granted this request. By then familiar with the prosecution's proposed Molineux and Sandoval evidence, defense counsel agreed to submit a written response outlining Liggins's position on the relevant legal issues. Defense counsel filed responsive papers on September 10, 1998.

The State and defense counsel appeared before the Trial Court as planned on September 11, 1998. When the case was called, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Olivo v. Graham
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • March 23, 2021
    ... ... describe pre-trial hearings held to determine the ... admissibility of prior crimes or bad acts evidence. See ... Liggins v. Burge, 689 F.Supp.2d 640, 644 n.2 (S.D.N.Y ... 2010) (“ New York v. Molineux permits a ... defendant's prior criminal and bad ... ...
  • Grant v. Racette
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • March 4, 2019
    ... ... unaddressed claim unpreserved and dismissed it due to this ... procedural default); Liggins v. Burge , 689 F.Supp.2d ... 640, 651-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same) ... The ... state argued before the Appellate Division ... ...
  • Basagoitia v. Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • September 30, 2012
    ...but then rules 'in any event' on the merits, such a claim is procedurally defaulted." (citation omitted)); Liggins v. Burge, 689 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652-53 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Basagoitia's remaining challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are therefore procedurally barred. Nevertheles......
  • Brightley v. Heath
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • March 15, 2016
    ...(1992), that right does not arise under the federal constitution, but rather under New York state law. See, e.g., Liggins v. Burge, 689 F. Supp. 2d 640, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding right to be present at Ventimiglia hearing was based on state -- not federal -- law); Ford v. Phillips, No. 0......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT