Light v. Prasad
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. COA19-720,COA19-720 |
| Citation | 837 S.E.2d 383 (Table) |
| Parties | Margaret Ann LIGHT, Plaintiff, v. Venkat L. PRASAD, M.D., and UNC Physicians Network, L.L.C, d/b/a Rex Family Practice of Wakefield, Fan Dong, P.A. and Fastmed Urgent Care, P.C., Defendants. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Knott & Boyle, PLLC, by W. Ellis Boyle and Joe Knott, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by John W. Minier and Mindi L. Schulze, for Defendants-Appellees.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's order granting Defendants' motion for a protective order, precluding Plaintiff from deposing either of Defendants' expert witnesses prior to trial, and overruling Plaintiff's objection to Defendants' expert witnesses testifying at trial. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the protective order or allowing the expert witnesses to testify at trial, we affirm.
Plaintiff Margaret Ann Light filed a medical malpractice suit against Venkat L. Prasad, M.D., and Rex Family Practice of Wakefield (collectively, "Defendants") on 22 December 2015. On 23 March 2016, Defendants filed their answer denying liability. On 20 July 2016, the trial court entered a consent discovery scheduling order, setting the case for trial on 5 June 2017. Plaintiff amended her complaint on 3 January 2017, adding two additional defendants ("Additional Defendants"). The Additional Defendants filed their answers on 24 March 2017.1
On 30 October 2017, the trial court entered an amended consent discovery scheduling order ("Discovery Scheduling Order"). The Discovery Scheduling Order included the following relevant provisions:
On 9 March 2018, Defendants designated Dr. Kerry Willis in Beaufort, North Carolina, as an expert in family medicine and a standard of care witness, and Dr. Domenic Sica in Richmond, Virginia, as an expert in nephrology. On 8 April 2018, Defendants' counsel sent an email to Plaintiff's counsel stating, Plaintiff's counsel did not respond.
On 22 May 2018, the parties participated in a mediated settlement conference, which ended in an impasse. On 8 June 2018, the parties jointly moved for a continuance from the 30 July 2018 trial date. This motion was granted on 14 June 2018, and the trial was continued to 24 September 2018. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Additional Defendants on 30 July 2018.
On 2 August 2018, Plaintiff asked Defendants to provide dates for depositions of their expert witnesses. On 9 August 2018, Defendants filed a motion for protective order, requesting "discovery not be had with respect to Plaintiff's request for the depositions of Defendants' experts." On 20 August 2018, the trial court heard arguments on Defendants' motion for protective order and granted the requested relief in open court, thus precluding Plaintiff from deposing either of Defendants' expert witnesses prior to trial.
The case came on for trial on 24 September 2018. Plaintiff objected to Defendants' expert witnesses testifying because Plaintiff had not been allowed to depose them; the trial court overruled those objections. Plaintiff cross-examined Dr. Willis but did not cross-examine Dr. Sica. On 3 October 2018, the jury found that Plaintiff was not injured by Defendants' negligence. Also on 3 October 2018, the trial court entered a written order granting the motion for protective order ("Protective Order").
On 8 February 2019, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants upon the jury's verdict, allowed Defendants' motion for costs in part in the amount of $10,673.29, and denied Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternative motion for a new trial. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by allowing Defendants' motion for a protective order, prohibiting Plaintiff from deposing Defendants' expert witnesses, and subsequently allowing Defendants' expert witnesses to testify at trial.
"It is well-established that, because the primary duty of a trial judge is to control the course of the trial so as to prevent injustice to any party, the judge has broad discretion to control discovery[.]" Capital Res., LLC v. Chelda, Inc. , 223 N.C. App. 227, 234, 735 S.E.2d 203, 209 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, Rule 26 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judge of the court in which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (2018). Among the orders that Rule 26(c) authorizes a trial court to enter is "that the discovery not be had[.]" Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c)(i).
A Rule 26(c) protective order "is discretionary and is reviewable only for abuse of that discretion." Patterson v. Sweatt , 146 N.C. App. 351, 356, 553 S.E.2d 404, 408 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court may only disturb a trial court's ruling if it was manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." Crosmun v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. College , 832 S.E.2d 223, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "Findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence." Point Intrepid, LLC v. Farley , 215 N.C. App. 82, 86, 714 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2011) (citation omitted).
In its Protective Order, the trial court found as follows:
The Discovery Scheduling Order can be construed to establish the timeframe for Plaintiff to have taken Defendants' expert witnesses' depositions as 9 March 2018 through 8 May 2018. Paragraph 1 of the Discovery Scheduling Order required Plaintiff to designate all expert witnesses by 15 November 2017. Paragraph 2, which states that Plaintiff's expert witnesses "shall be made reasonably available for discovery deposition no later than January 15, 2018[,]" established a 60-day timeframe for Defendants to take depositions of Plaintiff's expert witnesses. Similarly, Paragraph 3 required Defendants to designate all expert witnesses by "February 15, 2018, or thirty (30) days after the deposition of the last of Plaintiff's experts, whichever is later ...." Paragraph 4, which states that Defendants' expert witnesses "shall be made reasonably available for discovery deposition on or before April 16, 2018, or 60 days after such designation[,]" established a 60-day timeframe for Plaintiff to take depositions of Defendants' expert witnesses. Paragraph 9 prohibited the parties from taking discovery depositions of individuals other than expert witnesses, in the "30 days immediately prior to the date set for trial to commence."
Thus, pursuant to the trial court's construction of the Discovery Scheduling Order, the timeframe for Plaintiff to have taken Defendants' expert witnesses' depositions was 9 March 2018 through 8 May 2018. As Defendants designated their expert witnesses on 9 March 2018, the time frame for Plaintiffs to take depositions of those expert witnesses was 9 March 2018 through 8 May 2018. Because Plaintiff's request to depose Defendants' expert witnesses was made for the first time on 2 August 2019, Plaintiff's request fell outside of the timeframe for taking those depositions. The trial court's finding that "Plaintiff's untimely request is inconsistent with the Discovery Scheduling Order" was thus supported by competent evidence. See Point Intrepid , 215 N.C. App. at 86, 714 S.E.2d at 800.
Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 4 merely establishes the date by which Defendants must have made their expert witnesses available for discovery, while Paragraph 9 established the date after which neither party could take a discovery deposition. However, the fact that the Discovery Scheduling Order could be construed differently does not render the trial court's finding unsupported, and this Court, when applying an abuse of discretion standard, has no authority to reweigh the evidence. See, e.g., Fayetteville Publ'g Co. v. Advanced Internet Techs., Inc. , 192 N.C. App. 419, 426, 665 S.E.2d 518, 523 (2008).
Additionally, Plaintiff's request...
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