Liggins v. City of Duncanville, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-0654-S
| Decision Date | 11 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-0654-S |
| Parties | LOU LIGGINS v. CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, TEXAS and NATHAN ROACH |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendants' Second Motion and Brief to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") [ECF No. 27]. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
This case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the shooting of Plaintiff Lou Liggins ("Plaintiff") by a Duncanville police officer responding to an emergency call. Plaintiff has a history of mental illness. See Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. ("Compl.") [ECF No. 25] ¶¶ 14-15. After he stopped taking medication, Plaintiff experienced a severe mental health episode on March 20, 2018, including suicidal ideation. Id. Plaintiff's mother, Mary Brown, called Plaintiff's health care providers to request emergency assistance, but was advised to call 911. Id. ¶ 16. Shortly thereafter, Mary Brown contacted the Duncanville Police Department ("DPD"), informing them that her son was having a mental health episode, but that he was not armed or dangerous. Id. ¶ 17. Mary Brown also told DPD that there were no firearms in the house. Id. ¶ 18. According to Plaintiff, this information was communicated to the officers arriving on the scene, including Defendant Officer Nathan Roach ("Officer Roach") and Defendant Robert Brown, the Duncanville Chief of Police ("Chief Brown"). Id. ¶ 19. Chief Brown allegedly assured Mary Brown repeatedly that DPD would not shoot Plaintiff and a negotiating team would be sent to the home. Id. ¶ 20.
Despite assurances from Chief Brown, Plaintiff claims that no negotiator, certified mental health peace officer, or other mental health professional contacted Plaintiff Id. ¶ 22. Instead, Plaintiff maintains that officers entered the home with guns drawn. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff does not contend, however, that the entry was done forcefully or without permission. At the time officers entered the home, Plaintiff states that he did not display aggressive behavior. See id. ¶ 28. After officers arrived, Plaintiff allegedly attempted to retrieve his cell phone from his pocket. See id. ¶ 29. As he did so, and allegedly without warning, Officer Roach shot Plaintiff in the abdomen. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. Immediately after the shooting, Plaintiff alleges that another police officer screamed at Officer Roach, "What the hell are you doing?!" Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff was transferred to Methodist Health System where he underwent emergency surgery. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff claims that because of the gunshot wound, he suffers from lasting pain and physical limitations.1 Id. ¶ 33.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff filed a complaint on March 17, 2018, bringing claims against the City of Duncanville, Texas ("City") and "John Doe," the officer who shot Plaintiff and was unidentified at that time. See Pl.'s Compl. ("Original Complaint") [ECF No. 1]. On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff, the City, and Officer Roach stipulated that Plaintiff would amend his Original Complaint to substitute Officer Roach in place of "John Doe." Stipulation as to Amendment & Responsive Pleadings ("Stipulation") [ECF No. 10]. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 17, 2020, naming Officer Roach as a defendant for the first time. Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Amended Complaint") [ECF No. 11]. After obtaining leave of Court, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is the live complaint before the Court. Electronic Order [ECF No. 21].
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against the City and Officer Roach (collectively, "Defendants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas state law. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) excessive force against Officer Roach; (2) municipal liability against the City; and (3) assault and battery against Officer Roach. Compl. ¶¶ 37-63. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims fail for several reasons. First, Defendants contend that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claims against Officer Roach. Defs.' Second Mot. & Br. to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") [ECF No. 27] 17-18. Second, even if Plaintiff's claims are not time-barred, Defendants assert that Officer Roach is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 9-15. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against the City fail because Plaintiff does not establish a constitutional violation caused by the City's official policy. Id. at 8-9. The Motion to Dismiss is ripe and pending before the Court.2
To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To meet this "facial plausibility" standard, a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility does not require probability, but a plaintiff must establish "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the court does not accept as true "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (internal citations omitted).
The ultimate question is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. It only determines whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).
To state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Leffall v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). To ascribe liability to the City, Plaintiff must also allege that the City's official policy or custom "was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted." Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). The City "may not be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior." Id. (citations omitted).
The statute of limitations for a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state. Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In Texas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including assault and battery, is two years. Id. (); Kopecki v. City of Corpus Christi, Civil Action No. C-06-513, 2007 WL 320975, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2007) () (citation omitted). Therefore, both Plaintiff's excessive force claim, brought under § 1983, and assault and battery claim, brought under Texas state law, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. However, "the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Hernandez v. Thomson, 464 F. App'x 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)) (emphasis in original). Under federal law, the accrual date for a § 1983 cause of action occurs on the date "the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured." Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Under Texas law, the accrual date for assault and battery occurs on the date a wrongful act causes a legal injury. Kopecki, 2007 WL 320975, at *4 (citations omitted).
The parties do not dispute that: (1) Plaintiff's causes of action accrued on March 20, 2018, the date he was shot; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Officer Roach are governed by a two-year statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on March 17, 2020—three days before the limitations period would have expired on March 20, 2020; (4) Plaintiff's Original Complaint did not list Officer Roach as a defendant, but instead identified the officer who shot Plaintiff as "JohnDoe;" (5) Plaintiff and Defendants stipulated on April 9, 2020, that Plaintiff would amend the Original Complaint to substitute Officer Roach for "John Doe;" and (6) Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 17, 2020, which was the first time Officer Roach was named as a defendant. Because Plaintiff did not name Officer Roach as a defendant until after the limitations period had expired, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims against Officer Roach are time-barred and must be dismissed. Mot. to Dismiss 17-18.
In response, Plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred because:...
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